The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs, a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs,a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

Engineering challenges to the long term operation of the International Space Station

The U.S. Congress has maintained an intense interest in the ISS program since its inception. In the Appropriations Act of 1997, the Senate of the United States included language directing National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to have the National Research Council (NRC) under take a study that evaluates the engineering challenges posed by extravehicular activity (EVA) requirements, United States and non-United States space launch requirements, the potential need to upgrade or replace equipment and components after Assembly Complete, and the requirement to decommission and disassemble the facility. NASA and the NRC decided the focus should be on the anticipated challenges in the continuous operation and maintenance of the ISS after assembly of the on-orbit facility has been completed. This would encompass the operational years, from late 2004 (if the current schedule holds) to 2020-2025. This executive summary overviews the results of this NRC study. It focuses on the U.S. operation of the ISS after Assembly Complete, including cooperative efforts by the United States and Russia. The paper summarizes the primary findings and recommendations in each of the areas considered during this two-year NRC study.     

Inflatable composite habitat structures for lunar and mars exploration

Recent advances in materials technology have improved the performance capabilities of inflatable, flexible composite structures, which have increased their potential for use in numerous space applications. Space suits, which are comprised of flexible composite components, are a good example of the successful use of inflatable composite structures in space. Space suits employ inflatables technology to provide a stand alone spacecraft for astronauts during extra-vehicular activity. A natural extension of this application of inflatables technology is in orbital or planetary habitat structures. NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) is currently investigating flexible composite structures deployed via inflation for use as habitats, transfer vehicles and depots for continued exploration of the Moon and Mars.

Inflatable composite structures are being investigated because they offer significant benefits over conventional structures for aerospace applications. Inflatable structures are flexible and can be packaged in smaller and more complex shaped volumes, which result in the selection of smaller launch vehicles which dramatically reduce launch costs. Inflatable composite structures are typically manufactured from materials that have higher strength to weight ratios than conventional systems and are therefore lower in mass. Mass reductions are further realized because of the tailorability of inflatable composite structures, which allow the strength of the system to be concentrated where needed. Flexible composite structures also tend to be more damage tolerant due to their “forgiveness” as compared to rigid mechanical systems. In addition, inflatables have consistently proven to be lower in both development and manufacturing costs.

Several inflatable habitat development programs are discussed with their increasing maturation toward use on a flight mission. Selected development programs being discussed include several NASA Langley Research Center habitat programs that were conducted in the 1960s, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory inflatable space station study, the NASA JSC deployable inflatable Lunar habitat study, and the inflatable Mars TransHab study and test program currently ongoing at NASA JSC. Relevant technology developments made by ILC Dover are also presented.     

Evolution and logistics of an early lunar base

The planned construction of a permanently manned space station in low earth orbit has reopened the discussion about the establishment of a manned lunar base within the next 25 years for exploration of the Moon and space. Several studies demonstrate that a lunar base very modest in size may cost $50 to 90 billion spread over 25 years which would fit into the expected NASA budget for this period. Having these cost in mind the authors present a concept having a greater effectiveness based on the following operational characteristics: (1) The development of a low cost heavy-lift launch vehicle for cargo transportation and propellant supply reduces the specific transportation cost by one order of magnitude compared to the existing Space Shuttle system. (2) Orbital transfer vehicles with LOX/LH2 technology should be preferred over advanced propulsion systems because of proved technology and cost reduction by utilization of lunar produced LOX. (3) The evolution of the lunar base towards a lunar colony and manufacturing facility could only be initiated by a powerful transportation system allowing for cost-effective space construction projects and manned spaceflight to other planets.The lunar base program of this paper is based on a schedule considering a 8 years development, 5 years lunar base assembly and 20 years operational phase during which the lunar crew will increase from 60 to 180 people. Launch rates will be 10 shuttle launches and 10 HLLV launches p.a. at the average. Development costs of the transportation and lunar base system will amount to $29 billion. Adding hardware and operational costs for lunar base assembly results in the acquisition cost of $49 billion. Total life cycle costs are estimated to be in the order of $101 billion considering a 20 years operational phase which will cost $2.6 billion p.a. at the average. For the 2508 man-years spent in lunosphere the relative cost will be $40.2 million per man-year of which space transportation will cost $25.0 million per man-year.     

