空间充气展开结构的材料成型固化技术综述

空间充气展开结构的体积小,质量轻,可用于构建大型空间结构,在航天领域具有广阔的应用前景。空间充气展开结构需要采用柔性材料,通过充气展开成型固化使柔性材料具有足够的强度和刚度。成型固化是研制空间充气展开结构的关键技术之一,文章介绍了四种成型固化技术：铝／聚合物薄膜成型固化技术、热成型固化技术、热塑性／形状记忆成型固化技术和紫外线成型固化技术。通过分析,认为在目前条件下铝／聚合物薄膜成型固化技术更接近于空间充气展开结构的实际应用。     

The Mars Sample Return Project.

The Mars Sample Return (MSR) Project is underway. A 2003 mission to be launched on a Delta III Class vehicle and a 2005 mission launched on an Ariane 5 will culminate in carefully selected Mars samples arriving on Earth in 2008. NASA is the lead agency and will provide the Mars landed elements, namely, landers, rovers, and Mars ascent vehicles (MAVs). The French Space Agency CNES is the largest international partner and will provide for the joint NASA/CNES 2005 Mission the Ariane 5 launch and the Earth Return Mars Orbiter that will capture the sample canisters from the Mars parking orbits the MAVs place them in. The sample canisters will be returned to Earth aboard the CNES Orbiter in the Earth Entry Vehicles provided by NASA. Other national space agencies are also expected to participate in substantial roles. Italy is planning to provide a drill that will operate from the Landers to provide subsurface samples. Other experiments in addition to the MSR payload will also be carried on the Landers. This paper will present the current status of the design of the MSR missions and flight articles.     

Mars Direct: Humans to the red planet by 1999

“Mars Direct”, is an approach to the space Exploration Initiative that allows for the rapid initiation of manned Mars exploration, possibly as early as 1999. The approach does not require any on-orbit assembly or refueling or any support from the Space Station or other orbital infrastructure. Furthermore, the Mars Direct plan is not merely a “flags and footprints” one-shot expedition, but puts into place immediately an economical method of Earth-Mars transportation, real surface exploratory mobility, and significant base capabilities that can evolve into a mostly self-sufficient Mars settlement. This paper presents both the initial and evolutionary phases of the Mars Direct plan. In the initial phase, only chemical propulsion is used, sendig 4 persons on conjunction class Mars exploratory missions. Two heavy lift booster launches are required to support each mission. The first launch delivers an unfueled Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) to the martian surface, where it fills itself with methane/oxygen bipropellant manufactured primarily out of indigenous resources. After propellant production is completed, a second launch delivers the crew to the prepared site, where they conduct regional exploration for 1.5 years and then return directly to Earth in the ERV. In the second phase of Mars Direct, nuclear thermal propulsion is used to cut crew transit times in half, increase cargo delivery capacity, and to create the potential for true global mobility through the use of CO₂ propelled ballistic hopping vehicles (“NIMFs”). In this paper we present both phases of the Mars Direct plan, including mission architecture, vehicle designs, and exploratory strategy leading to the establishment of a 48 person permanent Mars base. Some speculative thoughts on the possibility of actually colonizing Mars are also presented.     

The US national space transportation policy: issues for congress

Below is a summary of what was to be the first in a series of reports produced by the Office of Technology Assessment (now defunct) on policy for the USA's future space transportation technology and industrial base. It examines the Clinton Administration's 1994 National Space Transportation Policy and supporting implementation plans and raises and analyses such issues as conflicts and redundancies within NASA and DoD space transportation development programs; competition and cooperation with foreign launch vehicle and component providers; US government limits on the conversion of long-range missiles to space launchers in the face of Russian activity in this area; and the effectiveness of Administration efforts to include the private sector in space transportation decision making. Some issues not covered in the Policy are also discussed.     

