The development of a Russian communication satellite of small class, operating in the geostationary and high-elliptical orbits

In 1994–1995 Lavochkin Association (Russia) together with the other enterprises in accordance with technical requirements of the Russian Space agency, developed a new Russian communication satellite of a small class that will operate in both the geostationary (GSO) and high-elliptical (HEO) orbits. This satellite may be injected into operational orbits using a SOYUZ-2 launch vehicle (LV) and a FREGAT upper stage (US) from Plesetsk and Baykonur space launch sites (SLS).The main reason for creating such a satellite was to decrease the cost of the support and development of the Russian communication geostationary satellites group.Russian satellites Horizont, Express, Ekran and Gals, which operate in GSO, are the basis of the space segment for communications, radio and TV broadcasting. All of these satellites are injected into GSO by the PROTON LV. PROTON is a launch vehicle of a heavy class. The use of a middle class LV instead of a heavy class will allow to reduce considerably the launch cost. The change of a heavy class LV to a LV of middle class determined one economic reason for this project. Besides, the opportunity to launch S/C into GSO from Russian Plesetsk SLS increases the independence of Russia in the domain of space communications, despite the presence of the contract with Kazachstan about the rent of Baykonur SLS. Finally, use of small satellites with a rather small number of transponders is more effective than the use of big satellites. It will allow also to increase a satellite group (by the launch of additional satellites) precisely in accordance to the development of the ground segment.     

The development of a Russian communication satellite of small class, operating in the geostationary and high-elliptical orbits

In 1994-1995 Lavochkin Association (Russia) together with the other enterprises in accordance with technical requirements of the Russian Space agency, developed a new Russian communication satellite of a small class that will operate in both the geostationary (GSO) and high-elliptical (HEO) orbits. This satellite may be injected into operational orbits using a SOYUZ-2 launch vehicle (LV) and a FREGAT upper stage (US) from Plesetsk and Baykonur space launch sites (SLS).The main reason for creating such a satellite was to decrease the cost of the support and development of the Russian communication geostationary satellites group.Russian satellites Horizont, Express, Ekran and Gals, which operate in GSO, are the basis of the space segment for communications, radio and TV broadcasting. All of these satellites are injected into GSO by the PROTON LV. PROTON is a launch vehicle of a heavy class. The use of a middle class LV instead of a heavy class will allow to reduce considerably the launch cost. The change of a heavy class LV to a LV of middle class determined one economic reason for this project. Besides, the opportunity to launch S/C into GSO from Russian Plesetsk SLS increases the independence of Russia in the domain of space communications, despite the presence of the contract with Kazachstan about the rent of Baykonur SLS. Finally, use of small satellites with a rather small number of transponders is more effective than the use of big satellites. It will allow also to increase a satellite group (by the launch of additional satellites) precisely in accordance to the development of the ground segment.     

中国运载火箭地面系统发展方向研究

地面系统用于支持和保障火箭的发射与试验,对火箭的使用性能、发射能力、发射场配置及工作流程等有重要的影响。调研了国外运载火箭地面系统发展现状,总结了国外运载火箭地面系统发展趋势。从快速发射、简易发射、安全发射、自动发射和通用发射等方面提出了地面系统发展思路和主要关键技术,为我国后续运载火箭地面系统发展提供参考。     

LM-11SL:A Sea-Launched Carrier Rocket for Small Satellites and Its Launch Service

Following the successful maiden flight of the Long March 11(LM-11) launch vehicle from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in September 2015, the first sea-launched carrier rocket dedicated to provide a launch service for small satellites and their constellations, the Long March 11 Sea Launch(LM-11 SL) has been under development by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology(CALT) and the China Great Wall Industry Corporation(CGWIC). It is planned to commence launch service in 2018. Based on the LM-11, a land-launched four-staged solid launch vehicle which has entered the market and accomplished launch missions for several small satellites in the past 3 years, the newly adopted sea launch technology enables transport and launch of LM-11 SL from maritime ships, providing flexible launch location selection.After inheriting the mature launch vehicle technologies from previous members of the Long March launch vehicle family and adopting a new way of launching from the sea, the LM-11 SL is capable of sending payloads into low Earth orbits with all altitudes and inclinations, from 200 km to 1000 km, from equatorial to sun synchronous, within a shortduration launch campaign. The LM-11 SL provides a flexible, reliable and economical launch service for the global small satellite industry.     

