Understanding strategic decision making in the context of international space activities

This paper argues that a better understanding of strategic decision making processes in different space agencies is relevant to the successful carrying out of international cooperative undertakings in space and that this kind of information should be taken into account when decisions are to be made on engaging in a new partnership. In this context, the paper provides a general framework for the study of strategic decision making in space organisations, with particular emphasis on the influence of culture. Additionally, it offers practical examples of how differences in policy priorities, decision making environments and practices amongst space organisations can affect international cooperative endeavours. A particular concern is with the role of national and corporate cultures in creating and reflecting differences between space agencies. In order to gather information on strategic decision making processes in the space sector, a series of 30 interviews was conducted with top decision makers from NASA, ESA and the space organisations of Brazil, France, Canada, Russia, The Netherlands and the UK.     

Leading change at NASA: The case of Dan Goldin

Daniel Goldin set the record for longevity as administrator of NASA, serving from 1992 to 2001. Active and controversial, he was unusually visible as a self-proclaimed ‘agent of change’. Coping with a turbulent political environment, Goldin directed NASA from the end of the Cold War to the early 21st century. He effected change in the multitude of programs under his aegis, especially the Space Station and robotic Mars program. He was hailed at one point as a miracle worker and poster boy of government reinvention for his ‘faster, better, cheaper’ strategy of ‘doing more with less’. But Goldin left the agency under fire for cost overruns and reforms that reached too far. Using a policy innovation process approach, this paper traces Goldin's eventful years at NASA, his policy ends and administrative and technological means. It analyzes the record of success and failure of one of the most, influential administrators in NASA history. That record provides useful lessons for how an administrator gains, uses, and loses power in the US space policy system.     

The decision to build the space station too weak a commitment?

The decision to build the Space Station illustrates the way in which the incremental nature of policy making in the US government favours short-term flexibility over long-term commitments. In making the moves necessary to win approval for the Space, Station NASA officials and their allies took actions which gave policy makers frequent opportunities to re-examine the programme once approved, and may have made likely the continuing uncertainty over the future of the station. Difficulty in securing long-term commitments for large and complex science and technology programmes has been a central feature of US space policy ever since the landing on the Moon.     

Goals for space exploration based on stakeholder value network considerations

We present a methodology that provides traceable analysis from stakeholders’ needs to prioritized goals for human space exploration. We first construct a network to represent the stakeholder environment of NASA’s human exploration efforts, then assess the intensity of these stakeholder needs, and build a numerical model to represent the flow of value in the network. The underlying principle is that as a rational actor, NASA should invest its resources in creating outputs that provide the greatest return of support to it. We showcase this methodology, seeded with test data, the results of which suggests that the most important outputs of the exploration endeavor are human and robotic exploration firsts and science data, but also include funding to the science community, providing interesting NASA mission event content directly to the public and to the media, and commercial contracts. We propose that goals should be structured to ensure these value outputs, and be written in such as way as to convey the subsequent creation of value in the network. The goals derived in this manner suggest that the majority of the value created by human space exploration derives from campaign level design, rather than from operation of transportation elements. There would be higher assurance that these value outputs would be delivered if a responsible official or entity within the exploration function was specifically tasked with ensuring stakeholder value creation.     

The US national space transportation policy: issues for congress

Below is a summary of what was to be the first in a series of reports produced by the Office of Technology Assessment (now defunct) on policy for the USA's future space transportation technology and industrial base. It examines the Clinton Administration's 1994 National Space Transportation Policy and supporting implementation plans and raises and analyses such issues as conflicts and redundancies within NASA and DoD space transportation development programs; competition and cooperation with foreign launch vehicle and component providers; US government limits on the conversion of long-range missiles to space launchers in the face of Russian activity in this area; and the effectiveness of Administration efforts to include the private sector in space transportation decision making. Some issues not covered in the Policy are also discussed.     

