Management dynamics of NASA''s human spaceflight programs

The public management dynamics of human spaceflight at NASA in the post-Apollo era—Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and the United States national vision for space exploration—are examined. A number of variables are applied to assess this. Public management processes are identified as a function of political accountability, organizational decision-making and cultures, and technical aspects directed at high reliability and safety of the large-scale, complex, and high-risk technologies that characterize NASA's human spaceflight programs. The findings indicate that these variables are causally linked to management outcomes through dynamics of centralized and decentralized organizational approaches. The success or failure of NASA's human spaceflight programs are linked to organizational management based on dynamics between centralized aspects of management, like controls over cost and schedule, and decentralized aspects, such as engineering authority over technical development.     

NASA and the phenomenology of discovery: Vigilance,work conditions,and a renewed space policy

As NASA works to redefine the meaning of its mission, two social scientists apply tools from phenomenology to explore how an agency, on the cusp of new thought, is tasked with discovery. Sources for the analysis include interviews, observations, case files and documents before and after a site visit to Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. Findings suggest that NASA should consider creating an internal office of phenomenological inquiry designed to recognize phenomenology at work as a fundamental approach for discovery. A special note of appreciation is extended to NASA for fostering and encouraging access to their organization to observe operations at the side of astronauts in training, engineers and scientists at work, and managers overseeing a Space Shuttle mission.     

Potential cost reductions for three STS/Spacelab mission modes

Based on the results of studies carried out by ESA several possibilities are discussed to achieve mission cost reductions for large Spacelab instrument facilities as compared to their flight on several 7-day duration Spacelab missions. As an example three scientific telescope facilities are selected (LIRTS, EXSPOS, GRIST) which are defined to a Phase A level.Three new mission modes are considered:

• —Shuttle attached Spacelab mission mode with extended flight duration (up to 30 days) for which the application of planned capability extensions and new elements of the STS/Spacelab (e.g. Short Spacelab Pallets, Power Extension Package) are investigated.

• —Shuttle deployed mission mode, for which the telescope, accommodated on a Spacelab pallet, is docked to the Power Module, a new element of the Space Transportation System under study by NASA.

• —Free-flying mission mode, for which Shuttle launched dedicated missions of the facilities are considered, assuming varying degrees of autonomy with respect to supporting services of the Shuttle.

Reduction of costs have been considered on the levels of single mission cost and total programme cost. Fundamentally the charges for the instrument can be reduced by constraining the mass/volume factors with respect to the Shuttle capability. However, the instrument as part of a payload is only viable if an acceptable resource sharing including observation time can be achieved. Any single instrument will require several mission opportunities or one mission which achieves a similar or longer total observation programme.Based on an identification of instrument modifications of the Phase A baseline designs to favour cost reductions and on a derivation of technical requirements, constraints and finally budgetary cost comparisons an attempt is made to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the different mission modes.The favoured option for GRIST is a 2–3 weeks sortie mission followed after refurbishment by a longer Power Module docked mission. For LIRTS and EXSPOS the free-flying pallet modes are very attractive in terms of the longer durations achieved and in terms of cost per unit operating time.     

Data on and methodology for calculating space shuttle programme costs

This report presents data on the annual and total costs of NASA's Space Shuttle programme through fiscal year (FY) 1993. The total cost of the programme through FY 1993 is found to be $83.7 billion in 1992 dollars. This information has significance for pending policy decisions on the future of the Shuttle programme, its possible successors, and interrelated programmes, such as the Space Station.     

Attached payloads on SPACEHAB, growing from the Space Shuttle to the Space Station

Although NASA's Space Shuttle is largely dedicated in the near term to Space Station assembly, 10–16 day flight opportunities still abound for spacecraft technology demonstration payloads, and experiments for the established earth and space science communities. This paper will present the latest developments of SPACEHAB flight systems in order to accommodate the flight needs of these communities on the Space Shuttle today and the Space Station tomorrow. In particular, some examples of payloads from these disciplines will be introduced together with the accommodation and experiment objectives.     

