The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

Leadership in space transportation

Rather than aiming at overall preemenence in space, as in the past, it is important for the USA now to specify goals and objectives for its space programme. In the space transportation market, the USA faces long-term competition. Planned properly, the Space Shuttle, Space Station and transfer stages can be used as a unique transport system, forcing other suppliers to compete on US terms. Such a total transport service system could also include ELV support. In entering into international space agreements, the government must take into account the objective of maintaining the competitiveness of the US commercial sector.     

One hundred US EVAs: a perspective on spacewalks

In the 36 years between June 1965 and February 2001, the US human space flight program has conducted 100 spacewalks, or extravehicular activities (EVAs), as NASA officially calls them. EVA occurs when astronauts wearing spacesuits travel outside their protective spacecraft to perform tasks in the space vacuum environment. US EVA started with pioneering feasibility tests during the Gemini Program. The Apollo Program required sending astronauts to the moon and performing EVA to explore the lunar surface. EVA supported scientific mission objectives of the Skylab program, but may be best remembered for repairing launch damage to the vehicle and thus saving the program. EVA capability on Shuttle was initially planned to be a kit that could be flown at will, and was primarily intended for coping with vehicle return emergencies. The Skylab emergency and the pivotal role of EVA in salvaging that program quickly promoted Shuttle EVA to an essential element for achieving mission objectives, including retrieving satellites and developing techniques to assemble and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). Now, EVA is supporting assembly of ISS. This paper highlights development of US EVA capability within the context of the overarching mission objectives of the US human space flight program.     

The space station and Mars

This article presents a plan for reconfiguring the US-international Space Station, which could be used to undertake exploration of Mars. The author believes that there is an urgent need to give a unified purpose to the US Shuttle, Space Station and space science activities, and that planning for an international Mars sample return mission along the lines outlined here could start the US space programme moving again within budgetary requirements.     

The Space Shuttle—Evaluating an American icon

The Space Transportation System (STS), for better or worse, has dominated the US space program for some 30 years and is now an American icon. The Space Shuttle orbiters have flown over 120 missions and certainly accomplished some amazing feats, including the deployment of the International Space Station (ISS), the launch and double repair of the Hubble Telescope, a number of classified missions for the US defense establishment and the cementing of international cooperation in space. As the remaining Space Shuttle orbiters head toward various museums, it is timely to look at the STS program in terms of key US space policy decisions that have paralleled the Space Shuttle’s often troubled history. This article seeks, from both a historical and a policy perspective, to assess what might have been. While noting the major accomplishments of the STS, it also identifies what can best be characterized as major lost opportunities and flawed policy decisions that have had multi-billion dollar consequences. In this regard, the US Congress, the White House, and NASA leadership have all played a role. If there have been failings, they have not been by NASA alone, but the entire US space policy leadership.     

A reappraisal of the Space Shuttle programme

The conventional wisdom holds that the Space Shuttle programme has been a ‘policy failure’ because NASA compromised its original concept in the face of weak political commitment and inadequate funding. However, a detailed reappraisal of the history shows that this reasoning is ambiguous, counterfactual and contrary to experience. Congressional and presidential support for the Shuttle has consistently been generous despite flawed and shifting justifications for the programme advanced by NASA. Among the lessons to be learned are the need for more rigorous congressional oversight and the development of smaller, quicker and independent civil space programmes.     

Competing for a future in space: NASA and the Department of Defense

Although the 1958 Space Act stressed the civilian nature of the US space programme, the military space budget has grown to over twice the size of NASA's. Military influence on US space policy has grown accordingly. NASA has failed in articulating a sense of direction and purpose for the civilian space programme justifying sustained and adequate support. What matters most for a reinvigorated NASA is the level of commitment the nation is prepared to make, and in today's political climate greater spending on a civilian space programme would be unpopular. The USA looks likely to continue to fall behind in the international competition for space leadership.     

