Principal investigators and project managers: Insights from Discovery

NASA’s Discovery, Explorer, and Mars Scout mission lines have demonstrated over the past 15 years that, with careful planning, flexible management techniques, and a commitment to cost control, small space science missions can be built and launched at a fraction of the price of strategic missions. Many credit management techniques such as co-location, early contracting for long-lead items, and a resistance to scope creep for this, but it is also important to examine what may be the most significant variable in small mission implementation: the roles and the relationship of the principal investigator, responsible to NASA for the success of the mission, and the project manager, responsible for delivering the mission to NASA. This paper reports on a series of 55 oral histories with principal investigators, project managers, co-investigators, system engineers, and senior management from nearly every competitively selected Discovery mission launched to date that discuss the definition and evolution of these roles and share revealing insights from the key players themselves. The paper will show that there are as many ways to define the principal investigator/project manager relationship as there are missions, and that the subtleties in the relationship often provide new management tools not practical in larger missions.     

A preliminary assessment of an orbiter in the Haumean system: How quickly can a planetary orbiter reach such a distant target?

With the recent discoveries of planetary objects beyond Neptune and Pluto, the vast majority of all sizeable Solar System planetary objects lie now beyond Uranus, where insertion into orbit after a reasonably short travel is still not within the current capabilities of our spacecraft. Being able to go and stop at a transneptunian dwarf planet would represent a step stone for ambitious long-term goals. The pressure to send spacecraft to these bodies will grow, as, among the tens or hundreds of large objects, some will emerge as high priorities for science and exploration missions. It is subsequently necessary to prepare the technologies required for such spacecraft. In addition, being able to achieve a fast journey to a distant object will benefit also missions to closer targets.Thales Alenia Space has carried out a preliminary parameter exploration of such a mission with a challenging target: an orbiter in the Haumean system. The main parameters are the characteristics of the propulsion and power system, as well as the masses of the spacecraft. The exploration has inferred the technological improvement needed for reaching these objects within a reasonable time.     

月亮女神探月计划及对我国月球与深空探测的思考

日本月亮女神月球探测器在顺利完成各项探测任务后,于北京时间2009年6月11日受控落月.该探月计划在一箭三星组网探测月球背面重力场、有效载荷创新设计、科研活动组织、成果产出、公众参与和科普宣传等方面有许多亮点,对我国探月工程有重要参考价值.文章综合回顾、分析和评述了月亮女神探月计划的任务、探测器、轨道与飞控、重要事件等...     

A complexity-based risk assessment of low-cost planetary missions: when is a mission too fast and too cheap?

Under constrained budgets and rigid schedules, NASA and industry have greatly increased their utilization of small satellites to conduct low-cost planetary investigations. Recent failed small planetary science spacecraft such as Mars Polar Lander (MPL) and Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO), and impaired missions such as Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) have fueled the ongoing debate on whether NASA's “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC) approach is working. Several noteworthy failures of earth-orbiting missions have occurred as well including Lewis and the Wide-field Infrared Experiment (WIRE). While recent studies have observed that FBC has resulted in lower costs and shorter development times, these benefits may have been achieved at the expense of lowering probability of success. One question remaining to be answered is when is a mission “too fast and too cheap” that it is prone to failure? This paper assesses NASA FBC missions in terms of a complexity index measured against development time and spacecraft cost. A comparison of relative failure rates of recent planetary and earth-orbiting missions are presented, and conclusions regarding dependence on system complexity are drawn.     

Mars Express spacecraft: design and development solutions for affordable planetary missions

The spacecraft designed to support the ESA Mars Express mission and its science payloads is customized around an existing avionics well suited to environmental and operational constraints of deep-space interplanetary missions. The reuse of the avionics initially developed for the Rosetta cometary program thanks to an adequate ESA cornerstone program budget paves the way for affordable planetary missions.The costs and schedule benefits inherited from reuse of up-to-date avionics solutions validated in the frame of other programs allows to focus design and development efforts of a new mission over the specific areas which requires customization, such as spacecraft configuration and payload resources. This design approach, combined with the implementation of innovative development and management solutions have enabled to provide the Mars Express mission with an highly capable spacecraft for a remarkably low cost. The different spacecraft subsystems are all based on adequate design solutions. The development plan ensures an exhaustive spacecraft verification in order to perform the mission at minimum risk. New management schemes contribute to maintain the mission within its limited funding.Experience and heritage gained on this program will allow industry to propose to Scientists and Agencies high performance, low-cost solutions for the ambitious Mars Exploration Program of the forthcoming decade.     

