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1.
In 1996 the NASA Advisory Council asked for a comprehensive look at future launch projections out to the year 2030 and beyond. In response to this request NASA sponsored a study at The Aerospace Corporation to develop long-range space transportation models for future commercial and government applications, and to analyze the design considerations and desired characteristics for future space transportation systems. Follow-ons to present space missions as well as a wide array of potential new space applications are considered in the study. This paper summarizes the space transportation system characteristics required to enable various classes of future missions. High reliability and the ability to achieve high flight rates per vehicle are shown to be key attributes for achieving more economical launch systems. Technical, economic and policy implications are also discussed.  相似文献   

2.
NASA has created a plan to implement the Flexible Path strategy, which utilizes a heavy lift launch vehicle to deliver crew and cargo to orbit. In this plan, NASA would develop much of the transportation architecture (launch vehicle, crew capsule, and in-space propulsion), leaving the other in-space elements open to commercial and international partnerships. This paper presents a space exploration strategy that reverses that philosophy, where commercial and international launch vehicles provide launch services. Utilizing a propellant depot to aggregate propellant on orbit, smaller launch vehicles are capable of delivering all of the mass necessary for space exploration. This strategy has benefits to the architecture in terms of cost, schedule, and reliability.  相似文献   

3.
Space agencies and governments have been long striving to find justification for the budgets allocated to non-commercial space missions. The most frequent justifications were scientific discoveries, technological development as well as national prestige. The current study aims to have a different look at the question “Which are the benefits brought by space?” by investigating/sampling/interrogating the public opinion and identifying the perception and view of the generation that form the bulk of the taxpaying citizens for the immediate future and will be actively financing any future missions. The study focuses on the answers provided to an online survey by an international sample of population. The target individuals are in the age range of 25–44 and are users of social networks. They are either employed or students, but they are not directly involved with the space sector. The survey aims to establish whether the promotional activities of ESA, NASA and other space agencies are aligned with the perceived benefits of this sample population. Is space contributing to what the target people consider important? What could be done to improve/change this perception? How did the public perception evolve? Which are the biggest problems humanity is confronted with today according to the sample population? Could space help addressing these major problems? The paper will firstly present the statistical analysis of the sample answers and the conclusions that can be drawn from them. In a second step it will compare the perceptions and expectations of the public in regards to space with the current space agencies strategies and identify the gaps and discontinuities.  相似文献   

4.
《Acta Astronautica》2001,48(5-12):711-721
Early human missions to the Moon have landed on six different sites on the lunar surface. These have all been in the low-latitude regions of the near side of the Moon. Early missions were designed primarily to assure crew safety rather than for scientific value. While the later missions added increasingly more challenging science, they remained restricted to near-side, low-latitude sites. Since the 1970s, we have learned considerably more about lunar planetology and resources. A return within the next five to ten years can greatly stimulate future human space exploration activities. We can learn much more about the distribution of lunar resources, especially about hydrogen, hydrated minerals, and water ice because they appear to be abundant near the lunar poles. The presence of hydrogen opens the possibility of industrial use of lunar resources to provide fuel for space transportation throughout the solar system.This paper discusses the rationale for near-term return of human crews to the Moon, and the advantages to be gained by selecting the Moon as the next target for human missions beyond low-Earth orbit. It describes a systems architecture for early missions, including transportation and habitation aspects. Specifically, we describe a primary transportation architecture that emphasizes existing Earth-to-orbit transportation systems, using expendable launch vehicles for cargo delivery and the Space Shuttle and its derivatives for human transportation. Transfer nodes should be located at the International Space Station (ISS) and at the Earth-Moon L1 (libration point).Each of the major systems is described, and the requisite technology readiness is assessed. These systems include Earth-to-orbit transportation, lunar transfer, lunar descent and landing, surface habitation and mobility, and return to Earth. With optimum reliance on currently existing space systems and a technology readiness assessment, we estimate the minimum development time required and perform order-of-magnitude cost estimates of a near-term human lunar mission.  相似文献   