SSETO—Small Satellite for Exoplanetary Transit Observation

SSETO is the result of a phase-A study in context of the small satellite program of the University of Stuttgart that demonstrates the capability of a university institute to build a small satellite with a budget of 5 million Euro. The satellite will be capable of observing exoplanets in a Neptune–Earth scale and obtaining data of interstellar dust. Due to a system failure of NASA?s Kepler mission, there is currently (October 2013) a lack of satellites searching for exoplanets. This paper details the design of subsystems and payload, as well as the required test tasks in accordance with the mission profile at a conceptional level. The costs for standard spacecraft testing and integration tasks are included, but not those of launch, ground support, operations and engineer working hours.     

Cooperative research in microgravity sciences during the French manned MIR missions

During the past ten years the French laboratories working in the field of fluids and material sciences had access to regular, long-lasting manned missions onboard the Russian MIR Space Station. Beyond the French scientific program that was performed with the ALICE apparatus, a cooperative research program was developed with DLR, NASA and RSA. This cooperation was based on bartered agreements that included the joint utilization of the instruments onboard the MIR station (ALICE, TITUS furnace from DLR, vibration device from RKK Energia) and the funding of dedicated cartridges (DLR) or thermostats (DLR and NASA), as well as launch services (NASA) by the Cooperating Agencies. We present a review of this program with a particular emphasis on its scientific results and on the progress that has been achieved in science and applications. They covered a large field of condensed matter physics, from material sciences to near-critical and off-critical phase separation kinetics and near critical fluid hydrodynamics (thermoacoustic heat transport and vibrational convection). The high microgravity relevance of all these investigations naturally led to outstanding results that was published in the world's best scientific journals. The analysis of the latest experiments performed during the PEGASUS mission shows they will not be an exception to that evaluation. Off-critical phase separation with NASA, pressure-driven piston effect and equiaxed solidification with DLR, heat transport under calibrated vibrations with RKK Energia, all will be presented. The conclusion will stress the international character of this microgravity research program, the conditions of its success and what can be gained from it in the perspective of the space station utilization.     

The hidden costs of reliability and failure in launch systems

In comparing the costs of different launch vehicles, the possibility of the risk of failure is assumed to be accounted for by the cost of insurance. The satellite may be insured against loss during launch, and the launch services provider may offer a “free relaunch.” However, actual costs of reliability and failure extend beyond this. Each failure necessitates an investigation and a “get well” programme by the operating agency, while putting the operations team “on hold” until services can resume. A commercial operator may also lose customer revenue and actual customers through loss of confidence or unavailability. Such costs tend to be hidden, and not evaluated in assessing the effectiveness of a system, but count towards total costs. Failure investigations help to improve system reliability, but this could equally have been achieved by expenditure in development and qualification. Reusable launch vehicles will have different costs associated with reliability and failure. The relationship between reliability and cost, properly assessed, ought to influence the design of both expendable and reusable launch systems.     

