Women and mission leadership

Only one of NASA's planetary science flight missions in the past 30 years has been led by a women scientist as Principal Investigator. The number of senior women in the field is small, but women are still underutilized, as seen by a cohort age analysis correlating with median ages for various key science roles. Worse, the more junior women are not joining missions as Co-Investigators and Participating Scientists at rates approaching their representation in the field of planetary science. In fact, they are underutilized in these roles not by a few percent, but by greater than a factor of two. The pipeline of women gaining mission experience today is increasing, but it is not keeping pace with the rate that women are now choosing to stay in the field for postdoctoral studies and beyond. The numbers definitively show for the first time that, for whatever reason, women are still underrepresented in mission leadership at NASA.     

Human missions to Mars: new psychological challenges and research issues

Human exploratory missions to Mars represent the most exciting future vision of human space flight. With respect to the distance to travel and mission duration, these missions will provide unique psychological challenges that do not compare to any other endeavor humans ever have attempted. The present paper presents outcomes of two recent projects sponsored by the European Space Agency--Humex and Reglisse--where these challenges and risks have been analyzed in some detail, and where concepts for future research have been developed. This presentation involves three steps. At first, it will be shown that our current psychological knowledge derived from orbital spaceflight and analogue environments is not sufficient to assess the specific risks of mission into outer space. Secondly, new psychological challenges of missions to Mars will be identified with respect to three different areas: (1) individual adaptation and performance, (2) crew interactions, and (3) concept and methods of psychological countermeasures. Finally, different options and issues of preparatory psychological research will be discussed.     

A gateway for human exploration of space? The weak stability boundary

NASA's plans for future human exploration of the Solar System describe only missions to Mars. Before such missions can be initiated, much study remains to be done in technology development, mission operations and human performance. While, for example, technology validation and operational experience could be gained in the context of lunar exploration missions, a NASA lunar program is seen as a competitor to a Mars mission rather than a step towards it. The recently characterized weak stability boundary in the Earth–Moon gravitational field may provide an operational approach to all types of planetary exploration, and infrastructure developed for a gateway to the Solar System may be a programmatic solution for exploration that avoids the fractious bickering between Mars and Moon advocates. This viewpoint proposes utilizing the concept of Greater Earth to educate policy makers, opinion makers and the public about these subtle attributes of our space neighborhood.     

JPL Innovation Foundry

Space science missions are increasingly challenged today: in ambition, by increasingly sophisticated hypotheses tested; in development, by the increasing complexity of advanced technologies; in budgeting, by the decline of flagship-class mission opportunities; in management, by expectations for breakthrough science despite a risk-averse programmatic climate; and in planning, by increasing competition for scarce resources. How are the space-science missions of tomorrow being formulated? The paper describes the JPL Innovation Foundry, created in 2011, to respond to this evolving context. The Foundry integrates methods, tools, and experts that span the mission concept lifecycle. Grounded in JPL's heritage of missions, flight instruments, mission proposals, and concept innovation, the Foundry seeks to provide continuity of support and cost-effective, on-call access to the right domain experts at the right time, as science definition teams and Principal Investigators mature mission ideas from “cocktail napkin” to PDR. The Foundry blends JPL capabilities in proposal development and concurrent engineering, including Team X, with new approaches for open-ended concept exploration in earlier, cost-constrained phases, and with ongoing research and technology projects. It applies complexity and cost models, project-formulation lessons learned, and strategy analyses appropriate to each level of concept maturity. The Foundry is organizationally integrated with JPL formulation program offices; staffed by JPL's line organizations for engineering, science, and costing; and overseen by senior Laboratory leaders to assure experienced coordination and review. Incubation of each concept is tailored depending on its maturity and proposal history, and its highest-leverage modeling and analysis needs.     

Group dynamics training for manned spaceflight and the CAPSULS mission: prophylactic against incompatibility and its consequences?

On February 7, 1994, four Canadian Astronauts were sealed off in a hyperbaric chamber at the Canadian Government's Defense and Civil Institute for Environmental Medicine in Toronto, Canada. This space lab training mission lasted seven days and was the first to be conducted with astronauts outside of Russia.