NASA's integrated space transportation plan

Improvements in the safety, reliability and affordability of current and future space transportation systems must be achieved if NASA is to perform its mission and if the U.S. space industry is to reach its full potential. In response to Presidential Policy in 1994, NASA, working with our industrial partners, initiated several efforts including the X-33, X-34, X-37 and Advanced Space Transportation programs with the goal of demonstrating the technologies that could enable these goals. We have learned that emerging technologies will enable the needed advancements but that more development along multiple, competing paths is needed. We have learned that developing requirements diligently and in partnership with industry will allow us to better converge with commercial capabilities. We have learned that commercial markets are not growing as fast as projected earlier, but there are still possibilities in the near-term to pursue alternate paths that can make access to space more robust. The goal of transitioning NASA's space transportation needs to commercial launch vehicles remains the key aim of our efforts and will require additional investment to reduce business and technical risks to acceptable levels.     

Omicron space habitat—research stage II

The design presented in this paper is in response to the revolution in private space activities, the increasing public interest in commercial flights to space and the utilization of structures such as space hotels or private orbital habitats. The baseline for the Omicron design concept is the Russian Salyut derived space station module. Salyut was the first space station to orbit the Earth. Its unique design and technical features were what made the development of space stations Salyut 1–7, MIR and the International Space Station (ISS) Zwezda service module possible. Due to its versatility and the reliable operating launch vehicle Proton, this space module series has the potential to be adapted for space hotel development. This paper proposes a conceptual design of the space habitat called Omicron, with particular focus on interior design for the microgravity environment. The Omicron concepts address the needs of space tourism with a strong emphasis on the safety and comfort of the spaceflight participants. The Omicron habitat supports three inhabitants in nominal conditions (e.g., two passengers and one astronaut). The habitat provides a flexible interior, facilities and spaces dynamically transforming in order to accommodate various types of activities, which will be performed in an organically formed interior supporting spatial orientation and movement in microgravity. The future development potential of Omicron is also considered. The baseline version is composed solely of one rigid module with an inverted cupola for observations. An alternative version offers more space using an inflatable structure. Finally, a combination of multiple Omicron modules enables the creation of a larger orbital habitat. The Omicron's subsystems support a few days visit by trained passengers. The transport to the habitat would be provided e.g., by the Soyuz TMA spacecraft carried by the Soyuz launch vehicle in the early stage of Omicron's development, before a fully reusable spacecraft would be available.     

Application of existing launch and flight system hardware for early SEI mission

A major paradigm shift in space exploration is at hand. While great discipline must be exercised, we can reinstitute the exploration of the Moon and Mars through use of current systems and technology. These early initiatives will require coupling available or growth boosters with evolving upper stages and spacecraft that employ new emerging technologies and subsystems to characterize the resources, topography, gravity and sites for future manned expeditions. We have the opportunity to perform first-rate scientific research while also serving the needs of the unfolding Space Exploration Initiative. These early programs can be pursued within limited budgets if management techniques, best described as “fast track”, are applied. Examples of such efforts that met all federal regulations, yet achieved significant returns in 1- to 2-year spans, are given.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs,a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

Human spaceflight and an asteroid redirect mission: Why?

The planning of human spaceflight programmes is an exercise in careful rationing of a scarce and expensive resource. Current NASA plans are to develop the new capability for human-rated launch into space to replace the Space Transportation System (STS), more commonly known as the Space Shuttle, combined with a heavy lift capability, and followed by an eventual Mars mission. As an intermediate step towards Mars, NASA proposes to venture beyond Low Earth Orbit to cis-lunar space to visit a small asteroid which will be captured and moved to lunar orbit by a separate robotic mission. The rationale for this and how to garner support from the scientific community for such an asteroid mission are discussed. Key points that emerge are that a programme usually has greater legitimacy when it emerges from public debate, mostly via a Presidential Commission, a report by the National Research Council or a Decadal Review of science goals etc. Also, human spaceflight missions need to have support from a wide range of interested communities. Accordingly, an outline scientific case for a human visit to an asteroid is made. Further, it is argued here that the scientific interest in an asteroid mission needs to be included early in the planning stages, so that the appropriate capabilities (here the need for drilling cores and carrying equipment to, and returning samples from, the asteroid) can be included.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs, a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