Informed maintenance for next generation reusable launch systems

Perhaps the most substantial single obstacle to progress of space exploration and utilization of space for human benefit is the safety & reliability and the inherent cost of launching to, and returning from, space. The primary influence in the high costs of current launch systems (the same is true for commercial and military aircraft and most other reusable systems) is the operations, maintenance and infrastructure portion of the program's total life cycle costs. Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) maintenance and design have traditionally been two separate engineering disciplines with often conflicting objectives - maximizing ease of maintenance versus optimizing performance, size and cost. Testability analysis, an element of Informed Maintenance (IM), has been an ad hoc, manual effort, in which maintenance engineers attempt to identify an efficient method of troubleshooting for the given product, with little or no control over product design. Therefore, testability deficiencies in the design cannot be rectified. It is now widely recognized that IM must be engineered into the product at the design stage itself, so that an optimal compromise is achieved between system maintainability and performance.The elements of IM include testability analysis, diagnostics/prognostics, automated maintenance scheduling, automated logistics coordination, paperless documentation and data mining. IM derives its heritage from complimentary NASA science, space and aeronautic enterprises such as the on-board autonomous Remote Agent Architecture recently flown on NASA's Deep Space 1 Probe as well as commercial industries that employ quick turnaround operations. Commercial technologies and processes supporting NASA's IM initiatives include condition based maintenance technologies from Boeing's Commercial 777 Aircraft and Lockheed-Martin's F-22 Fighter, automotive computer diagnostics and autonomous controllers that enable 100,000 mile maintenance free operations, and locomotive monitoring system software.This paper will summarize NASA's long-term strategy, development, and implementation plans for Informed Maintenance for next generation RLVs. This will be done through a convergence into a single IM vision the work being performed throughout NASA, industry and academia. Additionally, a current status of IM development throughout NASA programs such as the Space Shuttle, X-33, X-34 and X-37 will be provided and will conclude with an overview of near-term work that is being initiated in FY00 to support NASA's 2^nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program.     

Canada and the International Space Station program: overview and status

The twelve months since IAF 2000 have been perhaps the most exciting, challenging and rewarding months for Canada since the beginning of our participation in the International Space Station program in 1984. The highlight was the successful launch, on-orbit check out, and the first operational use of Canadarm2, the Space Station Remote Manipulator System, between April and July 2001. The anomalies encountered and the solutions found to achieve this success are described in the paper. The paper describes, also, the substantial progress that has been made, during the twelve months since IAF 2000, by Canada as it continues to complete work on all flight-elements of its contribution to the International Space Station and as we transition into real-time Space Station operations support and Canadian utilization. Canada's contribution to the International Space Station is the Mobile Servicing System (MSS), the external robotic system that is key to the successful assembly of the Space Station, the maintenance of its external systems, astronaut EVA support, and the servicing of external science payloads. The MSS ground segment that supports MSS operations, training, sustaining engineering, and logistics activities is reaching maturity. The MSS Engineering Support Center and the MSS Sustaining Engineering Facility are providing real-time support for on-orbit operations, and a Canadian Payloads Telescience Operations Center is now in place. Mission Controllers, astronauts and cosmonauts from all Space Station Partners continue to receive training at the Canadian Space Agency. The Remote Multi Purpose Room, one element of the MSS Operations Complex, will be ready to assume backroom support in 2002. Canada has completed work on identifying its Space Station utilization activities for the period 2000 through 2004. Also during the past twelve months the CSA drafted and is proceeding with the approval of a Canadian Space Station Commercialization Policy. Canadian astronauts have now participated in three ISS assembly missions--Julie Payette on STS-96, Marc Garneau on STS-97, and Chris Hadfield on STS-100 in April 2001 during which he performed Canada's first EVA and the successful installation of the Space Station Remote Manipulator System.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

One hundred US EVAs: a perspective on spacewalks

In the 36 years between June 1965 and February 2001, the US human space flight program has conducted 100 spacewalks, or extravehicular activities (EVAs), as NASA officially calls them. EVA occurs when astronauts wearing spacesuits travel outside their protective spacecraft to perform tasks in the space vacuum environment. US EVA started with pioneering feasibility tests during the Gemini Program. The Apollo Program required sending astronauts to the moon and performing EVA to explore the lunar surface. EVA supported scientific mission objectives of the Skylab program, but may be best remembered for repairing launch damage to the vehicle and thus saving the program. EVA capability on Shuttle was initially planned to be a kit that could be flown at will, and was primarily intended for coping with vehicle return emergencies. The Skylab emergency and the pivotal role of EVA in salvaging that program quickly promoted Shuttle EVA to an essential element for achieving mission objectives, including retrieving satellites and developing techniques to assemble and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). Now, EVA is supporting assembly of ISS. This paper highlights development of US EVA capability within the context of the overarching mission objectives of the US human space flight program.     

