The shuttle development and its growth potential

During the next two decades, we will establish the foundation for the 21st century's accomplishments in space. The Space Shuttle vehicle will become the cornerstone for that foundation by providing economical opportunities for space exploration and utilization.Reusability of the Shuttle vehicle is the key to its economy. The major developmental challenges encountered in the Shuttle program are typified by the complexities involved in designing the reusable propulsion and thermal protection subsystems. We successfully met such challenges and are nearing the launch of the first Shuttle orbital flight.Our immediate goal is to enter the Space Shuttle operational phase because only then will we fully understand the unique capabilities of the Shuttle. Concurrent with our effort to begin Shuttle operations are our initial efforts to expand Shuttle capabilities, extending them significantly beyond those of the current baseline system.Shuttle payload capacity and mission-duration capabilities are to increase considerably during the next decade. Just as present Shuttle performance specifications and development timetables were guided by the space program plans and forecasts of the 1960s, so will the development of long-range space programs be determined by our near-future achievements. We anticipate that the Space Shuttle will play a critical role in those achievements.     

The future of human spaceflight.

After the Apollo Moon program, the international space station represents a further milestone of humankind in space, International follow-on programs like a manned return to the Moon and a first manned Mars Mission can be considered as the next logical step. More and more attention is also paid to the topic of future space tourism in Earth orbit, which is currently under investigation in the USA, Japan and Europe due to its multibillion dollar market potential and high acceptance in society. The wide variety of experience, gained within the space station program, should be used in order to achieve time and cost savings for future manned programs. Different strategies and roadmaps are investigated for space tourism and human missions to the Moon and Mars, based on a comprehensive systems analysis approach. By using DLR's software tool FAST (Fast Assessment of Space Technologies), different scenarios will be defined, optimised and finally evaluated with respect to mission architecture, required technologies, total costs and program duration. This includes trajectory analysis, spacecraft design on subsystem level, operations and life cycle cost analysis. For space tourism, an expected evolutionary roadmap will be described which is initiated by short suborbital tourism and ends with visionary designs like the Space Hotel Berlin and the Space Hotel Europe concept. Furthermore the potential space tourism market, its economic meaning as well as the expected range of the costs of a space ticket (e.g. $50,000 for a suborbital flight) will be analysed and quantified. For human missions to the Moon and Mars, an international 20 year program for the first decades of the next millennium is proposed, which requires about $2.5 Billion per year for a manned return to the Moon program and about $2.6 Billion per year for the first 3 manned Mars missions. This is about the annual budget, which is currently spend by the USA only for the operations of its Space Shuttle fleet which generally proofs the affordability of such ambitious programs after the build-up of the International Space Station, when corresponding budget might become again available.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.     

Emergency and rescue considerations for manned space missions.

Man in space is totally dependent upon spacecraft systems. particularly those providing Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS). It is therefore required that the design of manned spacecraft systems include provision for backup emergency and rescue modes of operation to insure adequate crew safety margin. This paper discusses safety, emergency and rescue provisions included in the Space Transportation System (STS), with emphasis on ECLS subsystems. Similar discussion is included for systems projected for use in future, extended duration manned space missions.     

Leadership issues with multicultural crews on the international space station: lessons learned from Shuttle/Mir

In isolated and confined environments, two important leadership roles have been identified: the task/instrumental role (which focuses on work goals and operational needs), and the supportive/expressive role (which focuses on morale goals and emotional needs). On the International Space Station, the mission commander should be familiar with both of these aspects of leadership. In previous research involving a 135-day Mir space station simulation in Moscow and a series of on-orbit Mir space station missions during the Shuttle/Mir program, both these leadership roles were studied. In new analyses of the Shuttle/Mir data, we found that for crewmembers, the supportive role of the commander (but not the task role) related positively with crew cohesion. For mission control personnel on the ground, both the task and supportive roles of their leader were related positively to mission control cohesion. The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of leadership on board the International Space Station.     

