The hidden costs of reliability and failure in launch systems

In comparing the costs of different launch vehicles, the possibility of the risk of failure is assumed to be accounted for by the cost of insurance. The satellite may be insured against loss during launch, and the launch services provider may offer a “free relaunch.” However, actual costs of reliability and failure extend beyond this. Each failure necessitates an investigation and a “get well” programme by the operating agency, while putting the operations team “on hold” until services can resume. A commercial operator may also lose customer revenue and actual customers through loss of confidence or unavailability. Such costs tend to be hidden, and not evaluated in assessing the effectiveness of a system, but count towards total costs. Failure investigations help to improve system reliability, but this could equally have been achieved by expenditure in development and qualification. Reusable launch vehicles will have different costs associated with reliability and failure. The relationship between reliability and cost, properly assessed, ought to influence the design of both expendable and reusable launch systems.     

Data on and methodology for calculating space shuttle programme costs

This report presents data on the annual and total costs of NASA's Space Shuttle programme through fiscal year (FY) 1993. The total cost of the programme through FY 1993 is found to be $83.7 billion in 1992 dollars. This information has significance for pending policy decisions on the future of the Shuttle programme, its possible successors, and interrelated programmes, such as the Space Station.     

European spaceflight at the crossroads

Plans for Europe's future participation in space development are still under active discussion. This article offers a contribution to the debate, considering how Europe can best fulfil its own objectives. Choice of launch vehicle and its payload, as well as of other tools such as space station, re-entry vehicle, and launch site equipment are analysed. The article also discusses the purposes of space research for Europe, and the costs of a useful programme. A far-reaching European space programme still needs to be drawn up if Europe is not to lose out.     

Thoughts on Europe's future in space

Fearing that mistaken decisions may be made, the author offers his comments to clarify the future possibilities for Ariane, Hermes and Columbus. The decisions soon to be taken on the manned spaceflight programme will affect the future of the entire European space programme. The possibilities for air-breathing propulsion are also reviewed.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

Economics of satellite communications systems

This paper is partly a tutorial, telling systematically how one goes about calculating the total annual costs of a satellite communications system, and partly the expression of some original ideas on the choice of parameters so as to minimize these costs.The calculation of costs can be divided into two broad categories. The first is technical and is concerned with estimating what particular equipment will cost and what will be the annual expense to maintain and operate it. One starts in the estimation of any new system by listing the principal items of equipment, such as satellites, earth stations of various sizes and functions, telemetry and tracking equipment and terrestrial interfaces, and then estimating how much each item will cost. Methods are presented for generating such estimates, based on a knowledge of the gross parameters, such as antenna size, coverage area, transmitter power and information rate. These parameters determine the system performance and it is usually possible, knowing them, to estimate the costs of the equipment rather well. Some formulae based on regression analyses are presented. Methods are then given for estimating closely related expenses, such as maintenance and operation, and then an approximate method is developed for estimating terrestrial interconnection costs.It is pointed out that in specific cases when tariff and geographical information are available, it is usually better to work with specific data, but nonetheless it is often desirable, especially in global system estimating, to approximate these interconnect costs without recourse to individual tariffs. The procedure results in a set of costs for the purchase of equipment and its maintenance, and a schedule of payments. Some payments will be incurred during the manufacture of the satellite and before any systems operation, but many will not be incurred until the system is no longer in use, e.g. incentives. In any case, with the methods presented in the first section, one arrives at a schedule of costs and payments for all the items and the years in which they will be incurred. The second category of costing problems is one of financing or engineering economics. All the costs are first “present valued” to some reference period using rates of return appropriate to the particular situation.One finally arrives at sets of annual costs which can be used as the basis for setting lease costs or revenue requirements and tariffs. The correspondence between methods using discounted rates of return and capital recovery formulae on one hand and those using various depreciation schedules, such as is typical of regulated industries on the other hand, is discussed.The remainder of the paper is devoted to discussing the relationship between critical parameters, such as replacement schedules, design lifetime, satellite power and Earth station antenna size, and the overall costs.It is shown that optima for these parameters may exist and can be calculated. In particular, the optimization of satellite replacement schedules to minimize the present value of total investment over a very long period is presented, along with simplified versions of the theory suitable for system planning.The choice of EIRP is also discussed and a procedure for choosing the value that minimizes the costs is shown.     

The Challenger accident and public opinion : Attitudes towards the space programme in the USA

This article reports on a major survey of American attitudes towards the space programme in general, and the Shuttle in particular. The survey was carried out in three waves: before the January 1986 Challenger accident, immediately afterwards, and five months later. It was found that the net effect of the accident was a strong shift of public sentiment in favour of the space programme and the Shuttle. Expectation was high for a timely resumption of Shuttle flights, although there was a delayed recognition that the impact of the accident on the space programme was more significant than originally thought by most Americans. There was a shift towards a more positive assessment of the benefits and costs of space exploration. Positive attitudes towards funding increased even more markedly. These shifts were of a magnitude rarely found in studies of public attitudes.     