The Space Shuttle—Evaluating an American icon

The Space Transportation System (STS), for better or worse, has dominated the US space program for some 30 years and is now an American icon. The Space Shuttle orbiters have flown over 120 missions and certainly accomplished some amazing feats, including the deployment of the International Space Station (ISS), the launch and double repair of the Hubble Telescope, a number of classified missions for the US defense establishment and the cementing of international cooperation in space. As the remaining Space Shuttle orbiters head toward various museums, it is timely to look at the STS program in terms of key US space policy decisions that have paralleled the Space Shuttle’s often troubled history. This article seeks, from both a historical and a policy perspective, to assess what might have been. While noting the major accomplishments of the STS, it also identifies what can best be characterized as major lost opportunities and flawed policy decisions that have had multi-billion dollar consequences. In this regard, the US Congress, the White House, and NASA leadership have all played a role. If there have been failings, they have not been by NASA alone, but the entire US space policy leadership.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

海运及沿海发射期间航天产品的腐蚀风险与应对策略

海南发射场投入运行在即,在此发射的航天器在海运和发射场期间将面临着腐蚀的风险。文章对比了海南发射场与酒泉、西昌、太原等内陆发射场的腐蚀环境差异,例举了NASA肯尼迪航天中心在海运和发射场期间航天产品的腐蚀案例,分析了我国未来航天器在海运和海南发射场期间的腐蚀风险,并根据NASA、ESA对沿海发射场航天器腐蚀的应对策略,提出了相应的防腐蚀建议与措施。     

The Hidden Costs of Reliability and Failure in Launch Systems

In comparing the costs of different launch vehicles, the possibility of the risk of failure is assumed to be accounted for by the cost of insurance. The satellite may be insured against loss during launch, and the launch services provider may offer a free relaunch. However, actual costs of reliability and failure extend beyond this. Each failure necessitates an investigation and a get well programme by the operating agency, while putting the operations team on hold until services can resume. A commercial operator may also lose customer revenue and actual customers through loss of confidence or unavailability. Such costs tend to be hidden, and not evaluated in assessing the effectiveness of a system, but count towards total costs. Failure investigations help to improve system reliability, but this could equally have been achieved by expenditure in development and qualification. Reusable launch vehicles will have different costs associated with reliability and failure. The relationship between reliability and cost, properly assessed, ought to influence the design of both expendable and reusable launch systems.     

Using Spacelab as a precursor of science operations for the Space Station

For more than 15 years, Spacelab, has provided a laboratory in space for an international array of experiments, facilities, and experimenters. In addition to continuing this important work, Spacelab is now serving as a crucial stepping-stone to the improved science, improved operations, and rapid access to space that will characterize International Space Station. In the Space Station era, science operations will depend primarily on distributed/remote operations that will allow investigators to direct science activities from their universities, facilities, or home bases. Spacelab missions are a crucial part of preparing for these activities, having been used to test, prove, and refine remote operations over several missions. The knowledge gained from preparing these Missions is also playing a crucial role in reducing the time required to put an experiment into orbit, from revolutionizing the processes involved to testing the hardware needed for these more advanced operations. This paper discusses the role of the Spacelab program and the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center- (MSFC-) managed missions in developing and refining remote operations, new hardware and facilities for use on Space Station, and procedures that dramatically reduce preparation time for flight.     

VEGA, a small launch vehicle

Several studies have been performed in Europe aiming to promote the full development of a small launch vehicle to put into orbit one ton class spacecrafts. But during the last ten years, the european workforce was mainly oriented towards the qualification of the heavy class ARIANE 5 launch vehicle.Then, due also to lack of visibility on this reduced segment of market, when comparing with the geosatcom market, no proposal was sufficiently attractive to get from the potentially interrested authorities a clear go-ahead, i.e. a financial committment.

