The decision to develop the Space Shuttle

Many of the problems that the Space Shuttle programme has had in meeting its goals of routine and cost-effective access to space can be traced to various characteristics of the decision to develop the Space Shuttle. That decision was made through a process of bureaucratic politics, with little attention given to future users of the Shuttle. The design chosen for development was a poor compromise between demanding Pentagon and NASA requirements and a limited budget.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

The space station and Mars

This article presents a plan for reconfiguring the US-international Space Station, which could be used to undertake exploration of Mars. The author believes that there is an urgent need to give a unified purpose to the US Shuttle, Space Station and space science activities, and that planning for an international Mars sample return mission along the lines outlined here could start the US space programme moving again within budgetary requirements.     

Leadership in space transportation

Rather than aiming at overall preemenence in space, as in the past, it is important for the USA now to specify goals and objectives for its space programme. In the space transportation market, the USA faces long-term competition. Planned properly, the Space Shuttle, Space Station and transfer stages can be used as a unique transport system, forcing other suppliers to compete on US terms. Such a total transport service system could also include ELV support. In entering into international space agreements, the government must take into account the objective of maintaining the competitiveness of the US commercial sector.     

A reappraisal of the Space Shuttle programme

The conventional wisdom holds that the Space Shuttle programme has been a ‘policy failure’ because NASA compromised its original concept in the face of weak political commitment and inadequate funding. However, a detailed reappraisal of the history shows that this reasoning is ambiguous, counterfactual and contrary to experience. Congressional and presidential support for the Shuttle has consistently been generous despite flawed and shifting justifications for the programme advanced by NASA. Among the lessons to be learned are the need for more rigorous congressional oversight and the development of smaller, quicker and independent civil space programmes.     

Efficient payload processing: the opposite side of frequent space shuttle launches

The planned rate of up to 40 Space Shuttle missions per year from the Kennedy Space Center requires a matching payload processing capability that must be efficient and economical. Five facilities are being converted to handle spacecraft assembly and checkout, two to handle explosives and other dangerous spacecraft components, and one for total payload integration. New handling and transporting equipment is being built, and new procedures established. This paper presents an overview of the processing cycles of the two presently known types of payloads, their integration into Shuttle-ready cargos, and the installation of the cargo into the Space Shuttle Orbiter.     

Assessing the legacy of the Space Shuttle

This article reviews the core legacies of the Space Shuttle program after 25 years and suggests that, while it was not an unadulterated success, on balance the Shuttle served a valuable role in the development of spaceflight and deserves an overall positive assessment in history. There are five core legacies that deserve discussion. First, the Space Shuttle has a reputation as a mistake resulting from a policy failure that should never have been pursued. Second, it has been criticized as a program that prohibited other paths for the US space program. Third, and more positively, the Space Shuttle provided more than two decades of significant human spaceflight capability and stretched the nature of what could be accomplished in Earth orbit much beyond where it had previously been. Fourth, it served as a relatively flexible platform for scientific activities. Finally, and perhaps most significantly since the US human spaceflight program has always been focused on national prestige, the Space Shuttle served well as a symbol of American technological verisimilitude.     

Space Phoenix

The US federal government is collaborating with a non-profit university consortium and its commercial project managers to develop the Space Shuttle fleet's expended external fuel tanks for scientific and commercial uses in space. Nearly a half dozen years in evolution, the Space Phoenix Program is a private-sector civil space programme with the long-term goal of opening the Earth's space to as many people, organizations and activities as possible, as soon as possible, and at the lowest cost to them as possible. In time it is expected to be a major focus for private-sector activities in space. This report describes how it will work.     

Attached payloads on SPACEHAB, growing from the Space Shuttle to the Space Station

Although NASA's Space Shuttle is largely dedicated in the near term to Space Station assembly, 10–16 day flight opportunities still abound for spacecraft technology demonstration payloads, and experiments for the established earth and space science communities. This paper will present the latest developments of SPACEHAB flight systems in order to accommodate the flight needs of these communities on the Space Shuttle today and the Space Station tomorrow. In particular, some examples of payloads from these disciplines will be introduced together with the accommodation and experiment objectives.     

Shuttle avionics verification and integration testing

The Space Shuttle Orbiter employs a fly-by-wire control system of 200 major avionic hardware devices interfacing with five flight computers through a complex data bus system. Responses to man-in-the-loop commands are dependent on the flight software. Early program development testing of the computer and avionic hardware has been accomplished at Rockwell International's Shuttle Avionics Development Laboratory (ADL). Hardware development has led to complete multi-string system testing and flight software evaluations. This paper provides an overview of the ADL. Its role and test capabilities in support of Shuttle development are defined. The nature of computer driven test programs for the Orbiter displays, the Digital Autopilot, and flight software development describe the test bed provided by the ADL.     

Potential cost reductions for three STS/Spacelab mission modes

Based on the results of studies carried out by ESA several possibilities are discussed to achieve mission cost reductions for large Spacelab instrument facilities as compared to their flight on several 7-day duration Spacelab missions. As an example three scientific telescope facilities are selected (LIRTS, EXSPOS, GRIST) which are defined to a Phase A level.Three new mission modes are considered:

• —Shuttle attached Spacelab mission mode with extended flight duration (up to 30 days) for which the application of planned capability extensions and new elements of the STS/Spacelab (e.g. Short Spacelab Pallets, Power Extension Package) are investigated.

