| 中国民航"禁折令"的"囚徒困境" |
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| 引用本文： | 余真翰.中国民航"禁折令"的"囚徒困境"[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报(管理科学版),2003,21(3):1-3. |
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| 作者姓名： | 余真翰 |
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| 作者单位： | 海军后勤学院 天津300450 |
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| 摘 要： | 利用博弈论的方法，对中国民航业施行多年的“禁折令”进行分析，指出各航空公司在“禁折令”中的博弈属于完全信息静态博弈。通过对民航业差别产品价格竞争需求曲线模型的分析，证明了“禁折令”所形成的价格卡特尔具有非稳定性，各航空公司存在突破“禁折令”限制的违约冲动，因此，实施机票打折销售，是市场运作的客观要求和必然趋势。
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| 关 键 词： | “囚徒困境” 中国 民航业 博弈论 机票价格 “禁折令” 行政干预 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-9734(2003)03-0001-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年5月30日 |
“The Prisoners'Dilemma ”of CAAC'S Regulation for Discount Limits |
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| YU Zhen-han.“The Prisoners''Dilemma ”of CAAC''S Regulation for Discount Limits[J].Journal of Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management,2003,21(3):1-3. |
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| Authors: | YU Zhen-han |
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| Institution: | YU Zhen-han |
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| Abstract: | The paper analyses the Regulation for Discount Limits that has been used for many years in China by the means of the Game theory.It points out that the games in RDL used by all airlines belong to Complete Information Game. And by analyzing the needing curve of the price competiton model of differential products in the field, the instability existing in price cartel formed by RDL can be proved as well as the airline's impulses to break the rule of RDL. Therefore, tickets selling at a discount is an objective requirement and an essential trend in market running.Z |
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| Keywords: | CAAC ticket price complete information game prisoners' dilemma |
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