Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

The origin of the smaller, faster, cheaper approach in NASA’s solar system exploration program

The current emphasis on smaller, faster, cheaper (SFC) spacecraft in NASA’s solar system exploration program is the product of a number of interacting – even interdependent – factors. The SFC concept as applied to NASA’s solar system exploration program can be viewed as the vector sum of (1) the space science community’s desire for more frequent planetary missions to plug the data gaps, educate the next generation of scientists, provide missions to targets of opportunity, and enable programmatic flexibility in times of budgetary crisis; (2) the poor publicity garnered by NASA in the early 1990s and the resultant atmosphere of public criticism (creating an opportunity for reform); (3) The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization’s and the National Space Council community’s desire to advance the Space Exploration Initiative and their perception that the NASA culture at the time represented a barrier to the effective pursuit of space exploration; (4) the effective leadership of NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin; and (5) the diminishing budget profile for space sciences in the early 1990s. This paper provides a summary of the origin of the smaller, faster, cheaper approach in the planetary program. A more through understanding of the history behind this policy will enable analysts to assess more accurately the relative successes and failures of NASA’s new approach to solar system exploration.     

Competing for a future in space: NASA and the Department of Defense

Although the 1958 Space Act stressed the civilian nature of the US space programme, the military space budget has grown to over twice the size of NASA's. Military influence on US space policy has grown accordingly. NASA has failed in articulating a sense of direction and purpose for the civilian space programme justifying sustained and adequate support. What matters most for a reinvigorated NASA is the level of commitment the nation is prepared to make, and in today's political climate greater spending on a civilian space programme would be unpopular. The USA looks likely to continue to fall behind in the international competition for space leadership.     

The future of space medicine.

In November 2000, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its partners in the International Space Station (ISS) ushered in a new era of space flight: permanent human presence in low-Earth orbit. As the culmination of the last four decades of human space flight activities. the ISS focuses our attention on what we have learned to date. and what still must be learned before we can embark on future exploration endeavors. Space medicine has been a primary part of our past success in human space flight, and will continue to play a critical role in future ventures. To prepare for the day when crews may leave low-Earth orbit for long-duration exploratory missions, space medicine practitioners must develop a thorough understanding of the effects of microgravity on the human body, as well as ways to limit or prevent them. In order to gain a complete understanding and create the tools and technologies needed to enable successful exploration. space medicine will become even more of a highly collaborative discipline. Future missions will require the partnership of physicians, biomedical scientists, engineers, and mission planners. This paper will examine the future of space medicine as it relates to human space exploration: what is necessary to keep a crew alive in space, how we do it today, how we will accomplish this in the future, and how the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to achieve future goals.     

Transforming solar system exploration: The origins of the Discovery Program, 1989–1993

The Discovery Program is a rarity in the history of NASA solar system exploration: a reform program that has survived and continued to be influential. This article examines its emergence between 1989 and 1993, largely as the result of the intervention of two people: Stamatios “Tom” Krimigis of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), and Wesley Huntress of NASA, who was Division Director of Solar System Exploration 1990–92 and the Associate Administrator for Space Science 1992–98. Krimigis drew on his leadership experience in the space physics community and his knowledge of its Explorer program to propose that it was possible to create new missions to the inner solar system for a fraction of the existing costs. He continued to push that idea for the next two years, but it took the influence of Huntress at NASA Headquarters to push it on to the agenda. Huntress explicitly decided to use APL to force change on the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the planetary science community. He succeeded in moving the JPL Mars Pathfinder and APL Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) mission proposals forward as the opening missions for Discovery. But it took Krimigis's political skill and access to Sen. Barbara Mikulski in 1993 to get the NEAR into the NASA budget, thereby likely ensuring that Discovery would not become another one-mission program.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

Assessing the legacy of the Space Shuttle

This article reviews the core legacies of the Space Shuttle program after 25 years and suggests that, while it was not an unadulterated success, on balance the Shuttle served a valuable role in the development of spaceflight and deserves an overall positive assessment in history. There are five core legacies that deserve discussion. First, the Space Shuttle has a reputation as a mistake resulting from a policy failure that should never have been pursued. Second, it has been criticized as a program that prohibited other paths for the US space program. Third, and more positively, the Space Shuttle provided more than two decades of significant human spaceflight capability and stretched the nature of what could be accomplished in Earth orbit much beyond where it had previously been. Fourth, it served as a relatively flexible platform for scientific activities. Finally, and perhaps most significantly since the US human spaceflight program has always been focused on national prestige, the Space Shuttle served well as a symbol of American technological verisimilitude.     