Evolution and logistics of an early lunar base

The planned construction of a permanently manned space station in low earth orbit has reopened the discussion about the establishment of a manned lunar base within the next 25 years for exploration of the Moon and space. Several studies demonstrate that a lunar base very modest in size may cost $50 to 90 billion spread over 25 years which would fit into the expected NASA budget for this period. Having these cost in mind the authors present a concept having a greater effectiveness based on the following operational characteristics: (1) The development of a low cost heavy-lift launch vehicle for cargo transportation and propellant supply reduces the specific transportation cost by one order of magnitude compared to the existing Space Shuttle system. (2) Orbital transfer vehicles with LOX/LH2 technology should be preferred over advanced propulsion systems because of proved technology and cost reduction by utilization of lunar produced LOX. (3) The evolution of the lunar base towards a lunar colony and manufacturing facility could only be initiated by a powerful transportation system allowing for cost-effective space construction projects and manned spaceflight to other planets.The lunar base program of this paper is based on a schedule considering a 8 years development, 5 years lunar base assembly and 20 years operational phase during which the lunar crew will increase from 60 to 180 people. Launch rates will be 10 shuttle launches and 10 HLLV launches p.a. at the average. Development costs of the transportation and lunar base system will amount to $29 billion. Adding hardware and operational costs for lunar base assembly results in the acquisition cost of $49 billion. Total life cycle costs are estimated to be in the order of $101 billion considering a 20 years operational phase which will cost $2.6 billion p.a. at the average. For the 2508 man-years spent in lunosphere the relative cost will be $40.2 million per man-year of which space transportation will cost $25.0 million per man-year.     

Using computer graphics to enhance astronaut and systems safety.

Computer graphics is being employed at the NASA Johnson Space Center as a tool to perform rapid, efficient and economical analyses for man-machine integration, flight operations development and systems engineering. The Operator Station Design System (OSDS), a computer-based facility featuring a highly flexible and versatile interactive software package, PLAID, is described. This unique evaluation tool, with its expanding data base of Space Shuttle elements, various payloads, experiments, crew equipment and man models, supports a multitude of technical evaluations, including spacecraft and workstation layout, definition of astronaut visual access, flight techniques development, cargo integration and crew training. As OSDS is being applied to the Space Shuttle, Orbiter payloads (including the European Space Agency's Spacelab) and future space vehicles and stations, astronaut and systems safety are being enhanced. Typical OSDS examples are presented. By performing physical and operational evaluations during early conceptual phases. supporting systems verification for flight readiness, and applying its capabilities to real-time mission support, the OSDS provides the wherewithal to satisfy a growing need of the current and future space programs for efficient, economical analyses.     

The European Astronaut Centre prepares for International Space Station operations

The European Space Agency (ESA) contribution to the International Space Station (ISS) goes much beyond the delivery of hardware like the Columbus Laboratory, its payloads and the Automated Transfer Vehicles. ESA Astronauts will be members of the ISS crew. ESA, according to its commitments as ISS international partner, will be responsible to provide training on its elements and payloads to all ISS crewmembers and medical support for ESA astronauts. The European Astronaut Centre (EAC) in Cologne has developed over more than a decade into the centre of expertise for manned space activities within ESA by contributing to a number of important co-operative spaceflight missions. This role will be significantly extended for ISS manned operations. Apart from its support to ESA astronauts and their onboard operations, EAC will have a key role in training all ISS astronauts on ESA elements and payloads. The medical support of ISS crew, in particular of ESA astronauts has already started. This paper provides an overview on status and further plans in building up this homebase function for ESA astronauts and on the preparation towards Training Readiness for ISS crew training at EAC, Cologne. Copyright 2001 by the European Space Agency. Published by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., with permission. Released to IAF/IAA/AIAA to publish in all forms.     

Psycho-social training for man in space.