The Space Shuttle—Evaluating an American icon

The Space Transportation System (STS), for better or worse, has dominated the US space program for some 30 years and is now an American icon. The Space Shuttle orbiters have flown over 120 missions and certainly accomplished some amazing feats, including the deployment of the International Space Station (ISS), the launch and double repair of the Hubble Telescope, a number of classified missions for the US defense establishment and the cementing of international cooperation in space. As the remaining Space Shuttle orbiters head toward various museums, it is timely to look at the STS program in terms of key US space policy decisions that have paralleled the Space Shuttle’s often troubled history. This article seeks, from both a historical and a policy perspective, to assess what might have been. While noting the major accomplishments of the STS, it also identifies what can best be characterized as major lost opportunities and flawed policy decisions that have had multi-billion dollar consequences. In this regard, the US Congress, the White House, and NASA leadership have all played a role. If there have been failings, they have not been by NASA alone, but the entire US space policy leadership.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

Communications satellite business ventures : Measuring the impact of technology programmes and related policies

Both commercial organizations and government agencies invest in spacecraft technology programmes aimed at increasing the performance of communications satellites. Government agencies also make policy decisions which may affect communications satellite business ventures. This article describes an economic evaluation and planning tool which has been developed to assess the impact of various policies on typical fixed satellite service business ventures. The methodology is based upon a stochastic financial simulation model (DOMSAT II) which allows for consideration of reliability and various market, performance and cost uncertainties. Results of the assessment of NASA on-orbit and space power technology programmes are presented, as are results of insurance v self insurance decisions and the choice of transportation system.     

The private solution to the space transportation crisis

Confused and short-sighted decisions dominated by political expediency have been made about US space policy in the past 30 years. Overly large and ambitious systems have been chosen, resulting in today's crisis in space transportation. The history of commercial aircraft development offers an alternative example of producing in a range of sizes and capabilities for a wide variety of users, and shows that the space transport industry could benefit from applying the decision-making processes used in private enterprise. The authors examine strategies for privatization of space transportation and conclude that policy support for the commercial launch industry must be continued. NASA must be reoriented towards its basic research function, and more government services should be bought from the private sector.     

The origin of the smaller, faster, cheaper approach in NASA’s solar system exploration program

The current emphasis on smaller, faster, cheaper (SFC) spacecraft in NASA’s solar system exploration program is the product of a number of interacting – even interdependent – factors. The SFC concept as applied to NASA’s solar system exploration program can be viewed as the vector sum of (1) the space science community’s desire for more frequent planetary missions to plug the data gaps, educate the next generation of scientists, provide missions to targets of opportunity, and enable programmatic flexibility in times of budgetary crisis; (2) the poor publicity garnered by NASA in the early 1990s and the resultant atmosphere of public criticism (creating an opportunity for reform); (3) The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization’s and the National Space Council community’s desire to advance the Space Exploration Initiative and their perception that the NASA culture at the time represented a barrier to the effective pursuit of space exploration; (4) the effective leadership of NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin; and (5) the diminishing budget profile for space sciences in the early 1990s. This paper provides a summary of the origin of the smaller, faster, cheaper approach in the planetary program. A more through understanding of the history behind this policy will enable analysts to assess more accurately the relative successes and failures of NASA’s new approach to solar system exploration.     

The decay of NASA's technical culture

The ability of the US government to carry out future space policies depends upon the maintenance of a technically capable space flight agency. During its first decade of operation the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) developed an organizational culture supporting very high levels of reliability. This ‘technical culture’ stressed the importance of in-house technical capability, ‘hands on’ activity and extensive testing. Forces at work on the agency since 1970 have tended to erode the original culture. This article explains the ways in which the beliefs and norms guiding NASA operations have changed since the agency's first decade of operations.     

Evaluating NASA's role in risk communication process surrounding space policy decisions

In an effort to standardize evaluations of agency communications with stakeholders, a recent NASA report outlined the need to consider metrics that could be used to measure effectiveness over time by monitoring communications output and examining the outcome of communication activities. While evaluating agency communications in this way seems straightforward, actually carrying out such an evaluation is fraught with potential problems. This is especially true of communications surrounding risky or stigmatized activities, as evaluations of this type may lead to an overemphasis on negative participant reactions and an obscuring of those areas where competent work is being done. To help avoid this, an alternative is to conduct evaluations of the process involved in creating agency communications, rather than people's reactions to the communication programs themselves. Adopting this approach de-emphasizes the supposed requirement for researchers to correlate an individual or group's behavior with comprehension or agreement with agency communications. This paper outlines 5 criteria for such a process and discusses them in the context of an evaluation of the risk communication program surrounding the Cassini mission to Saturn.     