An inconvenient regulatory truth: Divergence in US and EU satellite export control policies on China

Since the early 1990s the USA has maintained export control sanctions against Chinese international commercial satellite launch services. In 1998 these sanctions were further strengthened, resulting in a de facto international embargo that is premised on ITAR export licenses. Since 1998 this de facto embargo has effectively prohibited China from launching Western commercial satellites of a sophisticated technological standard. Today, European commercial satellite manufacturers are positioned to fully benefit from ITAR-free technology investments, gaining access to Chinese launch services for the launch of commercial telecommunication satellites that are technologically comparable to US satellites. This article examines the policy implications for the USA in light of EU regulatory divergence and the impending return of China to the international commercial launch services market.     

The expanded delta launch vehicle family with a status on the new delta IV

The Expendable Launch Systems division of The Boeing Company is well into the development of the new family of Delta IV launch vehicles to support commercial and government missions. The Delta IV adds to the existing Delta family of vehicles, the Delta II in four configurations and the Delta III with twice the performance of the Delta II.The addition of the Delta IV adds five vehicles to the Delta family: the Delta IV medium, three Delta IV Medium-Plus vehicles with solid rocket augmentation, and the Delta IV Heavy vehicles. This family now addresses the full market range of payload requirements from 2,000 to 29,000 pounds to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). Full-scale commercial development was initiated in 1997, with the first Delta flight planned for the second quarter of 2001. This paper presents the status of the development program of the launch vehicles, the new green field, focused factory for common booster core production at Decatur, Alabama, the new launch facility construction at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Vandenberg Air Force Base, and the new LO2/LH2 RS-68 common booster core engine. The status of the Delta III return to flight is also presented.     

Cost Engineering – The new paradigm for space launch vehicle design

The paper describes the basic definition and application of 'Cost Engineering' which means to design a vehicle system for minimum development cost and/or for minimum operations cost. This is important now and for the future since space transportation has become primarily a commercial business in contrast to the past where it has been mainly a subject of military power and national prestige. Several examples are presented for minimum-cost space launch vehicle configurations, such as increasing vehicle size and/or the use of less efficient rocket engines in order to reduce development and operations cost. Further a cost comparison is presented on single-stage (SSTO)-vehicles vs. two-stage launchers which shows that SSTOs have lower development and operations cost although they are larger, respectively have a higher lift-off mass than two-stage vehicles with the same performance. The design of a space tourism-dedicated launch vehicle is an extreme challenge for a cost-engineered vehicle design in order to achieve cost per seat not higher than $50,000. Finally an outlook is presented on the different options for manned Earth-to-Moon transportation modes and vehicles – another most important application of 'cost engineering', taking into account the large cost of such a future venture.     

The commercial challenge to Arianespace: the TCI affair

The question of how far rockets used for commercial launch services are subsidised by their respective governments remains highly topical. This article traces the history of the first legal challenge to be made on this basis by a US launch service provider against Arianespace, a case which also called into question the pricing of the Space Shuttle. The perceptions, deliberations and negotiations of both sides are traced and it is noted that their most important outcome was not settlement of the case itself but agreement to start serious consultations on defining ‘rules of the road’ regarding government support to the commercial launch industry.     

基于卡片模型的系统工程在捷龙一号的应用研究（英文）

Rapid development of Chinese commercial launch vehicles brings new challenges under the traditional systems engineering(TSE) working method. A new model-based systems engineering(MBSE) working method was proposed for Smart Dragon 1(SD-1), which is a low-cost commercial launch vehicle developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology(CALT). Based on the characteristics of a commercial launch vehicle, the system model based on information cards was established. Through a problem-oriented working method, risk identification and management, the process of Card-MBSE was utilized and verified by the success of the maiden flight of SD-1. This paper introduces a new method and reference for the development of low-cost and high-reliability launch vehicles.     

