BNSC/RAS Town Meeting

In London on 20 September, the British National Space Centre and the Royal Astronomical Society convened a ‘Town Meeting’, a usage picked up from NASA. Basically it was a debate without the competetive element, whose topic was the next two of the European Space Agency's four ‘Cornestone’ projects for the ‘Horizon 2000’ programme, total budget 584 million ECU (about £467 million). The question in September was which would be no. 3 and which no. 4. Duncan Lunan reports on the discussion and the choices made.     

Pricing competitively — a response to Jay Lightfoot

A recent paper in this journal criticized the two methods commonly used to allocate the costs of multi-payload launches, and proposed two new alternatives. The paper argued that ‘Shapley-value’ pricing and the ‘Independent Cost Proportional Scheme’ are immune to instability problems possible under the traditional mass-proportional approach, and reduce ‘subsidies’ paid to small payloads. This rejoinder shows that neither claim is true in general. It also questions whether new pricing formulas are truly needed — or even sustainable in today's competitive market.     

The history of international space programmes

In reviewing the past 50 years of international space cooperation, much of it stunningly successful, some bedevilled by difficulties, the author notes that ‘space’ can now only be understood as a complex area of widely varied sectors, further complicated by different funding sources and dual-use activities. While scientists were the initial drivers of cooperation, their flourishing programmes risk losing government funding to the grandiose manned missions being envisaged. Such funding is strongly reliant on political will rather than on the merits of any particular programme, something that, until recently with the GEO, has been particularly evident in earth observations. A major problem has been countries’ efforts to secure some minor national advantage at the expense of the bigger picture. But for international space cooperation truly to benefit humanity, a greater acceptance of working for the common good and more efficient programme management (no duplication) will be required.     

The ‘Star Wars’ initiative: Problems and prospects

This article examines the long-term ‘Star Wars’ R&D programme initiated by President Reagan - the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The nature of this initiative and the research programme that has been approved are described. There is still considerable uncertainty over where the SDI research will eventually lead - whether it be a limited BMD system designed to protect military targets or a comprehensive shield to protect the USA and its allies. The feasibility and potential implications of the SDI are examined with this caveat in mind.     

Stepping stones to the future: Achieving a sustainable lunar outpost

The current emphasis in the US and internationally on lunar robotic missions is generally viewed as a precursor to possible future human missions to the Moon. As initially framed, the implementation of high level policies such as the US Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) might have been limited to either human lunar sortie missions, or to the testing at the Moon of concepts-of-operations and systems for eventual human missions to Mars [White House, Vision for Space Exploration, Washington, DC, 14 January, 2004. [1]]. However, recently announced (December 2006) US goals go much further: these plans now place at the center of future US—and perhaps international—human spaceflight activities a long-term commitment to an outpost on the Moon.Based on available documents, a human lunar outpost could be emplaced as early as the 2020–2025 timeframe, and would involve numerous novel systems, new technologies and unique operations requirements. As such, substantial investments in research and development (R&D) will be necessary prior to, during, and following the deployment of such an outpost. It seems possible that such an outpost will be an international endeavor, not just the undertaking of a single country—and the US has actively courted partners in the VSE. However, critical questions remain concerning an international lunar outpost. What might such an outpost accomplish? To what extent will “sustainability” be built into the outpost? And, most importantly, what will be the outpost's life cycle cost (LCC)?This paper will explore these issues with a view toward informing key policy and program decisions that must be made during the next several years. The paper will (1) describe a high-level analytical model of a modest lunar outpost, (2) examine (using this model) the parametric characteristics of the outpost in terms of the three critical questions indicated above, and (3) present rough estimates of the relationships of outpost goals and “sustainability” to LCC. The paper will also consider possible outpost requirements for near-term investments in enabling research in light of experiences in past advanced technology programs.     

Star wars brought to earth

This article considers the thinking behind, and the ramifications of, President Reagan's Star Wars ‘vision’. The author argues that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is incompatible with other aspects of the Reagan administration's own defence policies and that the ‘security shield’ version of it would make future US-Soviet arms agreements impossible. Only the so-called ‘prudent hedge’ research looks viable in the longer term. The SDI's main value will have been in bringing the USSR back to the negotiating table.     