Space policy and the size of the space shuttle fleet

During the space shuttle era, policy makers have repeatedly wrestled with the issue of fleet size. The number of shuttles had both practical and symbolic significance, reflecting the robustness of the space transportation system and US preeminence in space. In debating how many shuttles were needed, NASA and other government entities weighed various arguments to determine the optimum number of vehicles for human spaceflight. Deliberations and decisions about shuttle fleet size reflected changing policy priorities and attitudes about the role of the shuttle. That history frames issues that may arise again in planning for new space transportation vehicles beyond the shuttle.     

Administrative reforms and the policy logics of Japanese space policy

The Japanese administrative reform which took place in recent years integrated NASDA and ISAS to create a larger space agency. Why was such an agency called for? What was the purpose behind the administrative reform? This article examines the motivations, objectives and responses to the reform process by using policy logic and institutional analysis to examine the evolution of the Japanese space programme. It argues that the reform aimed to rationalize the national administrative system and salvage the government from financial crisis. Thus, the reform was not designed to strengthen space activities in Japan, and as a result, Japanese space policy making is confused.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

A brief analysis of US space employment

Space policy is an area of industrial economic policy. The space economy would vanish without the active role of the state. Although space may appear exotic to economist, it is not impossible to provide a quick economic insight into one of the most important aspects of all economic activities - the people employed. The space industry can attract employees from other industries in two ways. First, according to individual preferences and motivations. Second, on the basis of higher wages. Statistical evidence suggests the latter is more common. Moreover wages do not reflect productivity. NASA employees earn much more than employees in law or medicine. This does not match the social importance of these activities. Space employs many more people that stated by the OECD. Taking all activities together space employs almost half a million people in the USA. $1 billion given to NASA creates up to 24 000 vacancies in the space industry and also provides room for another 40 000 in the space economy in the long run. Current changes to the US national space programme suggest a decrease of $1.6 billion per year, implying a loss of up to 39 000 jobs.     

Public opinion polls and perceptions of US human spaceflight

A belief exists in the United States about public support for NASA's human spaceflight activities. Many hold that NASA and the cause of the human exploration of space enjoyed outstanding public support and confidence in the 1960s during the era of Apollo and that public support waned in the post-Apollo era, only to sink to quite low depths in the decade of the 1990s. These beliefs are predicated on anecdotal evidence that should not be discounted, but empirical evidence gleaned from public opinion polling data suggests that some of these conceptions are totally incorrect and others are either incomplete or more nuanced than previously believed. This article explores the evolution of public support for space exploration since the 1960s. Using polling data from a variety of sources it presents trends over time and offers comments on the meaning of public perceptions for the evolution of space policy and the development of space exploration in the United States.     

A reappraisal of the Space Shuttle programme

The conventional wisdom holds that the Space Shuttle programme has been a ‘policy failure’ because NASA compromised its original concept in the face of weak political commitment and inadequate funding. However, a detailed reappraisal of the history shows that this reasoning is ambiguous, counterfactual and contrary to experience. Congressional and presidential support for the Shuttle has consistently been generous despite flawed and shifting justifications for the programme advanced by NASA. Among the lessons to be learned are the need for more rigorous congressional oversight and the development of smaller, quicker and independent civil space programmes.     

Future spacelift projection

In 1996 the NASA Advisory Council asked for a comprehensive look at future launch projections out to the year 2030 and beyond. In response to this request NASA sponsored a study at The Aerospace Corporation to develop long-range space transportation models for future commercial and government applications, and to analyze the design considerations and desired characteristics for future space transportation systems. Follow-ons to present space missions as well as a wide array of potential new space applications are considered in the study. This paper summarizes the space transportation system characteristics required to enable various classes of future missions. High reliability and the ability to achieve high flight rates per vehicle are shown to be key attributes for achieving more economical launch systems. Technical, economic and policy implications are also discussed.     

Future spacelift projections

In 1996 the NASA Advisory Council asked for a comprehensive look at future launch projections out to the year 2030 and beyond. In response to this request NASA sponsored a study at The Aerospace Corporation to develop long-range space transportation models for future commercial and government applications, and to analyze the design considerations and desired characteristics for future space transportation systems. Follow-ons to present space missions as well as a wide array of potential new space applications are considered in the study. This paper summarizes the space transportation system characteristics required to enable various classes of future missions. High reliability and the ability to achieve high flight rates per vehicle are shown to be key attributes for achieving more economical launch systems. Technical, economic and policy implications are also discussed.