The shuttle development and its growth potential

During the next two decades, we will establish the foundation for the 21st century's accomplishments in space. The Space Shuttle vehicle will become the cornerstone for that foundation by providing economical opportunities for space exploration and utilization.Reusability of the Shuttle vehicle is the key to its economy. The major developmental challenges encountered in the Shuttle program are typified by the complexities involved in designing the reusable propulsion and thermal protection subsystems. We successfully met such challenges and are nearing the launch of the first Shuttle orbital flight.Our immediate goal is to enter the Space Shuttle operational phase because only then will we fully understand the unique capabilities of the Shuttle. Concurrent with our effort to begin Shuttle operations are our initial efforts to expand Shuttle capabilities, extending them significantly beyond those of the current baseline system.Shuttle payload capacity and mission-duration capabilities are to increase considerably during the next decade. Just as present Shuttle performance specifications and development timetables were guided by the space program plans and forecasts of the 1960s, so will the development of long-range space programs be determined by our near-future achievements. We anticipate that the Space Shuttle will play a critical role in those achievements.     

The decision to develop the Space Shuttle

Many of the problems that the Space Shuttle programme has had in meeting its goals of routine and cost-effective access to space can be traced to various characteristics of the decision to develop the Space Shuttle. That decision was made through a process of bureaucratic politics, with little attention given to future users of the Shuttle. The design chosen for development was a poor compromise between demanding Pentagon and NASA requirements and a limited budget.     

The International Space Station: a pathway to the future

Nearly six years after the launch of the first International Space Station element, and four years after its initial occupation, the United States and our 6 international partners have made great strides in operating this impressive Earth orbiting research facility. This past year we have done so in the face of the adversity of operating without the benefit of the Space Shuttle. In his January 14, 2004, speech announcing a new vision for America's space program, President Bush affirmed the United States' commitment to completing construction of the International Space Station by 2010. The President also stated that we would focus our future research aboard the Station on the long-term effects of space travel on human biology. This research will help enable human crews to venture through the vast voids of space for months at a time. In addition, ISS affords a unique opportunity to serve as an engineering test bed for hardware and operations critical to the exploration tasks. NASA looks forward to working with our partners on International Space Station research that will help open up new pathways for future exploration and discovery beyond low Earth orbit. This paper provides an overview of the International Space Station Program focusing on a review of the events of the past year, as well as plans for next year and the future.     

The decision to build the space station too weak a commitment?

The decision to build the Space Station illustrates the way in which the incremental nature of policy making in the US government favours short-term flexibility over long-term commitments. In making the moves necessary to win approval for the Space, Station NASA officials and their allies took actions which gave policy makers frequent opportunities to re-examine the programme once approved, and may have made likely the continuing uncertainty over the future of the station. Difficulty in securing long-term commitments for large and complex science and technology programmes has been a central feature of US space policy ever since the landing on the Moon.     

RLV economics: fiscal evaluation of NASA''s reusable launch vehicle effort

The US RLV program aims to stimulate commercial development of a next-generation heavy-lift launcher and lower launch costs by one order of magnitude from the Space Shuttle. This paper discusses the incentives needed to encourage private investment — income tax relief, investment mitigation, financing assistance — in the venture and uses a specifically developed case study model to evaluate their effectiveness. It finds that an R&D tax credit would be the most practical incentive. Directions for future work are provided.     

Data on and methodology for calculating space shuttle programme costs

This report presents data on the annual and total costs of NASA's Space Shuttle programme through fiscal year (FY) 1993. The total cost of the programme through FY 1993 is found to be $83.7 billion in 1992 dollars. This information has significance for pending policy decisions on the future of the Shuttle programme, its possible successors, and interrelated programmes, such as the Space Station.     