The objective of this mission was to give Canadian astronauts, space scientists and the staff of the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the opportunity to gain first hand experience on preparational and operational aspects of a typical space mission. Twenty-one scientific experiments involving six countries from several disciplines were involved in this mission.

This paper describes the goals and preliminary results of a psychological experiment/training program that used the CAPSULS mission as a test bed for its application in the manned space flight environment. The objective of this project was to enhance the understanding of small group behaviour with a view to maximizing team effectiveness and task accomplishment in teams living and working in isolation under difficult and confined conditions. The application of this model in the light of future missions is a key thesis in this paper.     

The Kinelite Project: a new powerful motion analyser for Spacelab and space station

The goal of the Kinelite Project is to develop a space qualified motion analysis system to be used in space by the scientific community, mainly to support neuroscience protocols. The measurement principle of the Kinelite is to determine, by triangulation mean, the 3D position of small, lightweight, reflective markers positioned at the different points of interest. The scene is illuminated by Infra Red flashes and the reflected light is acquired by up to 8 precalibrated and synchronized CCD cameras. The main characteristics of the system are: Camera field of view: 45 degrees; Number of cameras: 2 to 8; Acquisition frequency: 25, 50, 100, or 200 Hz; CCD format: 256 x 256; Number of markers: up to 64; 3D accuracy: 2mm; Main dimensions: 45 cm x 45 cm x 30 cm; Mass: 23 kg; Power consumption: less than 200 W. The Kinelite will first fly aboard the NASA Spacelab; it will be used, during the NEUROLAB mission (4/98), to support the "Frames of References and Internal Models" (Principal Investigator: Pr. A. Berthoz, Co Investigators: J. McIntyre, F. Lacquaniti).     

Crew autonomy for deep space exploration: Lessons from the Antarctic Search for Meteorites

Future piloted missions to explore asteroids, Mars, and other targets beyond the Moon will experience strict limitations on communication between vehicles in space and control centers on Earth. These limitations will require crews to operate with greater autonomy than any past space mission has demonstrated. The Antarctic Search for Meteorites (ANSMET) project, which regularly sends small teams of researchers to remote parts of the southern continent, resembles a space mission in many ways but does not rely upon a control center. It provides a useful crew autonomy model for planners of future deep space exploration missions. In contrast to current space missions, ANSMET gives the crew the authority to adjust competing work priorities, task assignments, and daily schedules; allows the crew to be the primary monitor of mission progress; demands greater crew accountability for operational errors; requires the crew to make the most of limited communication bandwidth; adopts systems designed for simple operation and failure recovery; and grants the crew a leading role in the selection and stowage of their equipment.     

Phoenix--the first Mars Scout mission

NASA has initiated the first of a new series of missions to augment the current Mars Program. In addition to the systematic series of planned, directed missions currently comprising the Mars Program plan, NASA has started a series of Mars Scout missions that are low cost, price fixed, Principal [correction of Principle] Investigator-led projects. These missions are intended to provide an avenue for rapid response to discoveries made as a result of the primary Mars missions, as well as allow more risky technologies and approaches to be applied in the investigation of Mars. The first in this new series is the Phoenix mission which was selected as part of a highly competitive process. Phoenix will use the Mars 2001 Lander that was discontinued in 2000 and apply a new set of science objectives and mission objectives and will validate this soft lander architecture for future applications. This paper will provide an overview of both the Program and the Project.     

Low cost planetary exploration: surrey lunar minisatellite and interplanetary platform missions