The Hidden Costs of Reliability and Failure in Launch Systems

In comparing the costs of different launch vehicles, the possibility of the risk of failure is assumed to be accounted for by the cost of insurance. The satellite may be insured against loss during launch, and the launch services provider may offer a free relaunch. However, actual costs of reliability and failure extend beyond this. Each failure necessitates an investigation and a get well programme by the operating agency, while putting the operations team on hold until services can resume. A commercial operator may also lose customer revenue and actual customers through loss of confidence or unavailability. Such costs tend to be hidden, and not evaluated in assessing the effectiveness of a system, but count towards total costs. Failure investigations help to improve system reliability, but this could equally have been achieved by expenditure in development and qualification. Reusable launch vehicles will have different costs associated with reliability and failure. The relationship between reliability and cost, properly assessed, ought to influence the design of both expendable and reusable launch systems.     

Estimating the life cycle cost of the space exploration initiative

The Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) will take mankind back to the Moon and then to Mars. Preliminary estimates of SEI life cycle cost (LCC) are central to assessing programme alternatives. SEI LCC should be estimated by identifying the additional cost to accomplish the initiative over and above the cost to sustain a ‘base’ of space activities. Results of a study of four SEI alternatives provided SEI LCC cost estimates ranging from $91 billion to $308 billion (constant 1989 US dollars) from 1992 through 2020, depending upon programme philosophy. SEI LCC will be driven by the philosophy and goals of the programme, and, given the goal of ‘permanence’, essentially indeterminate because of the open-ended time horizon.     

Launch vouchers for space science research

Recent US space policy proposes the use of space transportation ‘vouchers’ for space science payloads. Vouchers could affect the pace of space science and developments in space transportation both in the USA and internationally. This article focuses on the economic costs and benefits of vouchers, and strategies for effective programme design.     

Cost effectiveness of Spacelab experiments

Spacelab permits investigation in new seicntific disciplines like material processing, life sciences, chemistry, etc. The large mass and volume capabilities of Spacelab offer better possibilities for some areas of traditional space sciences like infrared astronomy, multi-spectral solar observations and large instruments for astronomical observations.Since free-flyers will require normally a new spacecraft development for each mission, the reusability of space qualified components and experiments will be a significant cost reduction factor over a long period. In the early phase of Spacelab utilisation, however, the scaling factor introduced by Spacelab utilisation, however, the scaling factor introduced by Spacelab results in higher payload development costs than originally appreciated.The costs of Spacelab utilisation are computed and compared with those of conventional free-flying satellites. The mission implementation costs and experiment development costs are shown for both cases. The Spacelab mission implementation costs are subdivided into NASA charges for the Standard Shuttle Mission, NASA charges to fly and operate Spacelab, the European costs of Spacelab payload integration and experiment development costs. In order to evaluate and compare mission implementation costs, the simple parameters are adopted of the cost per kg of experiments and the data collection-transmission capability of Shuttle/Spacelab and ESRO/ESA satellites. The mission implementation costs turn out to be very favourable for Spacelab. The experiment development costs, which are not included in the mission implementation costs, are compared for several free flyers with the corresponding development costs for several experiments of the first Spacelab payload. The comparison shows that the cost per kg of Spacelab experiment development is about five times less than of satellite experiments.     

STENTOR programme: An ongoing and efficient way for preparing the future

Presently, the french governmental bodies and space industry are joining their efforts and investments in a large technological programme named STENTOR; this programme is aiming to improve competitiveness of french space telecom industry by lowering costs and getting quickly vital technologies for the future.

First of all, this paper outlines main components of this programme and its major stages since 1994 up to 2009. Most innovating technologies of STENTOR satellite are described in terms of technical performances, development status and very promising impacts on cost and overall performances of future commercial telecom satellites; here is a preliminary list: plasma propulsion, thermal control using fluid loops and a deployable radiator, Li-Ion batteries, orbit determination with GPS receiver. Ku band regenerative payload with active antennas, etc.

Finally, some examples of service demonstrations foreseen for the in-orbit operating phase are given as illustrations.     

