A Neuro-Cognitive Theory of Deductive Relational Reasoning with Mental Models and Visual Images

Abstract

Many neuro-imaging studies have provided evidence that the parietal cortex plays a key role in reasoning based on mental models, which are supposed to be of abstract spatial nature. However, these studies have also shown concurrent activation in vision-related cortical areas which have often been interpreted as evidence for the role of visual mental imagery in reasoning. The aim of the paper is to resolve the inconsistencies in the previous literature on reasoning and imagery and to develop a neurally and cognitively plausible theory of human relational reasoning. The main assumption is that visual brain areas are only involved if the problem information is easy to visualize and when this information must be processed and maintained in visual working memory. A regular reasoning process, however, does not involve visual images but more abstract spatial representations—spatial mental models—held in parietal cortices. Only these spatial representations are crucial for the genuine reasoning processes.     

Preferred and Alternative Mental Models in Spatial Reasoning

The mental model theory postulates that spatial reasoning relies on the construction, inspection, and the variation of mental models. Experiment 1 shows that in reasoning problems with multiple solutions, reasoners construct only a single model that is preferred over others. Experiment 2 shows that inferences conforming to these preferred mental models (PMM) are easier than inferences that are valid for alternatives. Experiments 3 and 4 support the idea that model variation consists of a model revision process. The process usually starts with the PMM and then constructs alternative models by local transformations. Models which are difficult to reach are more likely to be neglected than models which are only minor revisions of the PMM.     

The cognitive adequacy of Allen's interval calculus for qualitative spatial representation and reasoning

Qualitative spatial reasoning (QSR) is often claimed to be cognitively more plausible than conventional numerical approaches to spatial reasoning, because it copes with the indeterminacy of spatial data and allows inferences based on incomplete spatial knowledge. The paper reports experimental results concerning the cognitive adequacy of an important approach used in QSR, namely the spatial interpretation of the interval calculus introduced by Allen (1983). Knauff, Rauh and Schlieder (1995) distinguished between the conceptual and inferential cognitive adequacy of Allen's interval calculus. The former refers to the thirteen base relations as a representational system and the latter to the compositions of these relations as a tool for reasoning. The results of two memory experiments on conceptual adequacy show that people use ordinal information similar to the interval relations when representing and remembering spatial arrangements. Furthermore, symmetry transformations on the interval relations were found to be responsible for most of the errors, whereas conceptualneighborhood theory did not appear to correspond to cognitively relevant concepts. Inferential adequacy was investigated by two reasoning experiments and the results show that in inference tasks where the number of possible interval relations for the composition is more than one, subjects ignore numerous possibilities and interindividually prefer the same relations. Reorientations and transpositions operating on the relations seem to be important for reasoning performance as well, whereas conceptual neighborhood did not appear to affect the difficulty of reasoning tasks based on the interval relations.