5.
Remote sensing scientists work under assumptions that should not be taken for granted and should, therefore, be challenged. These assumptions include the following:1. Space, especially Low Earth Orbit (LEO), will always be available to governmental and commercial space entities that launch Earth remote sensing missions.2. Space launches are benign with respect to environmental impacts.3. Minimization of Type 1 error, which provides increased confidence in the experimental outcome, is the best way to assess the significance of environmental change.4. Large-area remote sensing investigations, i.e. national, continental, global studies, are best done from space.5. National space missions should trump international, cooperative space missions to ensure national control and distribution of the data products.At best, all of these points are arguable, and in some cases, they're wrong. Development of observational space systems that are compatible with sustainability principles should be a primary concern when Earth remote sensing space systems are envisioned, designed, and launched. The discussion is based on the hypothesis that reducing the environmental impacts of the data acquisition step, which is at the very beginning of the information stream leading to decision and action, will enhance coherence in the information stream and strengthen the capacity of measurement processes to meet their stated functional goal, i.e. sustainable management of Earth resources. We suggest that unconventional points of view should be adopted and when appropriate, remedial measures considered that could help to reduce the environmental footprint of space remote sensing and of Earth observation and monitoring systems in general. This article discusses these five assumptions in the context of sustainable management of Earth's resources. Taking each assumption in turn, we find the following:(1) Space debris may limit access to Low Earth Orbit over the next decades.(2) Relatively speaking, given that they're rare event, space launches may be benign, but study is merited on upper stratospheric and exospheric layers given the chemical activity associated with rocket combustion by-products.(3) Minimization of Type II error should be considered in situations where minimization of Type I error greatly hampers or precludes our ability to correct the environmental condition being studied.(4) In certain situations, airborne collects may be less expensive and more environmentally benign, and comparative studies should be done to determine which path is wisest.(5) International cooperation and data sharing will reduce instrument and launch costs and mission redundancy. Given fiscal concerns of most of the major space agencies – e.g. NASA, ESA, CNES – it seems prudent to combine resources.  相似文献   

6.
In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.  相似文献   

7.
《Acta Astronautica》2001,48(5-12):869-883
Improvements in the safety, reliability and affordability of current and future space transportation systems must be achieved if NASA is to perform its mission and if the U.S. space industry is to reach its full potential. In response to Presidential Policy in 1994, NASA, working with our industrial partners, initiated several efforts including the X-33, X-34, X-37 and Advanced Space Transportation programs with the goal of demonstrating the technologies that could enable these goals. We have learned that emerging technologies will enable the needed advancements but that more development along multiple, competing paths is needed. We have learned that developing requirements diligently and in partnership with industry will allow us to better converge with commercial capabilities. We have learned that commercial markets are not growing as fast as projected earlier, but there are still possibilities in the near-term to pursue alternate paths that can make access to space more robust. The goal of transitioning NASA's space transportation needs to commercial launch vehicles remains the key aim of our efforts and will require additional investment to reduce business and technical risks to acceptable levels.  相似文献   

8.
Since the beginning space was an exclusive domain of public organizations, the role of privates is becoming more and more important, and not only in commercial activities. However, the main international treaties dealing with this subject are still based on the assumption that space activities are mostly reserved to states. In the last decade the idea that the role of privates could include the management of space infrastructures and launch vehicles gained support and now private launch services are a reality. An even wider role of privates is now advocated and private exploration and exploitation missions are discussed. This requires that space activity in general can generate an attractive return and those business models are identified.  相似文献   