MESSENGER's use of solar sailing for cost and risk reduction

The MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry, and Ranging (MESSENGER) mission used six planetary gravity assists in order to enable capture into orbit about Mercury. A key element of MESSENGER's successful trajectory was achieving the proper gravity assist from each planetary flyby. The criticality of the MESSENGER gravity assists levied tight accuracy requirements on the planetary-flyby targeting. Major errors could have precluded Mercury orbit insertion or required modifications to the trajectory that increased mission complexity, cost, and risk by requiring additional Mercury flybys and extending mission duration. Throughout the mission, MESSENGER modified its strategy for achieving accurate planetary flybys. By using solar sailing, the MESSENGER team was able to eliminate all of the flyby approach maneuvers without sacrificing flyby accuracy, thereby saving mission ΔV margin. The elimination of these approach maneuvers also markedly reduced mission risk, as these approach maneuvers were nominally planned during a time of heightened sensitivity to errors and precluded unique flyby science opportunities. The paradigm shift used by MESSENGER may be useful for other interplanetary missions, particularly if their trajectories require gravity assists in the inner solar system.     

A gateway for human exploration of space? The weak stability boundary

NASA's plans for future human exploration of the Solar System describe only missions to Mars. Before such missions can be initiated, much study remains to be done in technology development, mission operations and human performance. While, for example, technology validation and operational experience could be gained in the context of lunar exploration missions, a NASA lunar program is seen as a competitor to a Mars mission rather than a step towards it. The recently characterized weak stability boundary in the Earth–Moon gravitational field may provide an operational approach to all types of planetary exploration, and infrastructure developed for a gateway to the Solar System may be a programmatic solution for exploration that avoids the fractious bickering between Mars and Moon advocates. This viewpoint proposes utilizing the concept of Greater Earth to educate policy makers, opinion makers and the public about these subtle attributes of our space neighborhood.     

An alternative approach to solar system exploration planning

Planning for the future exploration of the solar system has involved the structuring of a series of missions that address major scientific objectives at a minimum runout cost for the entire endeavor. In many cases, however, the optimal structuring of a program that would minimize the runout cost would entail an unacceptable high annual funding. Our actual planning must consider the planning wedge imposed on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It is vital that a plan be structured that copes with the annual restraint. If we do not recognize this, our plan will not be realized and a queing problem will result, thus negating all of our planning efforts.This paper presents ideas as to how planetary initiatives can be structured, wherein the peak annual funding is minimized. One vital aspect in the plan is to have a transportation capability that can launch a mission in any planetary opportunity. Solar electric propulsion can provide this capability. Another cost reduction approach would be to structure a mission set in a time sequenced fashion that could utilize essentially the same spacecraft for the implementation of several missions. This opportunity does exist. A third technique would be to fulfill a scientific objective in several sequential missions rather than attempt to accomplish all of the objectives with one mission. This approach might be applied to a mission currently in the planning stage designated the Saturn Orbiter Dual Probe mission. The current concept involves the delivery of a Saturn probe, a Titan probe, and a Saturn Orbiter by a one Shuttle launch. In this case, the orbiter must serve as a relay station for both probes; map the magnetosphere of Saturn; conduct a survey of Saturn's major satellites; and perform the planetological observation of Saturn itself. This mission entails the development of a complex spacecraft that would be required to have a fairly long life due to the extended mission operations at the benefit of accomplishing the mission with one launch. An alternate approach would be to break the mission into two separate elements. We could, for example, launch a Saturn orbiter carrying a Saturn entry probe. After serving as a communications relay system for the Saturn probe, the orbiter would then be specialized to map the magnetosphere of Saturn. A second launch would involve the delivery of a Titan probe by another orbiter where after delivery the orbiter would conduct the planetological observation of Saturn and its satellites. For the split-launch option, the runout cost for the two missions would be greater than the single launch option. However, optimum structuring of the two missions could materially reduce the peak annual funding.This paper presents data on the estimated cost on a year by year basis of a mission set structured to minimize the runout cost with no concern as to the peak annual funding as compared to a mission set that would yield the same scientific objectives in a slightly longer time span wherein the annual peak funding would be minimized. The consequences of this revised plan are analyzed.     

