Aperture error mitigation via local-state estimation for frequency-based emitter location

This paper considers the problem of locating a stationary coherent emitter via a single moving platform making frequency measurements in the presence of aperture state uncertainty. It is shown that the estimated emitter location is most sensitive to the receiving aperture velocity uncertainty. The required aperture velocity accuracy is determined through a noninfinitesimal perturbation analysis. A solution to location accuracy enhancement with a minimal hardware addition is attempted. It is shown that this can be achieved by mounting a high-resolution tri-axis microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) accelerometer at the aperture to measure its velocity, which can deviate significantly from that estimated by the on-board navigation system. The Doppler shifts of the GPS signal carrier frequency, whenever it can be acquired through the aperture, are also considered as a way to aid the aperture velocity measurement. A decentralized, federated processing method for the aperture velocity estimate referenced at the aperture, integrating all measurement data, is presented. An upper bound for the error of aperture velocity estimate is derived. The potential for significant accuracy enhancement for emitter location is demonstrated.     

Analysis of single-platform passive emitter location with terraindata

Frequency measurements made at a moving platform can be used to locate an emitter. An error ellipsoid analysis is used to compare the performance under three levels of a priori information on the emitter's altitude: (1) no knowledge, (2) terrain data, and (3) complete knowledge of the emitter's altitude. The analysis is performed for two simple platform paths that provide frequency measurements that are approximately time reversed versions of one another. When no a priori knowledge is available there is little difference between the performance when the platform maneuvers on a concave circular path or on a convex circular path and the performance depends very Little on the platform altitude. However, when some a priori altitude information is available the performance is markedly different on the two paths and is highly dependent on the platform altitude. Thus, this analysis provides the unexpected result that for seemingly similar platform paths, the performance can vary markedly when the emitter altitude is assumed known. Also, an interesting result is that for some cases it is possible to achieve better x-y accuracy when using terrain data than when the emitter's z location is known, because the terrain data provides terrain slope information. These cases are characterized in terms of the terrain slope at the emitter     

Some do's and don't's for young EE's or advice I wish I'd had whenI started

The author outlines several rules for starting electrical engineers that he developed during his career. The rules are divided into general rules, rules for career growth, and job-related rules     

Three R's of radar: recollections, remonstrances, and ruminations

The author describes his experiences in the early days in radar, working on a radar landing system called ground control approach (GCA). He discusses for the disparity between the short time from conception to worldwide deployment of that system and today's 10- to 15-year cycle, as well as GCA's high (100%) availability, and identifies the factors responsible. The author goes on to argue that the radar community has a history of overselling what radar can do. He forecasts future trends and concludes with a few things he has learned over the years     

Comments on the Cost and Performance of Military Systems

Editor's Note: Mr. Fowler was the banquet speaker at the Tri Service Radar Symposium held at West Point in 1977. We invited Mr. Fowl to share his speech with the AES readership by providing this paper. The material and style correspond closely to his oral presentation.     

The UWB (impulse) radar caper or `punishment of the innocent'

The author describes his experiences chairing a panel to review ultrawideband (UWB), or impulse, radar. The panel's report pointed out the fallacies in the proposals of the extremists pushing the rapid development of such a radar, noted the very good work of the real contributors, and made several recommendations. Pressure from the extremists led to an investigation by the Inspector General of the US Department of Defense of the panel and its members. That investigation found no basis for the allegations and concluded that the panel's report was credible and the panel balanced     

The IBEX Flight Segment

IBEX provides the observations needed for detailed modeling and in-depth understanding of the interstellar interaction (McComas et al. in Physics of the Outer Heliosphere, Third Annual IGPP Conference, pp. 162–181, 2004; Space Sci. Rev., 2009a, this issue). From mission design to launch and acquisition, this goal drove all flight system development. This paper describes the management, design, testing and integration of IBEX’s flight system, which successfully launched from Kwajalein Atoll on October 19, 2008. The payload is supported by a simple, Sun-pointing, spin-stabilized spacecraft with no deployables. The spacecraft bus consists of the following subsystems: attitude control, command and data handling, electrical power, hydrazine propulsion, RF, thermal, and structures. A novel 3-step orbit approach was employed to put IBEX in its highly elliptical, 8-day final orbit using a Solid Rocket Motor, which provided large delta-V after IBEX separated from the Pegasus launch vehicle; an adapter cone, which interfaced between the SRM and Pegasus; Motorized Lightbands, which performed separation from the Pegasus, ejection of the adapter cone, and separation of the spent SRM from the spacecraft; a ShockRing isolation system to lower expected launch loads; and the onboard Hydrazine Propulsion System. After orbit raising, IBEX transitioned from commissioning to nominal operations and science acquisition. At every phase of development, the Systems Engineering and Mission Assurance teams supervised the design, testing and integration of all IBEX flight elements.     

A potpourri of vignettes, lessons learned and hardover prejudices

Managing any kind of substantial technical program is a complex and difficult job with many facets and a seemingly infinite number of possible misfortunes that can and frequently do, occur. This paper is, in no way, meant to cover the subject of engineering and program management but rather relates some instructive stories about three great managers and discusses a few areas that I believe are important     

The defense acquisition system too late for the scalpel; bring outthe meat axe!

The problems discussed include that associated with the requirements process which leads to overspecification and an overly rigid approach to development, and a procurement system which is bloated and grossly inefficient. The bureaucracy in the DoD acquisition system has grown steadily from the 1960's to 1990's. Each problem encountered, and there have been serious ones, has resulted in the addition by the DoD or Congress of another wicket to get through, another set of unended peripheral tasks, another layer of checks, meetings, reports. Each addition was an intended improvement which in the long run has only made things worse. The DoD rightly asked for greater reliability and the reliability/maintainability/availability RMA, cult was born. Recommendations dealing with these problems are discussed