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基于公司治理视角的高管超额薪酬约束机制
引用本文:王伟.基于公司治理视角的高管超额薪酬约束机制[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报(管理科学版),2014(4):100-104.
作者姓名:王伟
作者单位:郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001
基金项目:河南省社科联、省经团联项目(SKL-2013-112)
摘    要:现代企业中企业所有者和经营者成为不同的行为和利益主体的原因在于所有权与经营权的分离.两权分离的经营方式导致了代理问题的出现.随后高管薪酬作为降低代理成本的一种解决办法被普遍接受.而在缺乏所有者有效监督情况下的薪酬自我制定机制,必然引发企业高管的薪酬与公司业绩脱节,并由此导致超额薪酬问题.而高管超额薪酬现象不但损害了股东利益同时也挫伤了外部投资者的热情.因此从公司治理角度探寻高管超额薪酬的原因和建立高管超额薪酬的约束机制,对于降低代理成本、维护股东利益以及完善公司治理机制具有十分重要的意义.

关 键 词:公司治理  企业高管  超额薪酬  约束机制

A Research Based on the Perspective of Corporate Governance of Restraint Mechanisms on Excess Executives Compensation
WANG Wei.A Research Based on the Perspective of Corporate Governance of Restraint Mechanisms on Excess Executives Compensation[J].Journal of Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management,2014(4):100-104.
Authors:WANG Wei
Institution:WANG Wei (Business School Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001 , China )
Abstract:Separation of the concession and ownership in the modem enterprise management making the enter-prise owners and the manager became two different behaviors and stakeholders, also resulting inconsistencies in interests between business executives and owners. The absence of effective supervision from the owner in the mechanisms for selfpay issues will inevitably lead to excess executives compensation , which not only harm the interests of the shareholders but also dampen the enthusiasm of outside investors, and therefore to explore from the perspective of corporate governance and the establishment of excess executives compensation restraint mechanism is of great significance for reducing agency costs and improve corporate governance.
Keywords:corporate governance  executives  excess compensation  restraint mechanism
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