A series of small scientific satellite with flexible standard bus

Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency has a plan to develop the small satellite standard bus for various scientific missions and disaster monitoring missions. The satellite bus is a class of 250–400 kg mass with three-axis control capability of 0.02 accuracy. The science missions include X-ray astronomy missions, planetary telescope missions, and magnetosphere atmosphere missions. In order to adapt the wide range of mission requirements, the satellite bus has to be provided with flexibility. The concepts of modularization, reusability, and product line are applied to the standard bus system. This paper describes the characteristics of the small satellite standard bus which will be firstly launched in 2011.     

Policy for robust space-based earth science,technology and applications

Satellite remote sensing technology has contributed to the transformation of multiple earth science domains, putting space observations at the forefront of innovation in earth science. With new satellite missions being launched every year, new types of earth science data are being incorporated into science models and decision-making systems in a broad array of organizations. Policy guidance can influence the degree to which user needs influence mission design and when, and ensure that satellite missions serve both the scientific and user communities without becoming unfocused and overly expensive. By considering the needs of the user community early on in the mission-design process, agencies can ensure that satellites meet the needs of multiple constituencies. This paper describes the mission development process in NASA and ESA and compares and contrasts the successes and challenges faced by these agencies as they try to balance science and applications within their missions.     

JPL Innovation Foundry

Space science missions are increasingly challenged today: in ambition, by increasingly sophisticated hypotheses tested; in development, by the increasing complexity of advanced technologies; in budgeting, by the decline of flagship-class mission opportunities; in management, by expectations for breakthrough science despite a risk-averse programmatic climate; and in planning, by increasing competition for scarce resources. How are the space-science missions of tomorrow being formulated? The paper describes the JPL Innovation Foundry, created in 2011, to respond to this evolving context. The Foundry integrates methods, tools, and experts that span the mission concept lifecycle. Grounded in JPL's heritage of missions, flight instruments, mission proposals, and concept innovation, the Foundry seeks to provide continuity of support and cost-effective, on-call access to the right domain experts at the right time, as science definition teams and Principal Investigators mature mission ideas from “cocktail napkin” to PDR. The Foundry blends JPL capabilities in proposal development and concurrent engineering, including Team X, with new approaches for open-ended concept exploration in earlier, cost-constrained phases, and with ongoing research and technology projects. It applies complexity and cost models, project-formulation lessons learned, and strategy analyses appropriate to each level of concept maturity. The Foundry is organizationally integrated with JPL formulation program offices; staffed by JPL's line organizations for engineering, science, and costing; and overseen by senior Laboratory leaders to assure experienced coordination and review. Incubation of each concept is tailored depending on its maturity and proposal history, and its highest-leverage modeling and analysis needs.     

SciBox,an end-to-end automated science planning and commanding system

SciBox is a new technology for planning and commanding science operations for Earth-orbital and planetary space missions. It has been incrementally developed since 2001 and demonstrated on several spaceflight projects. The technology has matured to the point that it is now being used to plan and command all orbital science operations for the MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry, and Ranging (MESSENGER) mission to Mercury. SciBox encompasses the derivation of observing sequences from science objectives, the scheduling of those sequences, the generation of spacecraft and instrument commands, and the validation of those commands prior to uploading to the spacecraft. Although the process is automated, science and observing requirements are incorporated at each step by a series of rules and parameters to optimize observing opportunities, which are tested and validated through simulation and review. Except for limited special operations and tests, there is no manual scheduling of observations or construction of command sequences. SciBox reduces the lead time for operations planning by shortening the time-consuming coordination process, reduces cost by automating the labor-intensive processes of human-in-the-loop adjudication of observing priorities, reduces operations risk by systematically checking constraints, and maximizes science return by fully evaluating the trade space of observing opportunities to meet MESSENGER science priorities within spacecraft recorder, downlink, scheduling, and orbital-geometry constraints.     