Initial performance assessment of hybrid inflatable structures

Inflatable technology for space applications is under continual development and advances in high strength fibers and rigidizable materials have pushed the limitations of these structures. This has lead to their application in deploying large-aperture antennas, reflectors and solar sails. However, many significant advantages can be achieved by combining inflatable structures with structural stiffeners such as tape springs. These advantages include control of the deployment path of the structure while it is inflating (a past weakness of inflatable structure designs), an increased stiffness of the structure once deployed and a reduction in the required inflation volume. Such structures have been previously constructed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory focusing on large scale booms. However, due to the high efficiency of these designs they are also appealing to small satellite systems.This article outlines ongoing research work performed at the University of Southampton into the field of small satellite hybrid inflatable structures. Inflatable booms have been constructed and combined with tape spring reinforcements to create simple hybrid structures. These structures have been subjected to bending tests and compared directly to an equivalent inflatable tube without tape spring reinforcement. This enables the stiffness benefits to be determined with respect to the added mass of the tape springs. The paper presents these results, which leads to an initial performance assessment of these structures.     

Creating a productive international partnership in the Vision for Space Exploration

When US President George W. Bush on 14 January 2004 announced a new US “Vision for Space Exploration”, he called for international participation in “a journey, not a race”, a call received with skepticism and concern elsewhere. But, after a slow start in implementing this directive, during 2006 NASA has increased the forward momentum of action on the program and of discussions on international cooperation in exploring “the Moon, Mars, and beyond”. There are nevertheless a number of significant top-level issues that must be addressed if a cooperative approach to human space exploration is to be pursued. These include the relationship between utilization of the ISS and the lunar exploration plans, integration of potential partners’ current and future capabilities into the exploration plans, and the evolving space-related intentions of other countries.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

Inflatable antenna for cubesats: Motivation for development and antenna design

CubeSats and small satellites have potential to provide means to explore space and to perform science in a more affordable way. As the goals for these spacecraft become more ambitious in space exploration, moving from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) or further, the communication systems currently implemented will not be able to support those missions. One of the bottlenecks in small spacecraft communication systems is represented by antennas' size, due to the close relation between antenna gain and dimensions. Current antennas for CubeSats are mostly dipole or patch antennas with limited gain. Deployable (not inflatable) antennas for CubeSats are currently being investigated, but these solutions are affected by the challenge of packaging the whole deployable structure in a small spacecraft.The work that we propose represents the first attempt to develop an inflatable antenna for CubeSats. Inflatable structures and antennas can be packaged efficiently occupying a small amount of space, and they can provide, once deployed, large dish dimension and correspondent gain. Inflatable antennas have been previously tested in space (Inflatable Antenna Experiment, STS-77). However they have never been developed for small spacecraft such as CubeSats, where the packaging efficiency, the deployment, and the inflation represent a challenge.Our study explores for the first time the possibility of developing such antenna in a way compatible with CubeSat dimensions and constraints. The research provides answers on the possible dimensions for an inflatable antenna for small satellites, on the gain and resolution that can be achieved, and on the deployment and inflation mechanism compatible with CubeSat. Future work in the development of the antenna will include the test of the antenna in flight during a specific technical demonstration mission.The article is structured as follows: context and motivation for Cubesat inflatable antenna are described; then a study to design the antenna which achieves the required performance metrics, while respecting the constraints imposed by CubeSat structure, is presented.     