The decision to build the space station too weak a commitment?

The decision to build the Space Station illustrates the way in which the incremental nature of policy making in the US government favours short-term flexibility over long-term commitments. In making the moves necessary to win approval for the Space, Station NASA officials and their allies took actions which gave policy makers frequent opportunities to re-examine the programme once approved, and may have made likely the continuing uncertainty over the future of the station. Difficulty in securing long-term commitments for large and complex science and technology programmes has been a central feature of US space policy ever since the landing on the Moon.     

The Global Exploration Roadmap and its significance for NASA

The Global Exploration Roadmap reflects the collaborative effort of twelve space agencies to define a long-term human space exploration strategy which provides substantial benefits for improving the quality of life on Earth and is implementable and sustainable. Such a strategy is a necessary precondition to the government investments required to enable the challenging and rewarding missions that extend human presence into the solar system. The article introduces the international strategy and elaborates on NASA's leadership role in shaping that strategy. The publication of the roadmap, a reflection of the space landscape and multilateral agency-level dialog over the last four years, allows NASA to demonstrate its commitment to leading a long-term space exploration endeavor that delivers benefits, maintains strategic human spaceflight capabilities and expands human presence in space, with human missions to the surface of Mars as a driving goal. The road mapping process has clearly demonstrated the complementary interests of the participants and the potential benefits that can be gained through cooperation among nations to achieve a common goal. The present US human spaceflight policy is examined and it is shown that the establishment of a sustainable global space exploration strategy is fully consistent with that policy.     

Human spaceflight and an asteroid redirect mission: Why?

The planning of human spaceflight programmes is an exercise in careful rationing of a scarce and expensive resource. Current NASA plans are to develop the new capability for human-rated launch into space to replace the Space Transportation System (STS), more commonly known as the Space Shuttle, combined with a heavy lift capability, and followed by an eventual Mars mission. As an intermediate step towards Mars, NASA proposes to venture beyond Low Earth Orbit to cis-lunar space to visit a small asteroid which will be captured and moved to lunar orbit by a separate robotic mission. The rationale for this and how to garner support from the scientific community for such an asteroid mission are discussed. Key points that emerge are that a programme usually has greater legitimacy when it emerges from public debate, mostly via a Presidential Commission, a report by the National Research Council or a Decadal Review of science goals etc. Also, human spaceflight missions need to have support from a wide range of interested communities. Accordingly, an outline scientific case for a human visit to an asteroid is made. Further, it is argued here that the scientific interest in an asteroid mission needs to be included early in the planning stages, so that the appropriate capabilities (here the need for drilling cores and carrying equipment to, and returning samples from, the asteroid) can be included.     

Leadership issues with multicultural crews on the international space station: lessons learned from Shuttle/Mir

In isolated and confined environments, two important leadership roles have been identified: the task/instrumental role (which focuses on work goals and operational needs), and the supportive/expressive role (which focuses on morale goals and emotional needs). On the International Space Station, the mission commander should be familiar with both of these aspects of leadership. In previous research involving a 135-day Mir space station simulation in Moscow and a series of on-orbit Mir space station missions during the Shuttle/Mir program, both these leadership roles were studied. In new analyses of the Shuttle/Mir data, we found that for crewmembers, the supportive role of the commander (but not the task role) related positively with crew cohesion. For mission control personnel on the ground, both the task and supportive roles of their leader were related positively to mission control cohesion. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of leadership on board the International Space Station.     

