Commercial spaceports — a window of opportunity?

The feasibility of building commercial spaceports is being actively investigated in several countries. Potential benefits include boosting economic development and assisting the commercial launch industry. This report finds, however, that commercial spaceport development will probably not be capable of generating a large enough return on investment to attract private sector involvement without significant government assistance. It is also unlikely that the market for large launch vehicles will support spaceport development; however, small satellites may offer better prospects.     

Rebuilding US launch capabilities

Attempts to rebuild US commercial launch capabilities through stimulating private industry will be constrained by the fact that free-market competition does not really exist in the space industry. As the worldwide supply of launch vehicles grows, the policy now offered by the US government is only likely to fragment the US space launch vehicle industry. The author argues in favour of a proposal to establish a quasi-governmental corporation for space launches which would both safeguard the interests of government and commercial users and ensure that business acumen was applied.     

The impact of launch vehicle type and size on development cost

The technical development trend of future launch vehicle systems is towards fully reusable systems, in order to reduce space transportation cost. However, different types of launch vehicles are feasible, as there are

• —winged two-stage systems (WTS)

• —ballistic single-stage vehicles (BSS)

• —ballistic two-stage vehicles (BTS)

The performance of those systems is compared according to the present state of the art as well as the development cost, based on the “TRANSCOST-Model”. The development costs are shown versus launch mass (GLOW) and pay-load for the three types of reusable systems mentioned above.It is shown that performance optimization and cost minimization lead to different results. It is more economic to increase the vehicle size for achieving higher performance, instead of increasing technical complexity.Finally it is described that due to the essentially lower launch cost of reusable vehicles it will be feasible to recover the development cost by an amortization charge on the launch cost. This possibility, however, would allow commercial funding of future launch vehicle developments.     

Launch vehicles and the commercial uses of outer space : The underlying economic issues

This article discusses the economics of the demand for and supply of launch vehicles. Demand is derived from both commercial and governmental uses of space, while the supply of launch vehicles is determined by governmental needs which are rarely based on economic criteria alone. Multipurpose launches such as the Space Shuttle should be viewed as a national resource instead of a profit-seeking venture. Because of the mixing of government and private uses for space vehicles, traditional economic analysis provides only a starting point for policy decisions.     

RLV economics: fiscal evaluation of NASA''s reusable launch vehicle effort

The US RLV program aims to stimulate commercial development of a next-generation heavy-lift launcher and lower launch costs by one order of magnitude from the Space Shuttle. This paper discusses the incentives needed to encourage private investment — income tax relief, investment mitigation, financing assistance — in the venture and uses a specifically developed case study model to evaluate their effectiveness. It finds that an R&D tax credit would be the most practical incentive. Directions for future work are provided.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs,a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs, a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

Exploration of CASC's Commercial Space

China's commercial space activities started from the launch of Asiasat-1 satellite by a LM-3 launch vehicle on April 7, 1990. As the leading force in China's space industry, CASC has been committed to commercial space for nearly 30 years. The article describes CASC's advantages and activities in commercial space sector, as well as outlook for CASC commercial space development. The author concludes CASC is willing to coordinate and cooperate with state-owned and private companies and will create a new pattern for commercial space, opening up a new industry for space development and achieving more splendid achievement.     

Organizing and managing satellite solar power

Building an organization and management structure to create, launch, utilize and protect a satellite solar power energy system will require a global policy for the beneficial use of SSP. The fundamental organizational tasks are: (1) R&D, achieved through a project organization characterized by the integrated management of applied science, development research and construction engineering; (2) investment, generated by a series of groups creating financial vehicles for public and private investment; (3) transmission and distribution, characterized by attention to an engineering and maintenance process emphasizing high reliability; and (4) crisis response, demanding readiness for instant response to potential internal or external scenarios. A differentiated global organization spanning the long timeframe of SSP will need to have a central management core representative of all parts of the organization, with the capacity for self-renewal and re-adaptation. To be successful over its long timeframe, the SSP organization will need to build continuity and public confidence through intergenerational communication, public education, and community outreach. Integrating structures must be created at all levels of the organization, and should encompass joint work tasks and information-sharing among both industrial and government members. Developmental and alliance partners who support the formation and financing of a differentiated satellite solar power organization will share commensurately in the technologies and competencies that are created.     

Private space exploration: A new way for starting a spacefaring society?

Since the beginning space was an exclusive domain of public organizations, the role of privates is becoming more and more important, and not only in commercial activities. However, the main international treaties dealing with this subject are still based on the assumption that space activities are mostly reserved to states. In the last decade the idea that the role of privates could include the management of space infrastructures and launch vehicles gained support and now private launch services are a reality. An even wider role of privates is now advocated and private exploration and exploitation missions are discussed. This requires that space activity in general can generate an attractive return and those business models are identified.     

Federal tax incentives and financing for the reusable launch vehicle

Financing a very large new space transportation system is a major venture. It requires an initial investment of many billions of dollars and will be expected to perform successfully during its lifetime of at least twenty-five years. In the past, space systems of this magnitude have been funded, owned and operated by the government. Today, as the responsibility for opening and maintaining space systems is expected to shift from government to industry leadership, the reusable launch vehicle (RLV) presents the private sector with the challenge of finding ways of financing and building a system that will prove to be a successful private venture. The government, recognizing that it is a major customer of the RLV and that new technology must be developed for the RLV to work and to adequately reduce the cost of access to space, will fund some Initial technology development as well as provide some incentives for a private operator. This paper shows that using the current tax system's corporate investment benefits, coupled with a favorable debt financing arrangement, a profitable privately owned RLV system Is within the realm of possibility.     

