Third-party liability insurance and space launches

This article discusses a number of issues related to the US commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) industry and government's role in ensuring its competitiveness, particularly third-party liability insurance for space launches. The author finds that the space insurance industry has become a major constraint on the commercial development of space. The future implications are considered of US government involvement with the launch services industry, initially through providing third-party insurance itself. The author concludes that, for a stable commercial ELV industry, it will be necessary for the USA either to establish fair-trade agreements with other space-capable nations, or to maintain a significant government involvement to support the industry.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

Rebuilding US launch capabilities

Attempts to rebuild US commercial launch capabilities through stimulating private industry will be constrained by the fact that free-market competition does not really exist in the space industry. As the worldwide supply of launch vehicles grows, the policy now offered by the US government is only likely to fragment the US space launch vehicle industry. The author argues in favour of a proposal to establish a quasi-governmental corporation for space launches which would both safeguard the interests of government and commercial users and ensure that business acumen was applied.     

LM-11——The Main Force in China's Small Launch Vehicles for Commercial Launch

The Long March 11 launch vehicle(LM-11) is the only solid launch vehicle within China's new-generation launch vehicle series, enabling a full spectrum of Chinese launch vehicles. Compared with other China's LM series launch vehicles, it has the shortest launch preparation time. With the characteristics of appropriate launch capability, quick response, easy-to-use, flexible operation, universal interface and strong task adaptability, LM-11 can better meet the launch requirements for various small networking satellite, replacement and for emergency use. After four successful launches, LM-11 has become the main Chinese launch vehicle oriented to the international small satellite commercial launch market.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs, a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs,a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

Human spaceflight and an asteroid redirect mission: Why?

The planning of human spaceflight programmes is an exercise in careful rationing of a scarce and expensive resource. Current NASA plans are to develop the new capability for human-rated launch into space to replace the Space Transportation System (STS), more commonly known as the Space Shuttle, combined with a heavy lift capability, and followed by an eventual Mars mission. As an intermediate step towards Mars, NASA proposes to venture beyond Low Earth Orbit to cis-lunar space to visit a small asteroid which will be captured and moved to lunar orbit by a separate robotic mission. The rationale for this and how to garner support from the scientific community for such an asteroid mission are discussed. Key points that emerge are that a programme usually has greater legitimacy when it emerges from public debate, mostly via a Presidential Commission, a report by the National Research Council or a Decadal Review of science goals etc. Also, human spaceflight missions need to have support from a wide range of interested communities. Accordingly, an outline scientific case for a human visit to an asteroid is made. Further, it is argued here that the scientific interest in an asteroid mission needs to be included early in the planning stages, so that the appropriate capabilities (here the need for drilling cores and carrying equipment to, and returning samples from, the asteroid) can be included.     

Observations on the evolution of satellite launch volume and cyclicality in the space industry

Satellites have been rightly described as the lifeblood of the entire space industry and the number of satellites ordered or launched per year is an important defining metric of the industry's level of activity, such that trends and variability in this volume have significant strategic impact on the space industry. Over the past 40+ years, hundreds of satellites have been launched every year. Thus an important dataset is available for time series analysis and identification of trends and cycles in the various markets of the space industry. This article reports findings of a study for which we collected data on over 6000 satellites launched since 1960 on a yearly basis. We grouped the satellites into three broad categories – defense and intelligence, science, and commercial satellites – and identified and discussed the main trends and cyclical patterns for each of these. Institutional customers (defense and intelligence, and science) accounted for over two-thirds of all satellites launched within our time period (1960–2008), and, in the 1960s and 1970s, they accounted for 90% and 73.5%, respectively. A fair conclusion from this data is that the space industry was enabled by, and grew because of the institutional customers, not commercial market forces. However, when the launch data is examined more closely, a growing influence of the commercial sector is noticeable. Over the past two decades communication satellites accounted for roughly half of all launches, thus reflecting an important shift in the space industry in which the commercial sector is playing an equal role (on a launch volume basis) to that of the institutional market. Cyclical patterns in the satellite launch volume over the past decade are separately discussed before we sum up with a conclusion.     