Transforming solar system exploration: The origins of the Discovery Program, 1989–1993

The Discovery Program is a rarity in the history of NASA solar system exploration: a reform program that has survived and continued to be influential. This article examines its emergence between 1989 and 1993, largely as the result of the intervention of two people: Stamatios “Tom” Krimigis of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), and Wesley Huntress of NASA, who was Division Director of Solar System Exploration 1990–92 and the Associate Administrator for Space Science 1992–98. Krimigis drew on his leadership experience in the space physics community and his knowledge of its Explorer program to propose that it was possible to create new missions to the inner solar system for a fraction of the existing costs. He continued to push that idea for the next two years, but it took the influence of Huntress at NASA Headquarters to push it on to the agenda. Huntress explicitly decided to use APL to force change on the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the planetary science community. He succeeded in moving the JPL Mars Pathfinder and APL Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) mission proposals forward as the opening missions for Discovery. But it took Krimigis's political skill and access to Sen. Barbara Mikulski in 1993 to get the NEAR into the NASA budget, thereby likely ensuring that Discovery would not become another one-mission program.     

Low cost planetary exploration: surrey lunar minisatellite and interplanetary platform missions

In order to meet the growing global requirement for affordable missions beyond Low Earth Orbit, two types of platform are under design at the Surrey Space Centre. The first platform is a derivative of Surrey's UoSAT-12 minisatellite, launched in April 1999 and operating successfully in-orbit. The minisatellite has been modified to accommodate a propulsion system capable of delivering up to 1700 m/s delta-V, enabling it to support a wide range of very low cost missions to LaGrange points, Near-Earth Objects, and the Moon. A mission to the Moon - dubbed “MoonShine” - is proposed as the first demonstration of the modified minisatellite beyond LEO. The second platform - Surrey's Interplanetary Platform - has been designed to support missions with delta-V requirements up to 3200 m/s, making it ideal for low cost missions to Mars and Venus, as well as Near Earth Objects (NEOs) and other interplanetary trajectories. Analysis has proved mission feasibility, identifying key challenges in both missions for developing cost-effective techniques for: spacecraft propulsion; navigation; autonomous operations; and a reliable safe mode strategy. To reduce mission risk, inherently failure resistant lunar and interplanetary trajectories are under study. In order to significantly reduce cost and increase reliability, both platforms can communicate with low-cost ground stations and exploit Surrey's experience in autonomous operations. The lunar minisatellite can provide up to 70 kg payload margin in lunar orbit for a total mission cost US$16–25 M. The interplanetary platform can deliver 20 kg of scientific payload to Mars or Venus orbit for a mission cost US$25–50 M. Together, the platforms will enable regular flight of payloads to the Moon and interplanetary space at unprecedented low cost. This paper outlines key systems engineering issues for the proposed Lunar Minisatellite and interplanetary Platform Missions, and describes the accommodation and performance offered to planetary payloads.     

The use of remote sensing satellites for verification in international law

This paper examines the use of remote sensing satellites for verification in public international law. Verification always depends on the specific agreement or mission to be verified. There are no general framework rules: the means of verification and the verifying authorities vary from agreement to agreement and from mission to mission. Rapid technological development and the intensifying international cooperation have led to an increasing number of international verification missions. Whereas, in the past, verification was at the heart of intelligence and national services, the commercialization of the remote sensing industry and the information revolution have supported the creation of joint initiatives in this field. Traditionally, verification is associated with disarmament and arms control treaties, but the paper will underline that this is only one field of application for verification missions. It is important to note that there is no binding international regime specifically addressing such activity. The lack of legal certainty in this field also applies to the use of remotely sensed data as evidence in legal proceedings.     

The deep space 1 extended mission

The primary mission of Deep Space 1 (DS1), the first flight of the New Millennium program, completed successfully in September 1999, having exceeded its objectives of testing new, high-risk technologies important for future space and Earth science missions. DS1 is now in its extended mission, with plans to take advantage of the advanced technologies, including solar electric propulsion, to conduct an encounter with comet 19P/Borrelly in September 2001. During the extended mission, the spacecraft's commercial star tracker failed; this critical loss prevented the spacecraft from achieving three-axis attitude control or knowledge. A two-phase approach to recovering the mission was undertaken. The first involved devising a new method of pointing the high-gain antenna to Earth using the radio signal received at the Deep Space Network as an indicator of spacecraft attitude. The second was the development of new flight software that allowed the spacecraft to return to three-axis operation without substantial ground assistance. The principal new feature of this software is the use of the science camera as an attitude sensor. The differences between the science camera and the star tracker have important implications not only for the design of the new software but also for the methods of operating the spacecraft and conducting the mission. The ambitious rescue was fully successful, and the extended mission is back on track.     