International market for a reusable launch vehicle

A reusable launch vehicle could be developed early next century if the X-33 program is successful. Its development will be funded by industry, and the vehicle will be operated privately. A critical task is to assess the future market for such a vehicle. The total number of commercial payloads could range between 40 and 60 satellites per year, taking into account the market elasticity due to the launch price reduction. The RLV would face important competition from expendable launch vehicles. However, the RLV could capture two-thirds of this market, or 26–33 commercial payloads per year.     

Third-party liability insurance and space launches

This article discusses a number of issues related to the US commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) industry and government's role in ensuring its competitiveness, particularly third-party liability insurance for space launches. The author finds that the space insurance industry has become a major constraint on the commercial development of space. The future implications are considered of US government involvement with the launch services industry, initially through providing third-party insurance itself. The author concludes that, for a stable commercial ELV industry, it will be necessary for the USA either to establish fair-trade agreements with other space-capable nations, or to maintain a significant government involvement to support the industry.     

Provisions of the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA)

In an acknowledgement that private spaceflight is becoming a reality, the USA has enacted legislation, in the form of the CSLA, to assist the development of commercial, including passenger-carrying, launch vehicles. This report describes the salient features of the new act and explains the steps necessary for the obtention of a commercial launch license.     

The private solution to the space transportation crisis

Confused and short-sighted decisions dominated by political expediency have been made about US space policy in the past 30 years. Overly large and ambitious systems have been chosen, resulting in today's crisis in space transportation. The history of commercial aircraft development offers an alternative example of producing in a range of sizes and capabilities for a wide variety of users, and shows that the space transport industry could benefit from applying the decision-making processes used in private enterprise. The authors examine strategies for privatization of space transportation and conclude that policy support for the commercial launch industry must be continued. NASA must be reoriented towards its basic research function, and more government services should be bought from the private sector.     

Europe's major challenge for the 21st century: Access to space

Like the other great space powers of the 21st century, Europe has its own means of accessing space: Ariane, which has guaranteed its independence in the launching of civil and military satellites for almost 30 years and has won a significant part of the highly competitive commercial market. This market provides the Ariane system with the production volume indispensable for its reliability, which also benefits institutional launches. Europe's commercial market share will be even larger if the launch system is flexible and adaptable to the diversity of demand. Probable future technological changes make flexibility more necessary still. Two technical characteristics will be key: a large enough payload capacity and the injection of satellites into energetic orbits, including final geostationary orbit. But carrying out such missions will only be possible if a new generation upper stage is used. The November 2008 ESA ministerial meeting opted to wait until 2011 to decide whether this is necessary, making it doubtful whether Arianespace will be able to maintain leadership in the commercial market. The authors urge a rethink of this position.     

Technology readiness and risk assessments: A new approach

Systems that depend upon the application of new technologies inevitably face three major challenges during development: performance, schedule and budget. Technology research and development (R&D) programs are typically advocated based on argument that these investments will substantially reduce the uncertainty in all three of these dimensions of project management. However, if early R&D is implemented poorly, then the new system developments that plan to employ the resulting advanced technologies will suffer from cost overruns, schedule delays and the steady erosion of initial performance objectives. It is often critical for senior management to be able to determine which of these two paths is more likely—and to respond accordingly. The challenge for system and technology managers is to be able to make clear, well-documented assessments of technology readiness and risks, and to do so at key points in the life cycle of the program.Several approaches have been used to evaluate technology maturity and risk in order to better anticipate later system development risks. The “technology readiness levels” (TRLs), developed by NASA, are one discipline-independent, programmatic figure of merit (FOM) that allows more effective assessment of, and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies. Another broadly used management tool is of the “risk matrix”, which depends upon a graphical representation of uncertainty and consequences. However, for the most part these various methodologies have had no explicit interrelationship.This paper will examine past uses of current methods to improve R&D outcomes and will highlight some of the limitations that can arise. In this context, a new concept for the integration of the TRL methodology, and the concept of the “risk matrix” will be described. The paper will conclude with observations concerning prospective future directions for the important new concept of integrated “technology readiness and risk assessments”.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

Nuclear waste disposal in space: Implications of advanced space transportation

Previous studies have shown that the disposal of nuclear waste in space is promising as a practical and economically plausible option, based on use of the first generation space shuttle. The promise brightens if we consider use of more effective second generation systems such as fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit transports. These vehicles, with simpler more reliable flight characteristics and with operational economics at least twenty times more favorable than the first shuttle, can become available in the early 1990s when the nuclear waste problem will have grown to truly serious proportions. This paper surveys both vertical and horizontal-takeoff vehicles as they could be used for the Earth-to-orbit phase of nuclear waste disposal mission. The international nature of the nuclear waste issue is emphasized, and the suggestion is made that an international equatorial launch site be established. This launch center, apart from its inherent safety features, would serve as a focus for an international solution of the truly worldwide problem of nuclear waste disposal.     

Tracing the evolutionary path for space technologies

Proliferation and pace of advancing technologies warrant policy and strategic decision-making. Without thinking ahead, companies can loose marketshare and countries can yield comparative advantage. The rate at which burgeoning technologies progress, however, can make it difficult for corporations and governments alike to discern or better anticipate critical junctures in technology developments. This paper presents a conceptual, multidimensional framework, the “evolutionary path”, for understanding the stages of technological development in the civil space area. The analysis draws from three case studies — communications satellites, computers, and launch vehicles — and shows how the implications and developments of new, breakthrough technologies differ from the incremental technology upgrades or the later emergence of interconnected systems and infrastructures.