Space station — the new frontier

The exciting challenge of building a permanent space station has been taken up by the USA, and participation in its development has been offered to the USA's allies. European countries are faced with the dilemma of whether to cooperate or to try to develop an autonomous approach. This article discusses the opportunities for Europe in participating closely in the US project — particularly in providing pressurized modules based on the Columbus programme — and argues that it is an opportunity not to be missed.     

US space policy assessed

Recognizing that, in the wake of major geopolitical changes, technological developments and global recession, the US space programme needed to change, then Vice President Dan Quayle commissioned a review of the USA's space policy which was completed at the very end of 1992. Its findings — in summary form — and recommendations are reprinted here.     

US–Russian cooperation in human spaceflight: assessing the impacts

How far the broad security, political and economic goals behind the USA's invitation to Russia to participate in the International Space Station have been achieved is assessed in this synthesis of the views of a range of experts in Russian affairs and US foreign and national security policy. The article covers the impacts of cooperation on the Russian aerospace industrial base, on nonproliferation issues and on overall US–Russian relations. Various themes are identified—such as Russian ambivalence over embracing Western norms—and while the experts agreed on certain subjects, there was no overall unanimity.     

PFI in the sky, or pie in the sky? — Privatising military space

The UK has made use of dedicated, national military satellites for communications since November 1969. The replacement of the current system, Skynet 4, which will reach the end of its design lifetime early in the next century, is currently under consideration. Possible options which have been mooted to date include a new generation of a national satellite system (Skynet 5), or one of several international collaborative projects. However, these appear to have been superseded by a new possibility — a privately, commercially funded national system under the government's Private Finance Initiative (PFI). This paper examines the historical reliance of the UK on military satellite communications, the options for the next generation of such systems, and, drawing on the UK example, raises a number of questions concerning the potential significance of reliance on commercial enterprise to provide a key element of defence capability.     

A Herculean task? Economics, politics, and realigning government in the case of US polar-orbiting weather satellites

In 1994 one of the most radical institutional restructurings in the USA's government provision of critical weather information took place after eight previously unsuccessful attempts. The President merged weather data collection by satellites operated by the Department of Defense and satellites operated by the Department of Commerce. Reorganization involving agencies with different objectives, economic constraints, and operating cultures is rare. This paper reviews the decision leading to “convergence,” discusses economic arguments, and addresses the problems confronting the new organization. The paper also discusses the implications of the new organization for incentives to engage in space R&D and the increasingly large role played by these satellites in collecting not only weather but also climate-related data.     

Integrating European security through space

For decades, Western European nations have been comparatively uninterested in the military use of space, largely content to rely on the far greater resources of the USA in this area. Today, however, the traditional belief that the security requirements of ‘the West’ are synonymous with those of the USA is increasingly open to challenge. A new European defence identity is emerging, keen to achieve greater autonomy in the security field, albeit remaining within the overarching framework of NATO. Consequently there is a growing requirement for indigenous European capabilities in terms of military space assets. This requirement has been met in part by the establishment, by the Western Union, of a satellite centre in Spain, which currently analyses commercially procured satellite imagery. The centre's capabilities may be expanded if the WEU states decide to add a space-based element — either their own satellite system, or participation in an existing multinational programme. Such a decision is due to be taken towards the end of 1995. This paper concludes by briefly examining the political and security implications of such a decision.     

Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as the global leader in all areas of spaceflight and space science—is a unique organization in terms of size, mission, constraints, complexity and motivations. NASA's flagship endeavor—human spaceflight—is extremely risky and one of the most complicated tasks undertaken by man. It is well accepted that the tragic destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986 was the result of organizational failure. The surprising disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003—nearly 17 years to the day after Challenger—was a shocking reminder of how seemingly innocuous details play important roles in risky systems and organizations. NASA as an organization has changed considerably over the 42 years of its existence. If it is serious about minimizing failure and promoting its mission, perhaps the most intense period of organizational change lies in its immediate future. This paper outlines some of the critical features of NASA's organization and organizational change, namely path dependence and “normalization of deviance”. Subsequently, it reviews the rationale behind calling the Challenger tragedy an organizational failure. Finally, it argues that the recent Columbia accident displays characteristics of organizational failure and proposes recommendations for the future.     