Aeroshell design techniques for aerocapture entry vehicles

A major goal of NASA's In-Space Propulsion Program is to shorten trip times for scientific planetary missions. To meet this challenge arrival speeds will increase, requiring significant braking for orbit insertion, and thus increased deceleration propellant mass that may exceed launch lift capabilities. A technology called aerocapture has been developed to expand the mission potential of exploratory probes destined for planets with suitable atmospheres. Aerocapture inserts a probe into planetary orbit via a single pass through the atmosphere using the probe's aeroshell drag to reduce velocity. The benefit of an aerocapture maneuver is a large reduction in propellant mass that may result in smaller, less costly missions and reduced mission cruise times. The methodology used to design rigid aerocapture aeroshells will be presented with an emphasis on a new systems tool under development. Current methods for fast, efficient evaluations of structural systems for exploratory vehicles to planets and moons within our solar system have been under development within NASA having limited success. Many systems tools that have been attempted applied structural mass estimation techniques based on historical data and curve fitting techniques that are difficult and cumbersome to apply to new vehicle concepts and missions. The resulting vehicle aeroshell mass may be incorrectly estimated or have high margins included to account for uncertainty. This new tool will reduce the guesswork previously found in conceptual aeroshell mass estimations.     

Planetary parks—formulating a wilderness policy for planetary bodies

Building on an earlier article, establishment of a planetary park system for other planetary bodies is further developed. Reasons are elaborated for such a system to protect representative regions of other planetary bodies. Although a parks system might seem supererogatory, and an over-reaction to the currently very limited environmental impact of robotic and human exploration and settlement activities, four arguments are provided that suggest that such a system does have a value, even in advance of robotic and human missions. Planetary parks incorporate concepts of planetary protection, but they extend the reasons for practical protection policies beyond the utilitarian protection of scientific resources emphasized by planetary protection, into other utilitarian and intrinsic value arguments. Planetary parks might still allow for the development of non-park areas by commercial enterprise.     

Innovations in mission architectures for exploration beyond low Earth orbit

Through the application of advanced technologies and mission concepts, architectures for missions beyond Earth orbit have been dramatically simplified. These concepts enable a stepping stone approach to science driven; technology enabled human and robotic exploration. Numbers and masses of vehicles required are greatly reduced, yet the pursuit of a broader range of science objectives is enabled. The scope of human missions considered range from the assembly and maintenance of large aperture telescopes for emplacement at the Sun-Earth libration point L2, to human missions to asteroids, the moon and Mars. The vehicle designs are developed for proof of concept, to validate mission approaches and understand the value of new technologies. The stepping stone approach employs an incremental buildup of capabilities, which allows for future decision points on exploration objectives. It enables testing of technologies to achieve greater reliability and understanding of costs for the next steps in exploration.     

MarcoPolo-R: Near-Earth Asteroid sample return mission selected for the assessment study phase of the ESA program cosmic vision

This paper presents the sample return mission to a primitive Near-Earth Asteroid (NEA) MarcoPolo-R proposed to the European Space Agency in December 2010. MarcoPolo-R was selected in February 2011 with three other missions addressing different science objectives for the two-year Assessment Phase of the Medium-Class mission competition of the Cosmic Vision 2 program for launch in 2022. The baseline target of MarcoPolo-R is the binary NEA (175706) 1996 FG3, which offers an efficient operational and technical mission profile. A binary target also provides enhanced science return. The choice of a binary target allows several scientific investigations to occur more easily than through a single object, in particular regarding the fascinating geology and geophysics of asteroids. MarcoPolo-R will rendezvous with a primitive, organic-rich NEA, scientifically characterize it at multiple scales, and return a bulk sample to Earth for laboratory analyses. The MarcoPolo-R sample will provide a representative sample from the surface of a known asteroid with known geologic context, and will contribute to the inventory of primitive material that is probably missing from the meteorite collection. The MarcoPolo-R samples will thus contribute to the exploration of the origin of planetary materials and initial stages of habitable planet formation, to the identification and characterization of the organics and volatiles in a primitive asteroid and to the understanding of the unique geomorphology, dynamics and evolution of a binary asteroid that belongs to the Potentially Hazardous Asteroid (PHA) population.