猎鹰9火箭Block5构型首次飞行任务解析

美国太空探索技术公司于2018年5月完成猎鹰9Block5构型火箭的首次飞行任务,研究猎鹰9Block5构型火箭的总体方案,以及为更好地实现重复使用所采取的动力系统升级、箭体结构优化和其他改进措施,回顾了猎鹰9火箭3次主要构型升级的改进方案和衍化路线,分析了此构型火箭首飞对世界航天发展的影响,提出了未来商业航天运输系统的发展建议。     

垂直返回重复使用运载火箭技术分析

结合SpaceX公司近期进行的多次猎鹰火箭一子级垂直着陆返回技术试验,对比分析垂直返回重复使用运载火箭两种返回方式的工程应用价值。首先,建立运载火箭一子级动力返回段弹道设计动力学模型。随后,提出基于H-V飞行剖面分段返回弹道设计方法。然后针对“返回原场”（RTLS）和“不返回原场”(NRTLS)两种垂直返回方式,构建综合考虑上升段与返回段的推进剂耦合作用的一体化弹道优化设计策略。最后,通过数值仿真,对比分析了两种返回方式下的火箭运载能力。结果表明,采用“不返回原场”方式的运载能力损失仅占“返回原场”方式的一半,具有较好的工程应用价值。     

The impact of launch vehicle type and size on development cost

The technical development trend of future launch vehicle systems is towards fully reusable systems, in order to reduce space transportation cost. However, different types of launch vehicles are feasible, as there are

• —winged two-stage systems (WTS)

• —ballistic single-stage vehicles (BSS)

• —ballistic two-stage vehicles (BTS)

The performance of those systems is compared according to the present state of the art as well as the development cost, based on the “TRANSCOST-Model”. The development costs are shown versus launch mass (GLOW) and pay-load for the three types of reusable systems mentioned above.It is shown that performance optimization and cost minimization lead to different results. It is more economic to increase the vehicle size for achieving higher performance, instead of increasing technical complexity.Finally it is described that due to the essentially lower launch cost of reusable vehicles it will be feasible to recover the development cost by an amortization charge on the launch cost. This possibility, however, would allow commercial funding of future launch vehicle developments.     

Atlas II and IIA analyses and environments validation

General Dynamics has now flown all four versions of the Atlas commercial launch vehicle, which cover a payload weight capability to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) in the range of 5000–8000 lb. The key analyses to set design and environmental test parameters for the vehicle modifications and the ground and flight test data that validated them were prepared in paper IAF-91-170 for the first version, Atlas I.

This paper presents similar data for the next two versions, Atlas II and IIA. The Atlas II has propellant tanks lengthened by 12 ft and is boosted by MA-5A rocket engines uprated to 474,000 lb liftoff thrust. GTO payload capability is 6225 lb with the 11-ft fairing. The Atlas IIA is an Atlas II with uprated RL10A-4 engines on the lengthened Centaur II upper stage. The two 20,800 lb thrust, 449 s specific impulse engines with an optional extendible nozzle increase payload capability to GTO to 6635 lb. The paper describes design parameters and validated test results for many other improvements that have generally provided greater capability at less cost, weight and complexity and better reliability. Those described include: moving the MA-5A start system to the ground, replacing the vernier engines with a simple 50 lb thrust on-off hydrazine roll control system, addition of a POGO suppressor, replacement of Centaur jettisonable insulation panels with fixed foam, a new inertial navigation unit (INU) that combines in one package a ring-laser gyro based strapdown guidance system with two MIL-STD-1750A processors, redundant MIL-STD-1553 data bus interfaces, robust Ada-based software and a new Al-Li payload adapter. Payload environment is shown to be essentially unchanged from previous Atlas vehicles. Validation of load, stability, control and pressurization requirements for the larger vehicle is discussed.