• —Shuttle deployed mission mode, for which the telescope, accommodated on a Spacelab pallet, is docked to the Power Module, a new element of the Space Transportation System under study by NASA.

• —Free-flying mission mode, for which Shuttle launched dedicated missions of the facilities are considered, assuming varying degrees of autonomy with respect to supporting services of the Shuttle.

Reduction of costs have been considered on the levels of single mission cost and total programme cost. Fundamentally the charges for the instrument can be reduced by constraining the mass/volume factors with respect to the Shuttle capability. However, the instrument as part of a payload is only viable if an acceptable resource sharing including observation time can be achieved. Any single instrument will require several mission opportunities or one mission which achieves a similar or longer total observation programme.Based on an identification of instrument modifications of the Phase A baseline designs to favour cost reductions and on a derivation of technical requirements, constraints and finally budgetary cost comparisons an attempt is made to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the different mission modes.The favoured option for GRIST is a 2–3 weeks sortie mission followed after refurbishment by a longer Power Module docked mission. For LIRTS and EXSPOS the free-flying pallet modes are very attractive in terms of the longer durations achieved and in terms of cost per unit operating time.     

U.S. prebreathe protocol

This paper identifies and describes the prebreathe protocol currently used by the U.S. Space Shuttle Program to provide astronauts the capability to safely perform extravehicular activity. A comparison of planned vs actual prebreathe experience through the STS-37 Mission is also provided.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

The shuttle development and its growth potential

During the next two decades, we will establish the foundation for the 21st century's accomplishments in space. The Space Shuttle vehicle will become the cornerstone for that foundation by providing economical opportunities for space exploration and utilization.Reusability of the Shuttle vehicle is the key to its economy. The major developmental challenges encountered in the Shuttle program are typified by the complexities involved in designing the reusable propulsion and thermal protection subsystems. We successfully met such challenges and are nearing the launch of the first Shuttle orbital flight.Our immediate goal is to enter the Space Shuttle operational phase because only then will we fully understand the unique capabilities of the Shuttle. Concurrent with our effort to begin Shuttle operations are our initial efforts to expand Shuttle capabilities, extending them significantly beyond those of the current baseline system.Shuttle payload capacity and mission-duration capabilities are to increase considerably during the next decade. Just as present Shuttle performance specifications and development timetables were guided by the space program plans and forecasts of the 1960s, so will the development of long-range space programs be determined by our near-future achievements. We anticipate that the Space Shuttle will play a critical role in those achievements.     

Identification and status of design improvements to the NASA Shuttle EMU for International Space Station application

To meet the significant increase in EVA demand to support assembly and operations of the International Space Station (ISS), NASA and industry have improved the current Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), or "space suit", configuration to meet the unique and specific requirements of an orbital-based system. The current Shuttle EMU was designed to be maintained and serviced on the ground between frequent Shuttle flights. ISS will require the EMUs to meet increased EVAs out of the Shuttle Orbiter and to remain on orbit for up to 180 days without need for regular return to Earth for scheduled maintenance or refurbishment. Ongoing Shuttle EMU improvements have increased reliability, operational life and performance while minimizing ground and on-orbit maintenance cost and expendable inventory. Modifications to both the anthropomorphic mobility elements of the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) as well as to the Primary Life Support System (PLSS) are identified and discussed. This paper also addresses the status of on-going Shuttle EMU improvements and summarizes the approach for increasing interoperability of the U.S. and Russian space suits to be utilized aboard the ISS.     

Publications

This article presents four assessments prepared by a panel of US scientists and space authorities, on post-Challenger use of the Space Shuttle.     

Past, present, and future: the U.S. EVA program

This paper provides an overview and summary of U.S. extravehicular activity accomplishments of the last 26 years, Space Shuttle missions having scheduled extravehicular activities to be performed over the next several years, extravehicular activities expected to be necessary to support Space Station Freedom assembly tasks and operations, and potential extravehicular activity roles of the NASA Space Exploration Initiative Program.     

航天飞机先进固体火箭发动机的推进剂

综述了美国航天飞机走进固体火箭发动机的推进剂配方研制，制造工艺和工艺过程中的质量控制。     

The Challenger accident and public opinion : Attitudes towards the space programme in the USA

This article reports on a major survey of American attitudes towards the space programme in general, and the Shuttle in particular. The survey was carried out in three waves: before the January 1986 Challenger accident, immediately afterwards, and five months later. It was found that the net effect of the accident was a strong shift of public sentiment in favour of the space programme and the Shuttle. Expectation was high for a timely resumption of Shuttle flights, although there was a delayed recognition that the impact of the accident on the space programme was more significant than originally thought by most Americans. There was a shift towards a more positive assessment of the benefits and costs of space exploration. Positive attitudes towards funding increased even more markedly. These shifts were of a magnitude rarely found in studies of public attitudes.     

The Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM): a breakthrough in remote sensing of topography

The Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), flown on the Space Shuttle Endeavour on Flight STS-99 and launched on 11 February 2000, will produce digital elevation data of the Earth's land mass between 60 degrees north latitude and 54 degrees south latitude. This data will be at least one order of magnitude more precise in the elevation resolution, and will have postings of 30 m, representing an order of magnitude increase in the density of the postings over currently available data.