Lunette: A network of lunar landers for in-situ geophysical science

Over the last 3 years, a team at JPL has worked to design a new concept for a small, low cost lander applicable to a variety of in-situ lunar exploration activities. This concept, named Lunette, originated as a design which would exploit potential excess capacity of EELV launches by being compatible with the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA). The original Lunette mission concept would have allowed up to six low cost landers to be delivered to a targeted region of the moon, with landings separated by a few km, allowing establishment of a regional network with a single, shared launch. The original concept faced limits in the extent of regional distribution of landing sites since all six landers were dependent on a single solid rocket braking motor. In the last year the Lunette team has focused on a modification of the original ESPA-based concept to a design that would allow launch of multiple individual landers (each with its own braking stage) on a single launch vehicle, where each lander would be capable of independent targeting and landing. With such an implementation, the entire lunar surface could be accessed for establishment of network nodes that could enable high priority geophysical measurements on a scale not seen since Apollo. The present paper discusses the current state of the design of the Lunette geophysical network lander, as well as describing mission design, science operations, and an innovative design solution allowing the lander to take critical data continuously, even over the lunar night, without the need for radioisotope power systems.     

NASA's integrated space transportation plan

Improvements in the safety, reliability and affordability of current and future space transportation systems must be achieved if NASA is to perform its mission and if the U.S. space industry is to reach its full potential. In response to Presidential Policy in 1994, NASA, working with our industrial partners, initiated several efforts including the X-33, X-34, X-37 and Advanced Space Transportation programs with the goal of demonstrating the technologies that could enable these goals. We have learned that emerging technologies will enable the needed advancements but that more development along multiple, competing paths is needed. We have learned that developing requirements diligently and in partnership with industry will allow us to better converge with commercial capabilities. We have learned that commercial markets are not growing as fast as projected earlier, but there are still possibilities in the near-term to pursue alternate paths that can make access to space more robust. The goal of transitioning NASA's space transportation needs to commercial launch vehicles remains the key aim of our efforts and will require additional investment to reduce business and technical risks to acceptable levels.     

Europe's major challenge for the 21st century: Access to space

Like the other great space powers of the 21st century, Europe has its own means of accessing space: Ariane, which has guaranteed its independence in the launching of civil and military satellites for almost 30 years and has won a significant part of the highly competitive commercial market. This market provides the Ariane system with the production volume indispensable for its reliability, which also benefits institutional launches. Europe's commercial market share will be even larger if the launch system is flexible and adaptable to the diversity of demand. Probable future technological changes make flexibility more necessary still. Two technical characteristics will be key: a large enough payload capacity and the injection of satellites into energetic orbits, including final geostationary orbit. But carrying out such missions will only be possible if a new generation upper stage is used. The November 2008 ESA ministerial meeting opted to wait until 2011 to decide whether this is necessary, making it doubtful whether Arianespace will be able to maintain leadership in the commercial market. The authors urge a rethink of this position.     

美国载人航天安全要求和管理

安全问题对载人航天的成败至关重要.文章介绍了美国NASA在载人航天安全管理方面的有关标准和管理文件.文章也不排斥人的安全意识对载人航天的安全十分关键.     

Funding for space - private finance for public space missions?

Private users of space capability are used to buying a service, not a spacecraft. The supplier builds, launches and operates the spacecraft and the users only pay for the service that they receive. Publicly funded users could benefit from the same approach. Transferring responsibility for the success of the mission to a true prime contractor who is best able to manage technical and programme risks can lead to significant reductions in costs and timescales, but demands changes in attitudes by governments, users, industry and space agencies.     

Space life and biomedical sciences in support of the global exploration roadmap and societal development

The human exploration of space is pushing the boundaries of what is technically feasible. The space industry is preparing for the New Space era, the momentum for which will emanate from the commercial human spaceflight sector, and will be buttressed by international solar system exploration endeavours. With many distinctive technical challenges to be overcome, human spaceflight requires that numerous biological and physical systems be examined under exceptional circumstances for progress to be made. To effectively tackle such an undertaking significant intra- and international coordination and collaboration is required. Space life and biomedical science research and development (R & D) will support the Global Exploration Roadmap (GER) by enabling humans to ‘endure’ the extreme activity that is long duration human spaceflight. In so doing the field will discover solutions to some of our most difficult human health issues, and as a consequence benefit society as a whole. This space-specific R&D will drive a significant amount of terrestrial biomedical research and as a result the international community will not only gain benefits in the form of improved healthcare in space and on Earth, but also through the growth of its science base and industry.     