Data on and methodology for calculating space shuttle programme costs

This report presents data on the annual and total costs of NASA's Space Shuttle programme through fiscal year (FY) 1993. The total cost of the programme through FY 1993 is found to be $83.7 billion in 1992 dollars. This information has significance for pending policy decisions on the future of the Shuttle programme, its possible successors, and interrelated programmes, such as the Space Station.     

A reappraisal of the Space Shuttle programme

The conventional wisdom holds that the Space Shuttle programme has been a ‘policy failure’ because NASA compromised its original concept in the face of weak political commitment and inadequate funding. However, a detailed reappraisal of the history shows that this reasoning is ambiguous, counterfactual and contrary to experience. Congressional and presidential support for the Shuttle has consistently been generous despite flawed and shifting justifications for the programme advanced by NASA. Among the lessons to be learned are the need for more rigorous congressional oversight and the development of smaller, quicker and independent civil space programmes.     

The military in space : A historical relationship

The Deputy Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff offers some observations on the ‘militarization’ of space, arguing that military involvement does not necessarily mean an environment will become ‘weaponized’. He also comments on some future US space activities.     

Worldwide direct audio broadcasting from space : Promoting ‘Glasnost’ with DBS-A

About 100 countries now pursue their ‘public diplomacy’ interests by broadcasting audio programmes via shortwave to 400 000 000 radio listeners. However signals broadcast by surface-based shortwave transmitters are limited in coverage, reliability and quality, and shortwave broadcasting suffers from increasingly difficult operating and political problems. Space technology could now begin to be employed to create common-carrier, common-user (Intelsat- and Inmarsat-like) space-based systems which could provide a truly excellent, low-cost, direct-broadcast audio service throughout the world. The world's governments could thereby use space in a new way to promote ‘Glasnost-Openness’ for ‘the benefit of all mankind’.     

The Soviet manned lunar programme and its legacy

In the last two years the USSR has not only acknowledged publicly for the first time that it was trying to ‘race’ the USA to put the first man on the Moon, but they have finally given some details of the programme, the equipment and the political in-fighting which ensured that the programme was a failure. This article traces the history of the Soviet manned lunar programme and also discusses the implications for the future development of the Soviet manned programme of the giant N-1 booster's cancellation in 1974.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

State of the art, lightweight scientific experiments available for small to micro satellite missions

A selection of light weight scientific instruments originally designed for major international missions but which, because of their modest resource requirements, can now in addition be flown aboard ‘small’ to ‘micro’ satellites are, briefly, described. These instruments have the capability to either make measurements of constituents of the Earth's energetic particle environment, or provide detailed monitoring of multiple parameters of the cold terrestrial ionospheric plasma. Scientific reasons for flying such instruments in LEO are, in each case, advanced. Individually, they constitute representative examples of a mature genre of commercially available (a cost parameter of £100k/kg can be achieved), light weight, space qualified, instruments which can contribute significantly to the implementation of first class scientific programs aboard small/micro satellites. Uniquely fault tolerant data processing units are a feature of these devices.     

From initial ideas to a European plan: GMES as an exemplar of European space strategy

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) is an idea which originated during a meeting in Baveno, Italy, in May 1998, which generated a call for Europe to get its act together in the field of environmental monitoring from space, to define a well articulated strategy in this area and to build upon its excellent scientific research community, its proven technical prowess in Earth observation from space and its nascent political will to express its objectives in international fora related to climate change and other global environment topics. While Europe was already active in the most advanced areas of global monitoring, its rather uncoordinated efforts (even within the European Commission) lacked visibility and did not appear to fit into a clearly established strategy. The ‘Baveno initiative’ was an attempt to remedy this situation and find a place within a developing ‘European Strategy for Space’, which requires ESA and the European Union to work more closely together. GMES was extended to include the ‘security’ (in its wider sense) aspects of global monitoring, a move that produced a number of questions and misunderstandings, but which allowed many in Europe to realize that monitoring the activities of the Earth’ land masses, oceans and atmosphere do include a security dimension. GMES will eventually incorporate an implementation plan which will call upon various monitoring techniques, ambitious modelling projects and connections with society's more urgent requirements with respect to environmental protection and prevention or reduction of risks related to natural hazards. This will entail significant efforts to inform the user communities and to convince them of the relevance and usefulness of this initiative. It will also provide a sound basis for the European contribution to the new initiative for improved coordination of strategies and systems for Earth observations called for by the July 2003 Earth Observation Summit.     