9.
Below is a summary of what was to be the first in a series of reports produced by the Office of Technology Assessment (now defunct) on policy for the USA's future space transportation technology and industrial base. It examines the Clinton Administration's 1994 National Space Transportation Policy and supporting implementation plans and raises and analyses such issues as conflicts and redundancies within NASA and DoD space transportation development programs; competition and cooperation with foreign launch vehicle and component providers; US government limits on the conversion of long-range missiles to space launchers in the face of Russian activity in this area; and the effectiveness of Administration efforts to include the private sector in space transportation decision making. Some issues not covered in the Policy are also discussed.  相似文献   

10.
《Acta Astronautica》2008,62(11-12):1076-1084
Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.  相似文献   

11.
Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.  相似文献   

12.
The Discovery Program is a rarity in the history of NASA solar system exploration: a reform program that has survived and continued to be influential. This article examines its emergence between 1989 and 1993, largely as the result of the intervention of two people: Stamatios “Tom” Krimigis of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), and Wesley Huntress of NASA, who was Division Director of Solar System Exploration 1990–92 and the Associate Administrator for Space Science 1992–98. Krimigis drew on his leadership experience in the space physics community and his knowledge of its Explorer program to propose that it was possible to create new missions to the inner solar system for a fraction of the existing costs. He continued to push that idea for the next two years, but it took the influence of Huntress at NASA Headquarters to push it on to the agenda. Huntress explicitly decided to use APL to force change on the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the planetary science community. He succeeded in moving the JPL Mars Pathfinder and APL Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) mission proposals forward as the opening missions for Discovery. But it took Krimigis's political skill and access to Sen. Barbara Mikulski in 1993 to get the NEAR into the NASA budget, thereby likely ensuring that Discovery would not become another one-mission program.  相似文献   

13.
In late 2006, NASA's Constellation Program sponsored a study to examine the feasibility of sending a piloted Orion spacecraft to a near-Earth object. NEOs are asteroids or comets that have perihelion distances less than or equal to 1.3 astronomical units, and can have orbits that cross that of the Earth. Therefore, the most suitable targets for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) are those NEOs in heliocentric orbits similar to Earth's (i.e. low inclination and low eccentricity). One of the significant advantages of this type of mission is that it strengthens and validates the foundational infrastructure of the United States Space Exploration Policy and is highly complementary to NASA's planned lunar sortie and outpost missions circa 2020. A human expedition to a NEO would not only underline the broad utility of the Orion CEV and Ares launch systems, but would also be the first human expedition to an interplanetary body beyond the Earth–Moon system. These deep space operations will present unique challenges not present in lunar missions for the onboard crew, spacecraft systems, and mission control team. Executing several piloted NEO missions will enable NASA to gain crucial deep space operational experience, which will be necessary prerequisites for the eventual human missions to Mars.Our NEO team will present and discuss the following:
• new mission trajectories and concepts;
• operational command and control considerations;
• expected science, operational, resource utilization, and impact mitigation returns; and
• continued exploration momentum and future Mars exploration benefits.
Keywords: NASA; Human spaceflight; NEO; Near-Earth asteroid; Orion spacecraft; Constellation program; Deep space  相似文献   

14.
This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.  相似文献   

15.
Joseph N. Pelton   《Space Policy》2010,26(4):246-248
The Space Transportation System (STS), for better or worse, has dominated the US space program for some 30 years and is now an American icon. The Space Shuttle orbiters have flown over 120 missions and certainly accomplished some amazing feats, including the deployment of the International Space Station (ISS), the launch and double repair of the Hubble Telescope, a number of classified missions for the US defense establishment and the cementing of international cooperation in space. As the remaining Space Shuttle orbiters head toward various museums, it is timely to look at the STS program in terms of key US space policy decisions that have paralleled the Space Shuttle’s often troubled history. This article seeks, from both a historical and a policy perspective, to assess what might have been. While noting the major accomplishments of the STS, it also identifies what can best be characterized as major lost opportunities and flawed policy decisions that have had multi-billion dollar consequences. In this regard, the US Congress, the White House, and NASA leadership have all played a role. If there have been failings, they have not been by NASA alone, but the entire US space policy leadership.  相似文献   