Program goals for the NASA/NOAA Earth Observation Program derived from a stakeholder value network analysis

The 2007 US National Research Council Decadal Survey for Earth Science and Applications from Space was the first consensus perspective produced by the US Earth Science community of the relative priorities among a sequence of 17 satellite missions over the course of the next decade. However, the Decadal Survey only captured the perspective of the science community, leading to questions about the inclusion of broader priorities from constituent communities and stakeholders. We present a stakeholder value network analysis for the NASA/NOAA Earth Observation Program. The analysis includes a rigorous articulation of the needs and objectives of 13 major stakeholders and a complete stakeholder value network with 190 individual “value flows” that capture the interactions between all the stakeholders. It produces a novel stakeholder map, graphically indicating the outputs most likely to create a lasting Earth Science program. The most important value loops and program outputs are used to derive a set of high-level program goals that suggest what NASA and NOAA should do, as well as how they should conduct business. The analysis concludes that international partnerships represent a strong potential partner for certain science missions with greater potential value delivery than currently-prioritized efforts with defense stakeholders and concludes that weather and land-use missions, in addition to climate missions, should be given highest priority; water, human health, and solid Earth missions should be given lower priority based on each science category's potential for delivering value to the entire stakeholder network.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

The NASA programme in the 1990s and beyond

This article is an edited summary of a report on the future work of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration published in May 1988 by the US Congress's Congressional Budget Office. It considers whether NASA will be able to undertake new and ambitious initiatives in the coming decades, or instead hold its spending to current real levels, thus limiting US international leadership in space activities.     

Using Spacelab as a precursor of science operations for the Space Station

For more than 15 years, Spacelab, has provided a laboratory in space for an international array of experiments, facilities, and experimenters. In addition to continuing this important work, Spacelab is now serving as a crucial stepping-stone to the improved science, improved operations, and rapid access to space that will characterize International Space Station. In the Space Station era, science operations will depend primarily on distributed/remote operations that will allow investigators to direct science activities from their universities, facilities, or home bases. Spacelab missions are a crucial part of preparing for these activities, having been used to test, prove, and refine remote operations over several missions. The knowledge gained from preparing these Missions is also playing a crucial role in reducing the time required to put an experiment into orbit, from revolutionizing the processes involved to testing the hardware needed for these more advanced operations. This paper discusses the role of the Spacelab program and the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center- (MSFC-) managed missions in developing and refining remote operations, new hardware and facilities for use on Space Station, and procedures that dramatically reduce preparation time for flight.     

Cooperative research in microgravity sciences during the French manned MIR missions

During the past ten years the French laboratories working in the field of fluids and material sciences had access to regular, long-lasting manned missions onboard the Russian MIR Space Station. Beyond the French scientific program that was performed with the ALICE apparatus, a cooperative research program was developed with DLR, NASA and RSA. This cooperation was based on bartered agreements that included the joint utilization of the instruments onboard the MIR station (ALICE, TITUS furnace from DLR, vibration device from RKK Energia) and the funding of dedicated cartridges (DLR) or thermostats (DLR and NASA), as well as launch services (NASA) by the Cooperating Agencies. We present a review of this program with a particular emphasis on its scientific results and on the progress that has been achieved in science and applications. They covered a large field of condensed matter physics, from material sciences to near-critical and off-critical phase separation kinetics and near critical fluid hydrodynamics (thermoacoustic heat transport and vibrational convection). The high microgravity relevance of all these investigations naturally led to outstanding results that was published in the world's best scientific journals. The analysis of the latest experiments performed during the PEGASUS mission shows they will not be an exception to that evaluation. Off-critical phase separation with NASA, pressure-driven piston effect and equiaxed solidification with DLR, heat transport under calibrated vibrations with RKK Energia, all will be presented. The conclusion will stress the international character of this microgravity research program, the conditions of its success and what can be gained from it in the perspective of the space station utilization.     

Transforming space dreams into realities : Hopes for the 1990s

A member of the Cal Space group convened to study ways of capitalizing on the past 20 years of investment in space, Philip R. Harris here outlines how he believes the US space effort can be galvanized to meet the challenges of the next decade. A new space ethos must be fostered within the national culture by broadening popular involvement in space enterprise. NASA should also be reformed to give it more independence and initiative. This calls for transformational leadership, committed to creating and communicating the vision of change.     