Impact of unification on German space activities

1991 is one of the most decisive years in the history of German space activities. Not only do major policy decisions have to be taken concerning the continuation of the European programmes Hermes and Columbus — which, due to the heavy involvement of Germany in international cooperation, strongly affect its space policy — but one year after the unification of Germany the country is about to set up its new space programme. This is in fact a ‘new’ programme because for the first time it includes all space activities of the unified Germany.     

Towards a new remote sensing order?

This Viewpoint argues that the 1986 UN Principles on Remote Sensing have failed to anticipate the growth and broadening of the Earth observation field and are now less relevant. It traces the development of remote sensing: from a narrow government-controlled base, three distinct sectors of military, civil (i.e. public) and commercial Earth observation can now be distinguished and the latter is making images ever more widely and easily available. There has been no international effort to adjust the international legal regime to this changing environment and even the USA's remote sensing policy has basically been reactive. It is impossible now to conceive an overarching remote sensing policy and the challenge will be to shape each sectoral regime appropriately.     

‘Did you see that,grandpa Mao?’ The prestige and propaganda rationales of the Chinese space program

China has seen a dramatic acceleration in the scope and capabilities of its space program in the past decade. This has been coupled with significantly increased global economic presence and influence as well as a steady improvement of its military capabilities. China's emergence as a major world actor has encouraged the emergence of a ‘China threat’ school of thought which interprets all Chinese policy, including its space program, as an evidence of a threatening challenge to US dominance in which the pursuit of a range of military space capabilities plays a central role. This article challenges that interpretation, arguing that China's space program is the product of a range of factors including powerful domestic political and developmental rationales and that the program is overwhelmingly driven by domestic rather than international considerations, particularly in terms of the use of the program for the purposes of enhancing prestige.     

Economics of telecommunications space segments

This paper proposes a complete model for assessing the economics of telecommunications satellite systems, accounting for spacecraft development and manufacturing, launch and operations in orbit. This allows to account for such parameters as the mass and lifetime of the satellites, the number and type of payloads, the number of satellites procured and launched, the spare policy, the launch vehicle, the insurances, the satellite average MTTF and the management of the space segment efforts.

The model is divided into four parts: the spacecraft mass model, the spacecraft procurement cost model, the MTTF model and the space segment cost-effectiveness model. It provides for the rapid solution of a number of problems within a wide range of parameters such as assessing the influence on space segment economics of —certain satellite technologies, —satellite and payload mass, —number of payloads per spacecraft, —satellite lifetime, or —spare policy.     

Will China become a military space superpower?

China's ambitious space program was born in extremely poor national conditions in 1956. By 15 October 2003, with the successful return of the Shenzhou-4 manned space flight, it had developed dramatically. While this flight is a milestone in China's space capabilities, the Shenzhou-4 mission should be considered not as an end, but as the entry ticket to the space power club of the USA and Russia. China may now be a space power, but it is not yet a military space superpower in the way of the latter two countries. This paper investigates whether China will become a military space superpower by reviewing the development of its space program. It examines Chinese military space capabilities in terms of their military space potential, and discusses the political, military and economic implications of this issue. Finally, the paper suggests that China should continue to take the road to openness, focusing on commercial and economic efforts. This will be an alternative direction in which the country can consider exactly what space capabilities it needs in order to continue its economic development.     

Earth observation using low cost micro/minisatellites

Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) at the University of Surrey (UK) has pioneered cost-effective satellite engineering techniques for smaller, faster, cheaper satellites to provide affordable access to space. SSTL has designed, built, launched and operated a series of twelve 50kg microsatellites in low Earth orbit which carry a wide range of satellite communications, space science, remote sensing and in-orbit technology demonstration payloads — for both civil and military applications. Each of these has been built and launched for around US$3M. This paper reviews SSTL's remote sensing capabilities and presents image results from the microsatellite cameras in low Earth in orbit. The latest microsatellites (TMSAT & FASat-Bravo) under construction at SSTL and due for launch in mid-1997 will provide 3-band multispectral imaging with 80-metre resolution; autonomous on-board image analysis, processing and compression prior to transmission direct to ground-based users employing small portable terminals.     