Competitive pricing for multiple payload launch services: the road to commercial space

The commercial launch industry is maturing into an international market that is highly price competitive. A common way to deal with the high cost of launch services is to use a single booster to place several payloads into orbit. This practice requires the launch provider to divide the cost of the shared mission between the customers. Unfortunately, the methods normally used to do this are inadequate. This paper addresses the question of how best to share launch costs. It examines the existing methods and introduces two alternative methods for this purpose. The new methods are demonstrated and shown to be superior.     

Skill maintenance in extended spaceflight: a human factors analysis of space and analogue work environments

This paper discusses the implications of increasing mission lengths of manned spaceflight for the design of future space systems from a human factors point of view. It is argued that the increase in mission duration has brought about a number of new problems, which have not been sufficiently addressed in space research. Therefore, a review of analogue work environments is carried out to make up for the paucity of space research found in the area of human performance in long-duration spaceflight. This resulted in an evaluation of seven analogue environments concerning their similarity to space with industrial process control and nuclear submarines coming out as the closest match on the technical dimension. Finally, some recommendations are given from the lessons learned in spaceflight, simulation studies and appropriate analogue environments.     

Improved space safety for astronauts

The 2003 Columbia accident demonstrated that spaceflight remains a risky and dangerous human endeavor, yet there have been few ‘unofficial’ investigations into astronaut safety. This report summarizes the findings of one such study by George Washington University's Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute—e.g. that simplicity of design may be better than complexity, that cargo missions would be better carried out robotically and that all new space transportation systems should be developed to common international standards—before examining ways that international cooperation can advance the cause of space safety. In establishing future space safety standards input from a wider range of participants (industry, universities and private research institutes, as well as space agencies, etc.) will need to be sought.     

Management dynamics of NASA''s human spaceflight programs

The public management dynamics of human spaceflight at NASA in the post-Apollo era—Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and the United States national vision for space exploration—are examined. A number of variables are applied to assess this. Public management processes are identified as a function of political accountability, organizational decision-making and cultures, and technical aspects directed at high reliability and safety of the large-scale, complex, and high-risk technologies that characterize NASA's human spaceflight programs. The findings indicate that these variables are causally linked to management outcomes through dynamics of centralized and decentralized organizational approaches. The success or failure of NASA's human spaceflight programs are linked to organizational management based on dynamics between centralized aspects of management, like controls over cost and schedule, and decentralized aspects, such as engineering authority over technical development.     

Creating a UK human spaceflight capability: A modest proposal

Since the beginning of international manned activity in the early 1960s, UK governments have consistently avoided participation in human spaceflight, with its high cost and doubts over the resulting scientific gains generally cited as the reasons for opting out. This has resulted in the UK scientific community having no direct access to microgravity science experiments, while the education establishment has missed out on the gains to be had from scientific and technology inspiration for young people. It also makes realistic involvement in the future international manned exploration of the Moon and the solar system unlikely. A viable, low-cost programme could be implemented in the near future to allow for a modest UK manned access to the International Space Station. This need only cost around £50 million over five years, representing about a 5% increase in the current annual UK civil space budget, with funding sought from government departments, research councils and private industry. Making use of Soyuz commercial flights, the project would allow for two separate 10-day science missions. The small corps of three UK astronauts established for the project would form a modest ‘seed-corn’ for future international orbital, lunar and solar system manned exploration involvement for the UK. The benefits of this project would cover science research, education outreach, industrial employment and involvement in international cooperation in manned exploration of the cosmos, as well as in the microgravity research being undertaken by NASA and others.     

Launch vehicles and the commercial uses of outer space : The underlying economic issues

This article discusses the economics of the demand for and supply of launch vehicles. Demand is derived from both commercial and governmental uses of space, while the supply of launch vehicles is determined by governmental needs which are rarely based on economic criteria alone. Multipurpose launches such as the Space Shuttle should be viewed as a national resource instead of a profit-seeking venture. Because of the mixing of government and private uses for space vehicles, traditional economic analysis provides only a starting point for policy decisions.