提高摄动外推精度的一种方法—改进初值法

根据人造地球卫星—阶摄动理论的计算方案,导出了利用实测轨道根数改进摄动计算初值的条件方程。利用改进后的初值进行摄动外推,其精度可明显提高。     

Legal analysis of the International Space Station (ISS) programme using the concept of “legalisation”

NASA, the initiator of the International Space Station (ISS), is currently reinforcing partnerships with the commercial sector as well as other ISS partner states in preparation for the ISS's operation and utilisation. This gives rise to an urgent need to analyse the ISS's legal framework in order to clearly state its legal merits and shortcomings. This essay presents the advantages and disadvantages of the ISS's legal framework by employing the “legalisation”-based approach. These advantages and disadvantages give us clues for selecting the optimal legal arrangement for the future development of the ISS programme. It will therefore be possible to minimise the risks associated with and to generate profits from ISS activities. This will ensure the effective and coherent implementation of the ISS programme.     

Status and prospects of China''s space programme

This article presents the current status and characteristics of China's space programme before describing the country's future goals and the specific types of research and satellite production that will be undertaken to realize them. China's programme, although small, has achieved much in terms of economic and social benefits for its people (eg through land-surveying, communications, education, water conservation and earthquake prediction). This is a result of the emphasis place on applied-satellites, coordination of production, development and research and intensive ground testing. This emphasis will remain, along with the effort to ensure that new satellites are long-lived and stable in operation. However, a change from the previous policy of independence is signalled by a growing interest in international cooperation, including that with other developing countries like Brazil.     

Reflections on human presence in space.

Humankind's exploration of Space has until now been understood as analogous to that of planet Earth: sending out crews to far-off, unknown lands in the hope of finding supplies of food, water or energy along with shelter and living-space. But Space is turning out to be much less hospitable than our earthly milieu in terms of resources as well as energy costs. It seems appropriate to ask what level of adaptation is needed for humans to travel and live in the cosmos, and to assess if the next logical step should necessarily be a programme of conquest analogous to that of the Moon--for example, towards Mars. Should we not rather be making more use of Earth's immediate neighbourhood, namely the sphere of a million of kilometres we call "Greater Earth"? In the same way, it is appropriate to ask questions about the conception of human beings which will from now on sustain the conquest of Space. The astronaut of the last forty years is the direct heir of the explorers of Ancient and Modern times; now, through the influence of science and technology, humanity has been put "into motion" not only geographically, but also in its most essential foundations: culture, psychology, philosophy. If the development of telepresence technology now gives us the ability to talk about a "Greater Human Being", it is chiefly through freedom of choice for oneself, for humanity and even for Earth.     

Europe — towards a new long-term programme

The European response to the US invitation to participate in the space station programme will determine the long-term future of the European space industry. The European Space Agency is charged with replying to the invitation, which will be one of the items on the agenda of the first ministerial meeting of the Council in early 1985. All going well, by the end of 1985 Europe will have developed a new long-term strategy towards space which will include substantial collaboration with the USA.     

Funding for space - private finance for public space missions?

Private users of space capability are used to buying a service, not a spacecraft. The supplier builds, launches and operates the spacecraft and the users only pay for the service that they receive. Publicly funded users could benefit from the same approach. Transferring responsibility for the success of the mission to a true prime contractor who is best able to manage technical and programme risks can lead to significant reductions in costs and timescales, but demands changes in attitudes by governments, users, industry and space agencies.     

Potential evolution of an international moon base programme

The Moon is a major target in expanding human activity in Space. President Bush has called for a Space Exploration Initiative. European participation may depend on achieving an affordable programme and identifying distinct elements for non-U.S. participation. Affordability requires that all participants can influence the “cost to user” of Base operations. If lunar activity is to evolve towards resource exploitation, there will need to be a progressive reduction in operating costs. European interest would prefer participation that allowed longer-term independent interests. The paper addresses how non-U.S. agencies could contribute valuable elements to an International Moon Base while meeting three criteria:

• — Keep a core infrastructure under U.S. control.

• — Avoid a total reliance by the partner on U.S. services.

• — Allow the partner to evolve towards an eventual, semi-autonomous or autonomous capability.

The paper illustrates possible implications of meeting these constraints through “mini infrastructures” combining several elements to form a working architecture. It is concluded that any European participation in an International Moon Base Programme should contain both Space transport and surface elements.     

The history of international space programmes

In reviewing the past 50 years of international space cooperation, much of it stunningly successful, some bedevilled by difficulties, the author notes that ‘space’ can now only be understood as a complex area of widely varied sectors, further complicated by different funding sources and dual-use activities. While scientists were the initial drivers of cooperation, their flourishing programmes risk losing government funding to the grandiose manned missions being envisaged. Such funding is strongly reliant on political will rather than on the merits of any particular programme, something that, until recently with the GEO, has been particularly evident in earth observations. A major problem has been countries’ efforts to secure some minor national advantage at the expense of the bigger picture. But for international space cooperation truly to benefit humanity, a greater acceptance of working for the common good and more efficient programme management (no duplication) will be required.