The emerging China–EU space partnership: A geotechnological balancer

Through a techno-nationalist lens, this paper will assess the growing China–European Union (EU) space partnership, and its implications for international space cooperation and competition. Techno-nationalism (jishu minzuzhuyi), the idea that technological strength is an effective determinant of national power in a harshly competitive world,³ informs both Chinese and US perceptions of China's space development. Using this lens elevates all space activities—manned, unmanned, military and scientific—to the strategic level. It is our contention that because of the increasing China–EU space partnership, the USA must re-evaluate its approach to China—away from the containment approach, which has thus far predominated, toward an approach which would offer the USA the opportunity to influence and, thereby, decrease the importance of the emerging partnership.     

Space in the UK: something to celebrate?

This article discusses current UK space activities that were debated during the ‘policy’ day of a 3-day ‘Festival of Space’ held at Surrey University in July 2003. While the emphasis is on using space to fulfil the needs of society, it is apparent that crafting a coherent strategy that would provide the political support needed to do this—in Europe as well as in the UK—remains difficult.     

Why rover preparatory programmes? The example of the French programme “VAP”

The very first activities concerning planetary rovers began in 1964 in the Soviet Union and in the United States for lunar missions. Nowadays, with the increase of new mission needs and technical possibilities, several space agencies have engaged in some preliminary programmes in that area with the following objectives:

• —to prepare their involvement in future international rover missions

• —to ease contacts/discussions between scientists and engineers

• —to study and develop a new generation of in situ experiments

• —to perform system/mission analysis in conjunction with the definition of the mission objectives

• —to analyze robotic problematics and implement robotic concepts in the rover architectures.

To perform these activities, several organizations have been set up in Russia, the United States, Japan, Italy and France, according to the relative weight of space engineering over robotic research.

In the case of the French programme (‘VAP—Automatic Planetary Rover’), the organization is based on a partnership between the CNES, a scientific committee, four national research laboratories and industries in order to optimize scientific and technical work, with an optimal use of past robotic research studies, as well as to generate spin-offs for Earth applications. Indeed, as a preliminary result, we now have a co-operative agreement with Russia to procure cameras and associated software for the autonomous navigation of the Marsokhod 96 and 2 projects for terrestrial applications of robotic concepts defined within the framework of the VAP programme.     

Waverider

On 17–19 October 1990 the University of Maryland hosted the 1st International Hypersonic Waverider Symposium. It has been a long wait; and although far more eminent contributors took part, there was also one amateur group. The comeback for the Waverider concept is due in part, at least, to determined advocacy by the amateur group, ASTRA — probably the first case of its kind. Duncan Lunan, President of ASTRA, explains.     

Sputnik fever — again?

The author offers some comments on the drawbacks of another US-Soviet space race. She compares the relative positions of the USA and the USSR in various areas of space science and technology, and concludes that the USSR does not lead in all areas. More importantly, she argues that it is distressing still to be portraying the superpowers as in a race in space. ‘Sputnik fever’ the first time round showed that a space race does not lead to a strong, long-term US space programme. She argues that cooperation in some areas — perhaps a trip to Mars — could b an alternative.     

US government policy - the major factor shaping the international commercial space launch marketplace

In this Viewpoint — an edited version of a statement made to the US House Committee on Science's Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics' hearing on ‘US launch strategy’ — the President of Arianespace, Inc analyses the overriding importance of US government policies and executive decisions on the shaping and behavior of the international market in commercial space launch services. Chief among these is the overruling of commercial imperatives by foreign policy and national security interests and the consequent regular intervention of the US government in launch decisions. The ability of Arianespace successfully to compete in a market severely distorted as a result of these interventions, including the encouragement of joint ventures between US and Russian or Ukrainian companies, is explained.     

Potential evolution of an international moon base programme

The Moon is a major target in expanding human activity in Space. President Bush has called for a Space Exploration Initiative. European participation may depend on achieving an affordable programme and identifying distinct elements for non-U.S. participation. Affordability requires that all participants can influence the “cost to user” of Base operations. If lunar activity is to evolve towards resource exploitation, there will need to be a progressive reduction in operating costs. European interest would prefer participation that allowed longer-term independent interests. The paper addresses how non-U.S. agencies could contribute valuable elements to an International Moon Base while meeting three criteria:

• — Keep a core infrastructure under U.S. control.

• — Avoid a total reliance by the partner on U.S. services.

• — Allow the partner to evolve towards an eventual, semi-autonomous or autonomous capability.

The paper illustrates possible implications of meeting these constraints through “mini infrastructures” combining several elements to form a working architecture. It is concluded that any European participation in an International Moon Base Programme should contain both Space transport and surface elements.