16.
《Acta Astronautica》2010,66(11-12):1689-1697
In late 2006, NASA's Constellation Program sponsored a study to examine the feasibility of sending a piloted Orion spacecraft to a near-Earth object. NEOs are asteroids or comets that have perihelion distances less than or equal to 1.3 astronomical units, and can have orbits that cross that of the Earth. Therefore, the most suitable targets for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) are those NEOs in heliocentric orbits similar to Earth's (i.e. low inclination and low eccentricity). One of the significant advantages of this type of mission is that it strengthens and validates the foundational infrastructure of the United States Space Exploration Policy and is highly complementary to NASA's planned lunar sortie and outpost missions circa 2020. A human expedition to a NEO would not only underline the broad utility of the Orion CEV and Ares launch systems, but would also be the first human expedition to an interplanetary body beyond the Earth–Moon system. These deep space operations will present unique challenges not present in lunar missions for the onboard crew, spacecraft systems, and mission control team. Executing several piloted NEO missions will enable NASA to gain crucial deep space operational experience, which will be necessary prerequisites for the eventual human missions to Mars.Our NEO team will present and discuss the following:
  • •new mission trajectories and concepts;
  • •operational command and control considerations;
  • •expected science, operational, resource utilization, and impact mitigation returns; and
  • •continued exploration momentum and future Mars exploration benefits.
  相似文献   

17.
我国航天运输系统60年发展回顾   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
航天运输系统包括一次性运载火箭、重复使用运载器、轨道转移运载器3个领域,目前一次性运载火箭仍是我国满足进入空间需求的主体。我国运载火箭起步于20世纪60年代,经过半个世纪的发展,共研制了17种运载火箭、9种上面级,具备发射低、中、高不同轨道和不同有效载荷的能力。对我国航天运输系统60年发展历程和主要成就与不足进行了总结。  相似文献   

18.
Confused and short-sighted decisions dominated by political expediency have been made about US space policy in the past 30 years. Overly large and ambitious systems have been chosen, resulting in today's crisis in space transportation. The history of commercial aircraft development offers an alternative example of producing in a range of sizes and capabilities for a wide variety of users, and shows that the space transport industry could benefit from applying the decision-making processes used in private enterprise. The authors examine strategies for privatization of space transportation and conclude that policy support for the commercial launch industry must be continued. NASA must be reoriented towards its basic research function, and more government services should be bought from the private sector.  相似文献   

19.
On June 25, 2016, the Long March 7(LM-7) launch vehicle completed its maiden flight successfully. LM-7, as a new generation of medium and basic launch vehicle based on the design concepts of non-toxic and nonpolluting, was developed for the purpose of launching a cargo spacecraft to the Chinese space station. Based on the experience on launching cargo spacecraft and satellites, LM-7 can be adapted for mainstream satellite launch missions in the future with its characteristics of serialization and continuous optimization. LM-7 is expected to be used to launch manned spacecraft in the future. This paper presents a general review of LM-7 with regard to the general scheme and provides references for the development prospects of a medium launch vehicle series in China.  相似文献   

20.
李文龙  李平  邹宇 《宇航学报》2015,36(3):243-252
为研究烃类推进剂航天动力技术在中国的后续发展和未来应用方向,对比分析煤油、甲烷和丙烷等典型烃类推进剂的物理化学性质和应用特性,简要介绍烃类推进剂航天动力在一次性运载火箭、可重复使用运载器、高性能上面级推进、无毒空间推进和吸气式推进领域的发展动态及应用状况。当前国内外航天动力系统的发展和应用情况表明,以液氧煤油发动机和液氧甲烷发动机为代表的烃类推进剂航天动力将引领未来高性能低成本航天推进系统的发展趋势,依照中国液氧/烃火箭发动机的研制进展和技术水平,以其为核心的新型动力体系在中国未来的天地往返、载人登月和深空探测等多任务适应性方面具有良好应用前景。  相似文献   

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