In order to meet the growing global requirement for affordable missions beyond Low Earth Orbit, two types of platform are under design at the Surrey Space Centre. The first platform is a derivative of Surrey's UoSAT-12 minisatellite, launched in April 1999 and operating successfully in-orbit. The minisatellite has been modified to accommodate a propulsion system capable of delivering up to 1700 m/s delta-V, enabling it to support a wide range of very low cost missions to LaGrange points, Near-Earth Objects, and the Moon. A mission to the Moon - dubbed “MoonShine” - is proposed as the first demonstration of the modified minisatellite beyond LEO. The second platform - Surrey's Interplanetary Platform - has been designed to support missions with delta-V requirements up to 3200 m/s, making it ideal for low cost missions to Mars and Venus, as well as Near Earth Objects (NEOs) and other interplanetary trajectories. Analysis has proved mission feasibility, identifying key challenges in both missions for developing cost-effective techniques for: spacecraft propulsion; navigation; autonomous operations; and a reliable safe mode strategy. To reduce mission risk, inherently failure resistant lunar and interplanetary trajectories are under study. In order to significantly reduce cost and increase reliability, both platforms can communicate with low-cost ground stations and exploit Surrey's experience in autonomous operations. The lunar minisatellite can provide up to 70 kg payload margin in lunar orbit for a total mission cost US$16–25 M. The interplanetary platform can deliver 20 kg of scientific payload to Mars or Venus orbit for a mission cost US$25–50 M. Together, the platforms will enable regular flight of payloads to the Moon and interplanetary space at unprecedented low cost. This paper outlines key systems engineering issues for the proposed Lunar Minisatellite and interplanetary Platform Missions, and describes the accommodation and performance offered to planetary payloads.     

A management approach for allocating instrument development resources

The Cassini Science Management Plan was developed for NASA's Cassini mission to Saturn to assist the Science Instrument Manager in guiding the development of the spacecraft's science payload. This plan, unlike previous development approaches, allocated the entire mass, power, data rate and budget resources for the science instruments to the Principal Investigators. The result removed the Cassini Project from adjudicating and reallocating resources for instrument development problems. Instrument development problems that did occur were resolved by the Principal Investigators themselves through the use of a ‘resource exchange’. The exchange allowed Principal Investigators to submit ‘bids’ (i.e. a request for resources) to a database. Principal Investigators were allowed to barter their own resources with other investigators. The resulting exchange or multilateral trade allowed the investigators to reallocate their resource to ‘better’ their current position.     

International cooperation in space : Enhancing the world's common security

Instead of preparing for space warfare, the USA could make tremendous use of space activities to enhance global security. Arms control verification, environmental monitoring and international cooperation on space missions are important examples. International space year, 1992, could be the time to launch a triumphant effort such as an international mission to Mars.     

Principal investigators and project managers: Insights from Discovery

NASA’s Discovery, Explorer, and Mars Scout mission lines have demonstrated over the past 15 years that, with careful planning, flexible management techniques, and a commitment to cost control, small space science missions can be built and launched at a fraction of the price of strategic missions. Many credit management techniques such as co-location, early contracting for long-lead items, and a resistance to scope creep for this, but it is also important to examine what may be the most significant variable in small mission implementation: the roles and the relationship of the principal investigator, responsible to NASA for the success of the mission, and the project manager, responsible for delivering the mission to NASA. This paper reports on a series of 55 oral histories with principal investigators, project managers, co-investigators, system engineers, and senior management from nearly every competitively selected Discovery mission launched to date that discuss the definition and evolution of these roles and share revealing insights from the key players themselves. The paper will show that there are as many ways to define the principal investigator/project manager relationship as there are missions, and that the subtleties in the relationship often provide new management tools not practical in larger missions.     

Piloted operations at a near-Earth object (NEO)

In late 2006, NASA's Constellation Program sponsored a study to examine the feasibility of sending a piloted Orion spacecraft to a near-Earth object. NEOs are asteroids or comets that have perihelion distances less than or equal to 1.3 astronomical units, and can have orbits that cross that of the Earth. Therefore, the most suitable targets for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) are those NEOs in heliocentric orbits similar to Earth's (i.e. low inclination and low eccentricity). One of the significant advantages of this type of mission is that it strengthens and validates the foundational infrastructure of the United States Space Exploration Policy and is highly complementary to NASA's planned lunar sortie and outpost missions circa 2020. A human expedition to a NEO would not only underline the broad utility of the Orion CEV and Ares launch systems, but would also be the first human expedition to an interplanetary body beyond the Earth–Moon system. These deep space operations will present unique challenges not present in lunar missions for the onboard crew, spacecraft systems, and mission control team. Executing several piloted NEO missions will enable NASA to gain crucial deep space operational experience, which will be necessary prerequisites for the eventual human missions to Mars.Our NEO team will present and discuss the following:

• •new mission trajectories and concepts;
• •operational command and control considerations;
• •expected science, operational, resource utilization, and impact mitigation returns; and
• •continued exploration momentum and future Mars exploration benefits.