All flights to date (five Atlas II, one Atlas IIA) have been successful in launching satellites for EUTELSAT, the U.S. Air Force and INTELSAT. Significant design parameters validated by these flights are presented. Particularly noteworthy has been the performance of the INU, which has provided average GTO insertion errors of only 10 miles apogee, 0.2 miles perigee and 0.004 degrees inclination. It is concluded that Atlas II/IIA have successfully demonstrated probably the largest number of current state-of-the-art components of any expendable launch vehicle flying today.     

LM-11——The Main Force in China's Small Launch Vehicles for Commercial Launch

The Long March 11 launch vehicle(LM-11) is the only solid launch vehicle within China's new-generation launch vehicle series, enabling a full spectrum of Chinese launch vehicles. Compared with other China's LM series launch vehicles, it has the shortest launch preparation time. With the characteristics of appropriate launch capability, quick response, easy-to-use, flexible operation, universal interface and strong task adaptability, LM-11 can better meet the launch requirements for various small networking satellite, replacement and for emergency use. After four successful launches, LM-11 has become the main Chinese launch vehicle oriented to the international small satellite commercial launch market.     

长征三号甲系列运载火箭高适应性发展——从总体与导航制导控制的视角

从总体与导航制导控制的视角,对长征三号甲系列运载火箭发展与成就进行了分析和小结。长征三号甲系列运载火箭,在长征三号运载火箭解决我国发射高轨道卫星有无问题的基础上,历经基本能力、适应能力、高适应能力的发展,具备了高轨道大型卫星运载能力,突破了从单一轨道面到三维空间各种轨道发射、从高轨卫星转移轨道到工作轨道发射、从地球轨道到地月轨道发射以及从航天技术试验到高可靠工程应用发射等关键技术,使我国运载火箭整体能力取得了地球全轨道发射、星际轨道发射等跨越发展。航天重大工程和国际商业发射表明,该系列运载火箭已进入世界高轨道航天器发射的运载火箭前列,并奠定了进一步开拓发展的基础。     

Exploration of CASC's Commercial Space

China's commercial space activities started from the launch of Asiasat-1 satellite by a LM-3 launch vehicle on April 7, 1990. As the leading force in China's space industry, CASC has been committed to commercial space for nearly 30 years. The article describes CASC's advantages and activities in commercial space sector, as well as outlook for CASC commercial space development. The author concludes CASC is willing to coordinate and cooperate with state-owned and private companies and will create a new pattern for commercial space, opening up a new industry for space development and achieving more splendid achievement.     

Provisions of the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA)

In an acknowledgement that private spaceflight is becoming a reality, the USA has enacted legislation, in the form of the CSLA, to assist the development of commercial, including passenger-carrying, launch vehicles. This report describes the salient features of the new act and explains the steps necessary for the obtention of a commercial launch license.     

“长征三号”一,二级火箭的防潮,防水

叙述了“长征三号”火箭，首次在雨季发射时，采用的防潮防水技术的实施方案及使用后的效果。它给运载火箭的电气系统正常工作创造了良好的环境条件，保证了火箭安全、可靠、及时发射。     

某大型低温运载火箭无人值守加注发射技术研究

针对提升和保障航天发射人员安全问题,提出了低温运载火箭无人值守加注发射(CLVUFL)的理念和内涵.通过国内外代表性CLVUFL的技术对比,发现国内低温火箭加注发射应用CLVUFL技术存在箭地接口复杂、加注发射时间较长、关键设备可靠性有待提高、智能化自动化程度不高等主要问题.针对某大型低温运载火箭加注发射流程,通过分析...     

Third-party liability insurance and space launches

This article discusses a number of issues related to the US commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) industry and government's role in ensuring its competitiveness, particularly third-party liability insurance for space launches. The author finds that the space insurance industry has become a major constraint on the commercial development of space. The future implications are considered of US government involvement with the launch services industry, initially through providing third-party insurance itself. The author concludes that, for a stable commercial ELV industry, it will be necessary for the USA either to establish fair-trade agreements with other space-capable nations, or to maintain a significant government involvement to support the industry.