In preparation for the international manned space station various international and national space agencies are already participating with the Russian MIR programme with short, medium, and long term presence on the MIR station. Although selection criteria for all crew include careful psychological screening, with some effort also regarding team build-up, this has proved insufficient; moreover. little or no effort is expended in the area of psycho-social- or team training. This paper propounds the authors' thesis that, in addition to the steps already being taken, psycho-social training is essential for long-duration flight. A concrete proposal is made for such a training program, with an overview of how such a program will look like; examples of past applications are given.     

EVA 2000: a European/Russian space suit concept

For the European manned space activities an EVA space suit system was being developed in the frame of the Hermes Space Vehicle Programme of the European Space Agency (ESA). The space suit was to serve the needs for all relevant extravehicular activities for the Hermes Columbus operations planned to begin in 2004. For the present Russian manned space programme the relevant EVAs are performed by the Orlan-DMA semi-rigid space suit. The origin of its development reaches back to the 1970s and has since been adapted to cover the needs for extravehicular activities on Salyut and MIR until today. The latest modification of the space suit, which guaranteed its completely self-contained operation, was made in 1988. However, Russian specialists considered it necessary to start developing an EVA space suit of a new generation, which would have improved performance and would cover the needs by the turn of the century and into the beginning of the next century. Potentially these two suit developments could have a lot in common based on similarities in present concepts. As future manned space activities become more and more an international effort, a safe and reliable interoperability of the different space suit systems is required. Based on the results of the Munich Minister Conference in 1991, the European Space Agency and the Russian Space Agency agreed to initiate a requirements analysis and conceptual design study to determine the feasibility of a joint space suit development, EVA 2000. The design philosophy for the EVA 2000 study was oriented on a space suit system design of: space suit commonality and interoperability; increased crew productivity and safety; increase in useful life and reduced maintainability; reduced development and production cost. The EVA 2000 feasibility study was performed in 1992, and with the positive conclusions for EVA 2000, this approach became the new joint European Russian EVA Suit 2000 Development Programme. This paper gives an overview of the results of the feasibility study and presents the joint requirements and the proposed design concept of a jointly developed European Russian space suit.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

Lessons learned from Mir--a payload perspective

Among the principal objectives of the Phase 1 NASA/Mir program were for the United States to gain experience working with an international partner, to gain working experience in long-duration space flight, and to gain working experience in planning for and executing research on a long-duration space platform. The Phase 1 program was to provide the US early experience prior to the construction and operation of the International Space Station (Phase 2 and 3). While it can be argued that Mir and ISS are different platforms and that programmatically Phase 1 and ISS are organized differently, it is also clear that many aspects of operating a long-duration research program are platform independent. This can be demonstrated by a review of lessons learned from Skylab, a US space station program of the mid-1970s, many of which were again “learned” on Mir and are being “learned” on ISS. Among these are optimum crew training strategies, on-orbit crew operations, ground support, medical operations and crew psychological support, and safety certification processes.     

Technology Improvement for the High Reliability LM-2F Launch Vehicle

The Long March 2 F(LM-2F) launch vehicle, the only launch vehicle designed for manned space flight in China, successfully launched the Tiangong 2 space laboratory and the Shenzhou 11 manned spaceship into orbits in 2016 respectively. In this study, it introduces the technological improvements for enhancing the reliability of the LM-2F launch vehicle in the aspects of general technology, control system, manufacture and ground support system. The LM-2F launch vehicle will continue to provide more contributions to the Chinese Space Station Project with its high reliability and 100% success rate.     

Assessing the legacy of the Space Shuttle

This article reviews the core legacies of the Space Shuttle program after 25 years and suggests that, while it was not an unadulterated success, on balance the Shuttle served a valuable role in the development of spaceflight and deserves an overall positive assessment in history. There are five core legacies that deserve discussion. First, the Space Shuttle has a reputation as a mistake resulting from a policy failure that should never have been pursued. Second, it has been criticized as a program that prohibited other paths for the US space program. Third, and more positively, the Space Shuttle provided more than two decades of significant human spaceflight capability and stretched the nature of what could be accomplished in Earth orbit much beyond where it had previously been. Fourth, it served as a relatively flexible platform for scientific activities. Finally, and perhaps most significantly since the US human spaceflight program has always been focused on national prestige, the Space Shuttle served well as a symbol of American technological verisimilitude.     

