不对称信息和非线性需求下两级供应链优化契约

为研究两级供应链系统中不对称信息的作用，并设计供应链契约有效地解决信息不对称问题，文中建立了市场需求为价格弹性需求，包含一个供应商和一个零售商的两级供应链模型。当零售商成本结构为非对称信息时，利用委托一代理理论和最优控制原理设计了3种不对称信息和非线性需求下供应链契约：批发价契约、双参数线性契约和双参数非线性契约，并对上述3种契约模型进行数值仿真分析。研究显示双参数契约模型能够更有效地达到供应链协调。

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND NONLINEAR DEMAND

The challenge for supply chain management is to create appropriate supply chain contracts so as to optimize the system performance. To examine the role of asymmetric information in a two-echelon supply chain system and derive supply chain contracts to deal with existing asymmetric information, a two level supply chain model including one supplier and one retailer under the demand of price elasticity is developed. By using the principal-agent principle and the optimal control theory, three types of supply chain contract, i.e., a wholesale pricing contract, a two-parameter linear and a two-parameter nonlinear contracts are obtained. In these contracts, the supplier has asymmetric information about the retailer cost structure. Simulation results show that the two-parameter contracts are more effective strategies to achieve supply chain coordination.