     

The cost benefits of the Spacelab system to scientific investigations and space applications

In the past, one of the major problems in performing scientific investigations in space has been the high cost of developing, integrating, and transporting scientific experiments into space. The limited resources of unmanned spacecraft, coupled with the requirements for completely automated operations, was another factor contributing to the high costs of scientific research in space. In previous space missions after developing, integrating and transporting costly experiments into space and obtaining successful data, the experiment facility and spacecraft have been lost forever, because they could not be returned to earth. The objective of this paper is to present how the utilization of the Spacelab System will result in cost benefits to the scientific community, and significantly reduce the cost of space operations from previous space programs.The following approach was used to quantify the cost benefits of using the Spacelab System to greatly reduce the operational costs of scientific research in space. An analysis was made of the series of activities required to combine individual scientific experiments into an integrated payload that is compatible with the Space Transportation System (STS). These activities, including Shuttle and Spacelab integration, communications and data processing, launch support requirements, and flight operations were analyzed to indicate how this new space system, when compared with previous space systems, will reduce the cost of space research. It will be shown that utilization of the Spacelab modular design, standard payload interfaces, optional Mission Dependent Equipment (MDE), and standard services, such as the Experiment Computer Operating System (ECOS), allow the user many more services than previous programs, at significantly lower costs. In addition, the missions will also be analyzed to relate their cost benefit contributions to space scientific research.The analytical tools that are being developed at MSFC in the form of computer programs that can rapidly analyze experiment to Spacelab interfaces will be discussed to show how these tools allow the Spacelab integrator to economically establish the payload compatibility of a Spacelab mission.The information used in this paper has been assimilated from the actual experience gained in integrating over 50 highly complex, scientific experiments that will fly on the Spacelab first and second missions. In addition, this paper described the work being done at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to define the analytical integration tools and techniques required to economically and efficiently integrate a wide variety of Spacelab payloads and missions. The conclusions reached in this study are based on the actual experience gained at MSFC in its roles of Spacelab integration and mission managers for the first three Spacelab missions. The results of this paper will clearly show that the cost benefits of the Spacelab system will greatly reduce the costs and increase the opportunities for scientific investigation from space.     

Piloted operations at a near-Earth object (NEO)

In late 2006, NASA's Constellation Program sponsored a study to examine the feasibility of sending a piloted Orion spacecraft to a near-Earth object. NEOs are asteroids or comets that have perihelion distances less than or equal to 1.3 astronomical units, and can have orbits that cross that of the Earth. Therefore, the most suitable targets for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) are those NEOs in heliocentric orbits similar to Earth's (i.e. low inclination and low eccentricity). One of the significant advantages of this type of mission is that it strengthens and validates the foundational infrastructure of the United States Space Exploration Policy and is highly complementary to NASA's planned lunar sortie and outpost missions circa 2020. A human expedition to a NEO would not only underline the broad utility of the Orion CEV and Ares launch systems, but would also be the first human expedition to an interplanetary body beyond the Earth–Moon system. These deep space operations will present unique challenges not present in lunar missions for the onboard crew, spacecraft systems, and mission control team. Executing several piloted NEO missions will enable NASA to gain crucial deep space operational experience, which will be necessary prerequisites for the eventual human missions to Mars.Our NEO team will present and discuss the following:

• new mission trajectories and concepts;

• operational command and control considerations;

• expected science, operational, resource utilization, and impact mitigation returns; and

• continued exploration momentum and future Mars exploration benefits.

Policy for robust space-based earth science,technology and applications

Satellite remote sensing technology has contributed to the transformation of multiple earth science domains, putting space observations at the forefront of innovation in earth science. With new satellite missions being launched every year, new types of earth science data are being incorporated into science models and decision-making systems in a broad array of organizations. Policy guidance can influence the degree to which user needs influence mission design and when, and ensure that satellite missions serve both the scientific and user communities without becoming unfocused and overly expensive. By considering the needs of the user community early on in the mission-design process, agencies can ensure that satellites meet the needs of multiple constituencies. This paper describes the mission development process in NASA and ESA and compares and contrasts the successes and challenges faced by these agencies as they try to balance science and applications within their missions.     