One hundred US EVAs: a perspective on spacewalks

In the 36 years between June 1965 and February 2001, the US human space flight program has conducted 100 spacewalks, or extravehicular activities (EVAs), as NASA officially calls them. EVA occurs when astronauts wearing spacesuits travel outside their protective spacecraft to perform tasks in the space vacuum environment. US EVA started with pioneering feasibility tests during the Gemini Program. The Apollo Program required sending astronauts to the moon and performing EVA to explore the lunar surface. EVA supported scientific mission objectives of the Skylab program, but may be best remembered for repairing launch damage to the vehicle and thus saving the program. EVA capability on Shuttle was initially planned to be a kit that could be flown at will, and was primarily intended for coping with vehicle return emergencies. The Skylab emergency and the pivotal role of EVA in salvaging that program quickly promoted Shuttle EVA to an essential element for achieving mission objectives, including retrieving satellites and developing techniques to assemble and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). Now, EVA is supporting assembly of ISS. This paper highlights development of US EVA capability within the context of the overarching mission objectives of the US human space flight program.     

Priorities in space for the USA

This article follows the story of Shuttle development, in the context of the history of the US space programme from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was chosen as one of a series of ‘space spectaculars’ and has proven to be prohibitively expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The Space Station, too, cannot be economically supplied, even if the USA could afford to build it. The author concludes that NASA should cancel the Space Station and the replacement orbiter for Challenger, and engage on a major programme of launch vehicle development, independent of the US military. The aim should be a dramatic reduction of launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA which could restore the USA to space preeminence.     

载人航天器乘员舱空气龄分布数值仿真及试验研究

引入空气龄指标作为载人航天器舱内空气质量新的评价标准。通过空气龄分布研究,能够找出舱内新鲜空气供给较差的位置。建立了载人航天器乘员舱仿真模型,利用FLUENT软件UDS方程求解了舱内空气龄分布。采用示踪气体下降法对仿真结果中空气龄数值较高的位置进行了空气龄试验,测试结果与仿真结果吻合良好。文章的研究结果有助于指导未来我国空间站乘员舱通风系统的设计。     

Risk management in international manned space program operations

New, innovative joint safety policies and requirements were developed in support of the Shuttle/Mir program, which is the first phase of the International Space Station program. This work has resulted in a joint multinational analysis culminating in joint certification for mission readiness. For these planning and development efforts, each nation's risk programs and individual safety practices had to be integrated into a comprehensive and compatible system that reflects the joint nature of the endeavor. This paper highlights the major incremental steps involved in planning and program integration during development of the Shuttle/Mir program. It traces the transition from early development to operational status and highlights the valuable lessons learned that apply to the International Space Station program (Phase 2). Also examined are external and extraneous factors that affected mission operations and the corresponding solutions to ensure safe and effective Shuttle/Mir missions.     

Social and cultural issues during Shuttle/Mir space missions.

A number of interpersonal issues relevant to manned space missions have been identified from the literature. These include crew tension, cohesion, leadership, language and cultural factors, and displacement. Ground-based studies by others and us have clarified some of the parameters of these issues and have indicated ways in which they could be studied during actual space missions. In this paper, we summarize some of our findings related to social and cultural issues from a NASA-funded study conducted during several Shuttle/Mir space missions. We used standardized mood and group climate measures that were completed on a weekly basis by American and Russian crew and mission control subjects who participated in these missions. Our results indicated that American subjects reported more dissatisfaction with their interpersonal environment than their Russian counterparts, especially American astronauts. Mission control personnel were more dysphoric than crewmembers, but both groups were significantly less dysphoric than other work groups on Earth. Countermeasures based on our findings are discussed which can be applied to future multicultural space missions.