The situation is now rapidly evolving. Several european states, among them ITALY and FRANCE, are now convinced of the necessity of the availability of such a transportation system, an important argument to promote small missions, using small satellites. Application market will be mainly scientific experiments and earth observation; some telecommunications applications may be also envisaged such as placement of little LEO constellation satellites, or replacement after failure of big LEO constellation satellites.

FIAT AVIO and AEROSPATIALE have proposed to their national agencies the development of such a small launch vehicle, named VEGA.

The paper presents the story of the industrial proposal, and the present status of the project: Mission spectrum, technical definition, launch service and performance, target development plan and target recurring costs, as well as the industrial organisation for development, procurement, marketing and operations.     

The International Space Station: a pathway to the future

Nearly six years after the launch of the first International Space Station element, and four years after its initial occupation, the United States and our 6 international partners have made great strides in operating this impressive Earth orbiting research facility. This past year we have done so in the face of the adversity of operating without the benefit of the Space Shuttle. In his January 14, 2004, speech announcing a new vision for America's space program, President Bush affirmed the United States' commitment to completing construction of the International Space Station by 2010. The President also stated that we would focus our future research aboard the Station on the long-term effects of space travel on human biology. This research will help enable human crews to venture through the vast voids of space for months at a time. In addition, ISS affords a unique opportunity to serve as an engineering test bed for hardware and operations critical to the exploration tasks. NASA looks forward to working with our partners on International Space Station research that will help open up new pathways for future exploration and discovery beyond low Earth orbit. This paper provides an overview of the International Space Station Program focusing on a review of the events of the past year, as well as plans for next year and the future.     

The cost benefits of the Spacelab system to scientific investigations and space applications

In the past, one of the major problems in performing scientific investigations in space has been the high cost of developing, integrating, and transporting scientific experiments into space. The limited resources of unmanned spacecraft, coupled with the requirements for completely automated operations, was another factor contributing to the high costs of scientific research in space. In previous space missions after developing, integrating and transporting costly experiments into space and obtaining successful data, the experiment facility and spacecraft have been lost forever, because they could not be returned to earth. The objective of this paper is to present how the utilization of the Spacelab System will result in cost benefits to the scientific community, and significantly reduce the cost of space operations from previous space programs.The following approach was used to quantify the cost benefits of using the Spacelab System to greatly reduce the operational costs of scientific research in space. An analysis was made of the series of activities required to combine individual scientific experiments into an integrated payload that is compatible with the Space Transportation System (STS). These activities, including Shuttle and Spacelab integration, communications and data processing, launch support requirements, and flight operations were analyzed to indicate how this new space system, when compared with previous space systems, will reduce the cost of space research. It will be shown that utilization of the Spacelab modular design, standard payload interfaces, optional Mission Dependent Equipment (MDE), and standard services, such as the Experiment Computer Operating System (ECOS), allow the user many more services than previous programs, at significantly lower costs. In addition, the missions will also be analyzed to relate their cost benefit contributions to space scientific research.The analytical tools that are being developed at MSFC in the form of computer programs that can rapidly analyze experiment to Spacelab interfaces will be discussed to show how these tools allow the Spacelab integrator to economically establish the payload compatibility of a Spacelab mission.The information used in this paper has been assimilated from the actual experience gained in integrating over 50 highly complex, scientific experiments that will fly on the Spacelab first and second missions. In addition, this paper described the work being done at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to define the analytical integration tools and techniques required to economically and efficiently integrate a wide variety of Spacelab payloads and missions. The conclusions reached in this study are based on the actual experience gained at MSFC in its roles of Spacelab integration and mission managers for the first three Spacelab missions. The results of this paper will clearly show that the cost benefits of the Spacelab system will greatly reduce the costs and increase the opportunities for scientific investigation from space.