X-38, CRV and CRV Evolution Program Overview and European Role

The X-38 Project forms part of the “X” prototype vehicle family developed by the United States. Its development was initiated by NASA to prepare the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). The European participation in the X-38 Program has been significantly extended since the start of the X-38 cooperation in 1997 and is realized by ESA's “Applied Reentry Technology Program” and the German/DLR “Technologies for Future Space Transportation Systems” (TETRA) Project. European contributions to the X-38 Vehicle 201, (V-201) can be found in all technical key areas. The orbital flight and reentry with the X-38 V-201 will conclude the X-38 project in 2002.The CRV will be used from about mid-2005 as ’ambulance‘, ’lifeboat‘ or as alternate return vehicle for the crew of the International Space Station. Recognizing the very productive and mutually beneficial cooperation established on X-38, NASA and ESA have decided to continue this cooperation into the development of the operational CRV. The Phase C/D will be completed shortly after the Critical Design Review, scheduled for August 2002. The CRV production phase will start in October 2002 and will cover production of four CRV vehicles, ending in 2006.Based on the objective to identify a further evolution potential of the CRV towards a Crew Cargo Transfer Vehicle (CCTV), NASA has implemented upgrade studies in the CRV Phase C/D.     

Leading change at NASA: The case of Dan Goldin

Daniel Goldin set the record for longevity as administrator of NASA, serving from 1992 to 2001. Active and controversial, he was unusually visible as a self-proclaimed ‘agent of change’. Coping with a turbulent political environment, Goldin directed NASA from the end of the Cold War to the early 21st century. He effected change in the multitude of programs under his aegis, especially the Space Station and robotic Mars program. He was hailed at one point as a miracle worker and poster boy of government reinvention for his ‘faster, better, cheaper’ strategy of ‘doing more with less’. But Goldin left the agency under fire for cost overruns and reforms that reached too far. Using a policy innovation process approach, this paper traces Goldin's eventful years at NASA, his policy ends and administrative and technological means. It analyzes the record of success and failure of one of the most, influential administrators in NASA history. That record provides useful lessons for how an administrator gains, uses, and loses power in the US space policy system.     

Science in the national vision for space exploration: objectives and constituencies of the ‘discovery-driven’ paradigm

The NASA/White House Vision for Space Exploration is primarily focused on the development of human and robotic systems that will enable ‘discovery-driven’ investigations in areas important to the scientific community: Mars, the solar system's outer moons, and planets orbiting other stars. Such a portfolio can only be realized if NASA is prepared to target investment at opportunities that are most scientifically compelling. NASA's leaders will have to make decisions in subjective and uncertain environments about the relative long-term value of different kinds of scientific discoveries seen as equally important to different groups. A management paradigm of this kind will imply assessment of heterogeneous priorities and management of interdependent and changing requirements. In order to identify the basis and implications of a ‘discovery-driven’ paradigm, this paper surveys the relationship between the Vision's principles and its programmatic content, the objectives of the Vision's scientific focus areas and their interrelationships, and the public context in which science-focused exploration will proceed.     

Remote sensing of natural resources : Legal and political considerations for the Third World

A state's posture on remote sensing of the Earth by orbiting satellites varies depending upon whether it is a ‘sensing’ or a ‘sensed’ state, upon its present economic status, and upon its economic and political history. This article considers the international legal questions related to remote sensing and discusses the political aspects with special emphasis upon the views of the Third World. The author concludes that, unless Third World states and others who support them alter their views somewhat, it is probable that remote sensing of natural resources will continue without specific legal guidelines.     

Reconstituting the US space programme

This response to Alex Roland's article, ‘Priorities in space for the USA’, argues that his analysis and conclusions are based on shaky historical evidence. Professor Roland's interpretation of NASA's priorities since 1959 is challenged, and it is pointed out that the manned spaceflight programme has widespread support in the USA. The most important issue, raised by the article but not treated extensively enough, is whether the pursuit of the widely accepted emphasis on manned spaceflight is a large-scale societal mistake.     

It''s all a matter of fact. After all, fact matters

The fourth annual ‘British Rocketry Oral History Project’ (BROHP) conference was held from 2 to 4 April 2002, again in the magnificent grounds of Charterhouse School in Surrey. The conference marked a new point in its brief history, enlarged in scope and depth to extend to a new audience; yet one point remained constant throughout, namely that ‘history matters’. This report discusses the themes of the 2002 conference.