Stepping stones to the future: Achieving a sustainable lunar outpost

The current emphasis in the US and internationally on lunar robotic missions is generally viewed as a precursor to possible future human missions to the Moon. As initially framed, the implementation of high level policies such as the US Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) might have been limited to either human lunar sortie missions, or to the testing at the Moon of concepts-of-operations and systems for eventual human missions to Mars [White House, Vision for Space Exploration, Washington, DC, 14 January, 2004. [1]]. However, recently announced (December 2006) US goals go much further: these plans now place at the center of future US—and perhaps international—human spaceflight activities a long-term commitment to an outpost on the Moon.Based on available documents, a human lunar outpost could be emplaced as early as the 2020–2025 timeframe, and would involve numerous novel systems, new technologies and unique operations requirements. As such, substantial investments in research and development (R&D) will be necessary prior to, during, and following the deployment of such an outpost. It seems possible that such an outpost will be an international endeavor, not just the undertaking of a single country—and the US has actively courted partners in the VSE. However, critical questions remain concerning an international lunar outpost. What might such an outpost accomplish? To what extent will “sustainability” be built into the outpost? And, most importantly, what will be the outpost's life cycle cost (LCC)?This paper will explore these issues with a view toward informing key policy and program decisions that must be made during the next several years. The paper will (1) describe a high-level analytical model of a modest lunar outpost, (2) examine (using this model) the parametric characteristics of the outpost in terms of the three critical questions indicated above, and (3) present rough estimates of the relationships of outpost goals and “sustainability” to LCC. The paper will also consider possible outpost requirements for near-term investments in enabling research in light of experiences in past advanced technology programs.     

Life science experiments during the German-Russian MIR '97 mission

Manned spaceflight has been an important element of the German space program over the last decades. This is demonstrated by the nationally managed space missions Spacelab D-l (1985), D-2 (1993), and MIR '92 as well as by the participation in the 1st Spacelab mission FSLP (1983), the NASA missions IML-1 (1992) and IML-2 (1994), as well as in the ESA missions EUROMIR '94 and '95. On February 12th, this year, the German cosmonaut Reinhold Ewald was launched together with his Russian colleagues Wasilij Zibliew and Alexander Lasudkin onboard of a Soyuz spacecraft for another stay of a German cosmonaut onboard of the Russian Space Station MIR. This mission--the so-called German/Russian MIR '97--was, of course, another cornerstone with regard to the cooperation between Russian and German space organizations. The cooperation in the area of manned missions began 1978 with the flight of the German cosmonaut Sigmund Jahn onboard of Salyut 6, at that time a cooperation between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in the frame of the Interkosmos Program. In March 1992, it was followed by the flight of Klaus Dietrich Flade with his stay onboard of MIR. After two further successful ESA missions, EUROMIR '94 and '95 with the two German cosmonauts Ulf Merbold and Thomas Reiter and with a marked contribution of German scientists, the decision was taken to perform another German/Russian MIR mission, the so-called MIR '97. In Germany, MIR'97 was managed and performed in a joint effort between several partners. DARA, the German Space Agency, was responsible for the overall program and project management, while DLR, the German Aerospace Research Establishment, was responsible for the cosmonaut training, for medical operations, for the mission control at GSOC in Oberpfaffenhofen as well as for user support.     

Why space exploration should be a global project

Apollo should not serve as a model for the many programs for lunar and planetary exploration currently making headway: it was a unilateral effort whose generous budget would be inconceivable today. Yet President Kennedy was an advocate of cooperation in major space missions, an attitude that makes perfect sense today, when so many agencies have ambitious exploration plans. The importance of President G.W. Bush's ‘Vision for Space Exploration’, by providing a focus for NASA and others, has been underestimated. It should give us a chance to find out whether a long-term objective of moving humans off the home planet is really feasible—surely the point of exploration.