The US national space transportation policy: issues for congress

Below is a summary of what was to be the first in a series of reports produced by the Office of Technology Assessment (now defunct) on policy for the USA's future space transportation technology and industrial base. It examines the Clinton Administration's 1994 National Space Transportation Policy and supporting implementation plans and raises and analyses such issues as conflicts and redundancies within NASA and DoD space transportation development programs; competition and cooperation with foreign launch vehicle and component providers; US government limits on the conversion of long-range missiles to space launchers in the face of Russian activity in this area; and the effectiveness of Administration efforts to include the private sector in space transportation decision making. Some issues not covered in the Policy are also discussed.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

The commercial challenge to Arianespace: the TCI affair

The question of how far rockets used for commercial launch services are subsidised by their respective governments remains highly topical. This article traces the history of the first legal challenge to be made on this basis by a US launch service provider against Arianespace, a case which also called into question the pricing of the Space Shuttle. The perceptions, deliberations and negotiations of both sides are traced and it is noted that their most important outcome was not settlement of the case itself but agreement to start serious consultations on defining ‘rules of the road’ regarding government support to the commercial launch industry.     

Identification and status of design improvements to the NASA Shuttle EMU for International Space Station application

To meet the significant increase in EVA demand to support assembly and operations of the International Space Station (ISS), NASA and industry have improved the current Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), or "space suit", configuration to meet the unique and specific requirements of an orbital-based system. The current Shuttle EMU was designed to be maintained and serviced on the ground between frequent Shuttle flights. ISS will require the EMUs to meet increased EVAs out of the Shuttle Orbiter and to remain on orbit for up to 180 days without need for regular return to Earth for scheduled maintenance or refurbishment. Ongoing Shuttle EMU improvements have increased reliability, operational life and performance while minimizing ground and on-orbit maintenance cost and expendable inventory. Modifications to both the anthropomorphic mobility elements of the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) as well as to the Primary Life Support System (PLSS) are identified and discussed. This paper also addresses the status of on-going Shuttle EMU improvements and summarizes the approach for increasing interoperability of the U.S. and Russian space suits to be utilized aboard the ISS.     

Past, present, and future: the U.S. EVA program

This paper provides an overview and summary of U.S. extravehicular activity accomplishments of the last 26 years, Space Shuttle missions having scheduled extravehicular activities to be performed over the next several years, extravehicular activities expected to be necessary to support Space Station Freedom assembly tasks and operations, and potential extravehicular activity roles of the NASA Space Exploration Initiative Program.     

Human spaceflight and an asteroid redirect mission: Why?

The planning of human spaceflight programmes is an exercise in careful rationing of a scarce and expensive resource. Current NASA plans are to develop the new capability for human-rated launch into space to replace the Space Transportation System (STS), more commonly known as the Space Shuttle, combined with a heavy lift capability, and followed by an eventual Mars mission. As an intermediate step towards Mars, NASA proposes to venture beyond Low Earth Orbit to cis-lunar space to visit a small asteroid which will be captured and moved to lunar orbit by a separate robotic mission. The rationale for this and how to garner support from the scientific community for such an asteroid mission are discussed. Key points that emerge are that a programme usually has greater legitimacy when it emerges from public debate, mostly via a Presidential Commission, a report by the National Research Council or a Decadal Review of science goals etc. Also, human spaceflight missions need to have support from a wide range of interested communities. Accordingly, an outline scientific case for a human visit to an asteroid is made. Further, it is argued here that the scientific interest in an asteroid mission needs to be included early in the planning stages, so that the appropriate capabilities (here the need for drilling cores and carrying equipment to, and returning samples from, the asteroid) can be included.     

Forecasting space markets

Space Policy is here reprinting edited extracts from two reports — one French, one American — which aim to forecast the market for space applications and launch services over the next 10 and 15 years respectively. Euroconsult 1986 edition of The World Space Industry Survey: Ten-Year Outlook gives a country-by-country analysis of policies and programmes; an evaluation of markets for space applications and a forecast of the market for launch systems. The Report on the 1986 Outside Users Payload Model, prepared by Battelle, Columbus Division, for the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, provides an estimate of demand for launch services for payloads in a range of mission categories flown by countries outside the Soviet bloc. Using different starting points and methodologies, the two reports nevertheless draw convincingly similar conclusions.