Estimating the life cycle cost of the space exploration initiative

The Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) will take mankind back to the Moon and then to Mars. Preliminary estimates of SEI life cycle cost (LCC) are central to assessing programme alternatives. SEI LCC should be estimated by identifying the additional cost to accomplish the initiative over and above the cost to sustain a ‘base’ of space activities. Results of a study of four SEI alternatives provided SEI LCC cost estimates ranging from $91 billion to $308 billion (constant 1989 US dollars) from 1992 through 2020, depending upon programme philosophy. SEI LCC will be driven by the philosophy and goals of the programme, and, given the goal of ‘permanence’, essentially indeterminate because of the open-ended time horizon.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

Magnifying our world: Why we must extend civilization to the Moon

Since the completion of its original prehistoric migration some 10 000 years ago, humankind has had nowhere else on Earth to go. The Space Age has produced the wherewithal for a new off-Earth human migration to restart, with the Moon as the clear initial destination. As insurance against cataclysmic and human-induced natural disasters, as a means of creating new commercial industrial–financial opportunities at a time of fundamental change in the global economy, and as a way for the USA to regain some international political influence, it should pursue Moon settlement vigorously and soon. However, the developing US space exploration program being designed by NASA for such an undertaking is too narrowly confined to the pursuit of natural-science objectives. There must be fundamental involvement of the private sector and of a much wider range of professionals and federal departments therein.     

Taking space to the public

The UK space industry is an important part of the British economy and likely to become more so, but it needs well-educated graduates, government support and investment. Such an effort would be aided by an educated public. Education is an important part of a successful space industry policy. The Space Education Council, supported by the BNSC, is doing important work talking to the public about space. This article argues that there is a need for more space education work and reports on the Space Education Council's recent symposium.     

The Space Shuttle—Evaluating an American icon

The Space Transportation System (STS), for better or worse, has dominated the US space program for some 30 years and is now an American icon. The Space Shuttle orbiters have flown over 120 missions and certainly accomplished some amazing feats, including the deployment of the International Space Station (ISS), the launch and double repair of the Hubble Telescope, a number of classified missions for the US defense establishment and the cementing of international cooperation in space. As the remaining Space Shuttle orbiters head toward various museums, it is timely to look at the STS program in terms of key US space policy decisions that have paralleled the Space Shuttle’s often troubled history. This article seeks, from both a historical and a policy perspective, to assess what might have been. While noting the major accomplishments of the STS, it also identifies what can best be characterized as major lost opportunities and flawed policy decisions that have had multi-billion dollar consequences. In this regard, the US Congress, the White House, and NASA leadership have all played a role. If there have been failings, they have not been by NASA alone, but the entire US space policy leadership.     

A reappraisal of the Space Shuttle programme

The conventional wisdom holds that the Space Shuttle programme has been a ‘policy failure’ because NASA compromised its original concept in the face of weak political commitment and inadequate funding. However, a detailed reappraisal of the history shows that this reasoning is ambiguous, counterfactual and contrary to experience. Congressional and presidential support for the Shuttle has consistently been generous despite flawed and shifting justifications for the programme advanced by NASA. Among the lessons to be learned are the need for more rigorous congressional oversight and the development of smaller, quicker and independent civil space programmes.     

The origin of the smaller, faster, cheaper approach in NASA’s solar system exploration program

The current emphasis on smaller, faster, cheaper (SFC) spacecraft in NASA’s solar system exploration program is the product of a number of interacting – even interdependent – factors. The SFC concept as applied to NASA’s solar system exploration program can be viewed as the vector sum of (1) the space science community’s desire for more frequent planetary missions to plug the data gaps, educate the next generation of scientists, provide missions to targets of opportunity, and enable programmatic flexibility in times of budgetary crisis; (2) the poor publicity garnered by NASA in the early 1990s and the resultant atmosphere of public criticism (creating an opportunity for reform); (3) The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization’s and the National Space Council community’s desire to advance the Space Exploration Initiative and their perception that the NASA culture at the time represented a barrier to the effective pursuit of space exploration; (4) the effective leadership of NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin; and (5) the diminishing budget profile for space sciences in the early 1990s. This paper provides a summary of the origin of the smaller, faster, cheaper approach in the planetary program. A more through understanding of the history behind this policy will enable analysts to assess more accurately the relative successes and failures of NASA’s new approach to solar system exploration.     

Space product development: bringing the benefits of space down to Earth

In fulfilling the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) responsibility to encourage the fullest commercial use of space the Space Product Development (SPD) Program, within the Microgravity Research Program Office (MRPO) located at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, is managing an organization of Commercial Space Centers (CSC's) that have successfully employed methods for encouraging private industries to exploit the benefits of space-based research. Unique research opportunities of the space environment are being made available to private industry in an effort to develop new, competitive products; create jobs; and enhance the country's quality of life. Over 200 commercial research activities have been conducted in space by the CSC's and their industrial partners during the last several years. The success of this research is evidenced by the increasing amount of industrial participation in commercial microgravity research and the potential products nearing marketability.     