一种新型充气式重力梯度杆的研制和在轨展开试验

文章对中国“新技术验证一号”卫星搭载的一种新型充气式重力梯度杆的研制和在轨试验情况进行了介绍。重力梯度杆在小卫星控制领域中具有较好的应用前景,而充气结构具有轻质、占用空间小、发射成本低的特点,采用充气式重力梯度杆可避免传统机械式重力梯度杆质量重、尺寸大和机构复杂的缺点,它以充气伸展臂为主要结构形式,通过充气展开伸直成为重力梯度杆,既作为卫星重力梯度杆又通过在轨试验验证空间充气展开结构的性能。在轨试验结果表明充气式重力梯度杆展开稳定、有序、性能可靠,可以满足小卫星的性能和功能要求。该试验也是中国首个成功的充气展开结构在轨技术验证试验,标志着中国的充气展开结构技术初步具备了工程化能力。     

Developing new launch vehicle technology: The case for multi-national private sector cooperation

Space is now a global business, yet the cost of getting to space is still high. Developing new launch vehicles that are cheaper, safer, and more reliable is the key to both rapid commercial growth and to more and better government uses of space. However, the R&D process leading to new launch vehicles is expensive and technically challenging; the past 50 years have seen many government development programs, but no major technological breakthroughs. Perhaps, it is therefore time to think about other ways of developing new launch vehicles. The best expertise in this field resides primarily with private companies and is spread across many actors and nations. A consortium led by space firms might be a better approach to opening up space in the 21st century. Governments will have to develop new policies treating space as though it were a commercial industry, in particular, relaxing export trade restrictions wherever possible. Issues of dual-use may be outweighed by the rapidly growing widespread availability of launch capabilities. Since new launch vehicles will require large up-front R&D expenditures, government support will continue to be needed to supplement private capital funds. Contributions to this effort should be international. However, difficult it might be in today's security conscious environment to reorient government policy, doing so may offer the most efficient and successful way to break the technological and economic barriers to more reliable access to space.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

NASA''s small spacecraft technology initiative “Clark” spacecraft

The Small Satellite Technology Initiative (SSTI) is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) program to demonstrate smaller, high technology satellites constructed rapidly and less expensively. Under SSTI, NASA funded the development of “Clark,” a high technology demonstration satellite to provide 3-m resolution panchromatic and 15-m resolution multispectral images, as well as collect atmospheric constituent and cosmic x-ray data. The 690-Ib. satellite, to be launched in early 1997, will be in a 476 km, circular, sun-synchronous polar orbit. This paper describes the program objectives, the technical characteristics of the sensors and satellite, image processing, archiving and distribution. Data archiving and distribution will be performed by NASA Stennis Space Center and by the EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, USA.     

NASA's new Mars Exploration Program: the trajectory of knowledge

NASA's newly restructured Mars Exploration Program (MEP) is finally on the way to Mars with the successful April 7 launch of the 2001 Mars Odyssey Orbiter. In addition, the announcement by the Bush Administration that the exploration of Mars will be a priority within NASA's Office of Space Science further cements the first decade of the new millennium as one of the major thrusts to understand the "new" Mars. Over the course of the past year and a half, an integrated team of managers, scientists, and engineers has crafted a revamped MEP to respond to the scientific as well as management and resource challenges associated with deep space exploration of the Red Planet. This article describes the new program from the perspective of its guiding philosophies, major events, and scientific strategy. It is intended to serve as a roadmap to the next 10-15 years of Mars exploration from the NASA viewpoint. [For further details, see the Mars Exploration Program web site (URL): http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov]. The new MEP will certainly evolve in response to discoveries, to successes, and potentially to setbacks as well. However, the design of the restructured strategy is attentive to risks, and a major attempt to instill resiliency in the program has been adopted. Mars beckons, and the next decade of exploration should provide the impetus for a follow-on decade in which multiple sample returns and other major program directions are executed. Ultimately the vision to consider the first human scientific expeditions to the Red Planet will be enabled. By the end of the first decade of this program, we may know where and how to look for the elusive clues associated with a possible martian biological record, if any was every preserved, even if only as "chemical fossils."