The perfect boring situation—Addressing the experience of monotony during crewed deep space missions through habitability design

In contemporary orbital missions, workloads are so high and varied that crew may rarely experience stretches of monotony. However, in historical long duration missions, occurrences of monotony were, indeed, reported anecdotally by crew. Of the effective countermeasures that appear to be at hand, many rely on visual or logistical proximity to the Earth, and are not feasible in the remote context of an extended deep space mission scenario. There, particularly in- and outbound cruising stages would be characterised by longer, comparably uneventful periods of low workload, coupled with confinement and unchanging vehicle surroundings.     

Life science experiments during the German-Russian MIR '97 mission

Manned spaceflight has been an important element of the German space program over the last decades. This is demonstrated by the nationally managed space missions Spacelab D-l (1985), D-2 (1993), and MIR '92 as well as by the participation in the 1st Spacelab mission FSLP (1983), the NASA missions IML-1 (1992) and IML-2 (1994), as well as in the ESA missions EUROMIR '94 and '95. On February 12th, this year, the German cosmonaut Reinhold Ewald was launched together with his Russian colleagues Wasilij Zibliew and Alexander Lasudkin onboard of a Soyuz spacecraft for another stay of a German cosmonaut onboard of the Russian Space Station MIR. This mission--the so-called German/Russian MIR '97--was, of course, another cornerstone with regard to the cooperation between Russian and German space organizations. The cooperation in the area of manned missions began 1978 with the flight of the German cosmonaut Sigmund Jahn onboard of Salyut 6, at that time a cooperation between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in the frame of the Interkosmos Program. In March 1992, it was followed by the flight of Klaus Dietrich Flade with his stay onboard of MIR. After two further successful ESA missions, EUROMIR '94 and '95 with the two German cosmonauts Ulf Merbold and Thomas Reiter and with a marked contribution of German scientists, the decision was taken to perform another German/Russian MIR mission, the so-called MIR '97. In Germany, MIR'97 was managed and performed in a joint effort between several partners. DARA, the German Space Agency, was responsible for the overall program and project management, while DLR, the German Aerospace Research Establishment, was responsible for the cosmonaut training, for medical operations, for the mission control at GSOC in Oberpfaffenhofen as well as for user support.     

Social and cultural issues during Shuttle/Mir space missions.

A number of interpersonal issues relevant to manned space missions have been identified from the literature. These include crew tension, cohesion, leadership, language and cultural factors, and displacement. Ground-based studies by others and us have clarified some of the parameters of these issues and have indicated ways in which they could be studied during actual space missions. In this paper, we summarize some of our findings related to social and cultural issues from a NASA-funded study conducted during several Shuttle/Mir space missions. We used standardized mood and group climate measures that were completed on a weekly basis by American and Russian crew and mission control subjects who participated in these missions. Our results indicated that American subjects reported more dissatisfaction with their interpersonal environment than their Russian counterparts, especially American astronauts. Mission control personnel were more dysphoric than crewmembers, but both groups were significantly less dysphoric than other work groups on Earth. Countermeasures based on our findings are discussed which can be applied to future multicultural space missions.     

Survey of mission evolution and flexibility in the Space Shuttle program

Given the diversity of missions it has accomplished and the myriad of adaptations it has undergone, the US Space Shuttle is widely regarded as a highly flexible space vehicle. With the Shuttle’s upcoming 2011 retirement, it is instructive to survey the history of this vehicle’s flexibility for the insights it can provide to the design and characterization of flexibility in future space systems. Data are presented on the evolution of mission requirements over time for 120 missions performed by the Space Shuttle over a period of some 27 years. Distinct trends in the time domain – as well as their causes – are identified and discussed, and early manifest plans from 1982 serve as a confirmation that these trends were not originally anticipated. Eight examples are then presented of engineering modifications that allowed the Shuttle to adapt and accommodate these requirement changes. Several additional instances of Shuttle flexibility are explored, such as post-Columbia disaster modification, upgrade programs and derived vehicles, and one case in which flexibility was inhibited by an early design decision.