Leading change at NASA: The case of Dan Goldin

Daniel Goldin set the record for longevity as administrator of NASA, serving from 1992 to 2001. Active and controversial, he was unusually visible as a self-proclaimed ‘agent of change’. Coping with a turbulent political environment, Goldin directed NASA from the end of the Cold War to the early 21st century. He effected change in the multitude of programs under his aegis, especially the Space Station and robotic Mars program. He was hailed at one point as a miracle worker and poster boy of government reinvention for his ‘faster, better, cheaper’ strategy of ‘doing more with less’. But Goldin left the agency under fire for cost overruns and reforms that reached too far. Using a policy innovation process approach, this paper traces Goldin's eventful years at NASA, his policy ends and administrative and technological means. It analyzes the record of success and failure of one of the most, influential administrators in NASA history. That record provides useful lessons for how an administrator gains, uses, and loses power in the US space policy system.     

Space policy responsiveness: The relationship between public opinion and NASA funding

Is the government responsive to public opinion of space policy? In 1995, Stimson et al. demonstrated that changes in domestic public policy were in response to changes in public opinion. Ten years later, Jacobs and Page demonstrated that foreign policy was not responsive to public opinion, and instead responds to the opinion of business leaders. This research builds off these seminal works to explore who influences space policy. Findings suggest that the public supports the idea of space exploration, while also feeling that spending on space exploration is “too high.” Therefore, the government appears to be giving the people exactly what they want in regards to NASA’s budget – more money each year – but at the same time a smaller percentage of the federal budget.     

Meeting the needs of the new millennium: passenger space travel and world economic growth

Without doubt, humans’ most urgent need at the start of the new millennium is the continuation of economic growth, which is the only means by which the great majority of the world population can lift themselves out of the poverty in which they live. A sine qua non for continuing economic growth is for the rich countries to continue to develop new industries—as they did throughout the 20th century, thereby creating high-productivity employment for hundreds of millions of people around the world. Arguably the most significant of these thus far is the development of passenger air travel from zero in 1900 to 1.5 billion passengers per year by 2000. It is becoming clear that passenger space travel could grow to reach a similar economic scale—and that no other space activity has comparable potential. The paper describes the potential contribution to world economic growth of passenger space travel; the failure of government space agencies either to aid its development or to make a contribution to economic growth commensurate to their cost; and the value for economic policy of prioritising the realisation of passenger space travel. The faster passenger space travel services grow, the more the space industry will contribute to “Meeting the Needs of the New Millennium”.     

NASA's integrated space transportation plan

Improvements in the safety, reliability and affordability of current and future space transportation systems must be achieved if NASA is to perform its mission and if the U.S. space industry is to reach its full potential. In response to Presidential Policy in 1994, NASA, working with our industrial partners, initiated several efforts including the X-33, X-34, X-37 and Advanced Space Transportation programs with the goal of demonstrating the technologies that could enable these goals. We have learned that emerging technologies will enable the needed advancements but that more development along multiple, competing paths is needed. We have learned that developing requirements diligently and in partnership with industry will allow us to better converge with commercial capabilities. We have learned that commercial markets are not growing as fast as projected earlier, but there are still possibilities in the near-term to pursue alternate paths that can make access to space more robust. The goal of transitioning NASA's space transportation needs to commercial launch vehicles remains the key aim of our efforts and will require additional investment to reduce business and technical risks to acceptable levels.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs, a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs,a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

The United Nations Programme on Space Applications: Status and direction for 2010

The United Nations Programme on Space Applications was established in 1971 to assist countries in making full use of the benefits of space technology and its applications for social and economic development. Since its inception the programme has organized numerous training courses, workshops, seminars and conferences and provided funding support for more than 10?000 experts, mainly from developing countries, to participate in those activities. The programme has continuously evolved over four decades, taking into account the latest developments in the field of space activities, to best serve the capacity-building needs of countries and to help ensure that space-based solutions contribute to improving life on Earth. This report describes the status and direction of the UN Programme on Space Applications as recommended for approval by the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) Scientific and Technical Subcommittee at its 47th session held in Vienna in February 2010.     

Data on and methodology for calculating space shuttle programme costs

This report presents data on the annual and total costs of NASA's Space Shuttle programme through fiscal year (FY) 1993. The total cost of the programme through FY 1993 is found to be $83.7 billion in 1992 dollars. This information has significance for pending policy decisions on the future of the Shuttle programme, its possible successors, and interrelated programmes, such as the Space Station.     

Assessing the impact of space on society

There have been surprisingly few studies of the societal impact of space exploration, yet the impact has been considerable, and wide ranging. After briefly reviewing what has been published, the author reports on activities by NASA to improve our understanding of this issue. In accordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the NASA History Division has initiated a series of special studies and conferences on the societal impact of spaceflight. The first conference, held 19–21 September 2006 in Washington, DC and co-sponsored by the National Air and Space Museum, included some 35 speakers who addressed six main categories, spanning international, commercial, cultural, environmental and national security impacts. For both the conferences and the special studies, the goal is to examine the multifaceted impacts of spaceflight with rigorous historical research.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

Competing for a future in space: NASA and the Department of Defense

Although the 1958 Space Act stressed the civilian nature of the US space programme, the military space budget has grown to over twice the size of NASA's. Military influence on US space policy has grown accordingly. NASA has failed in articulating a sense of direction and purpose for the civilian space programme justifying sustained and adequate support. What matters most for a reinvigorated NASA is the level of commitment the nation is prepared to make, and in today's political climate greater spending on a civilian space programme would be unpopular. The USA looks likely to continue to fall behind in the international competition for space leadership.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.