Observations from over a decade of experience in developing faster, better, cheaper missions for the NASA small explorer program

The Small Explorer (SMEX) Project at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has accumulated nearly a decade of experience building missions with the underlying philosophy of “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC). Five satellites are now successfully operating on-orbit with only one serious instrument anomaly. Together this Project has accumulated 14.6 years of on-orbit experience without a spacecraft bus failure. Additionally, this project, under the Explorer Technology Infusion effort, has developed a protoflight version of a 21^st Century FBC spacecraft bus that has just completed environmental qualification and has been selected at the base spacecraft for NASA's Triana mission. Design and production of these six high performance spacecraft, in just ten years time, has provided a unique base of experience from which to draw lessons learned. This paper will discuss the fundamental practices that have been used by the SMEX Project in achieving this record of success.     

Success criteria and risk management for the new millennium program

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) New Millennium Program (NMP) is a technology development and validation program that will flight-validate advanced, new technologies with space flight applications. NMP's purpose is twofold. First, it will develop technologies that will enable future spacecraft to be smaller, more capable and reliable, and to be launched more frequently. Second, it will validate the technologies in flight to reduce the risks to future science missions that fly these technologies for the first time. To measure the program's success, NMP has devised a set of criteria that stresses the relevance of technologies selected for flight validation to NASA's 21st-century science mission needs. Also, NMP has instituted a ‘risk management’ policy, where, through a combination of adequate resources and early risk assessment and risk mitigation plans for the technologies, the overall risk of the NMP flights can be rendered acceptable.     

New microgravity fundamental physics research areas in the ISS era

NASA's microgravity fundamental physics program has used the Space Shuttle to perform high resolutions experiments in space. As we come to the end of the Shuttle era, we will begin to perform research aboard the ISS. A large stable of ground based experiments have been selected from NASA Research Announcements in a variety of disciplines. These investigations will form the backbone from which to select future flight candidates. Research in Laser Cooling and Atomic Physics will enable us to operate highly precise clocks in space. Low temperature physics experiments will use a liquid helium facility with a six-month lifetime. This facility can also support experiments in gravitational physics. Researchers in biological physics will be offered an opportunity to develop future experiments that can benefit from space experimentation. An overview of the future research directions and the benefits to the community of performing research aboard the ISS will be presented.     

The decision to develop the Space Shuttle

Many of the problems that the Space Shuttle programme has had in meeting its goals of routine and cost-effective access to space can be traced to various characteristics of the decision to develop the Space Shuttle. That decision was made through a process of bureaucratic politics, with little attention given to future users of the Shuttle. The design chosen for development was a poor compromise between demanding Pentagon and NASA requirements and a limited budget.     

Using computer graphics to enhance astronaut and systems safety.

Computer graphics is being employed at the NASA Johnson Space Center as a tool to perform rapid, efficient and economical analyses for man-machine integration, flight operations development and systems engineering. The Operator Station Design System (OSDS), a computer-based facility featuring a highly flexible and versatile interactive software package, PLAID, is described. This unique evaluation tool, with its expanding data base of Space Shuttle elements, various payloads, experiments, crew equipment and man models, supports a multitude of technical evaluations, including spacecraft and workstation layout, definition of astronaut visual access, flight techniques development, cargo integration and crew training. As OSDS is being applied to the Space Shuttle, Orbiter payloads (including the European Space Agency's Spacelab) and future space vehicles and stations, astronaut and systems safety are being enhanced. Typical OSDS examples are presented. By performing physical and operational evaluations during early conceptual phases. supporting systems verification for flight readiness, and applying its capabilities to real-time mission support, the OSDS provides the wherewithal to satisfy a growing need of the current and future space programs for efficient, economical analyses.     

The decay of NASA's technical culture

The ability of the US government to carry out future space policies depends upon the maintenance of a technically capable space flight agency. During its first decade of operation the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) developed an organizational culture supporting very high levels of reliability. This ‘technical culture’ stressed the importance of in-house technical capability, ‘hands on’ activity and extensive testing. Forces at work on the agency since 1970 have tended to erode the original culture. This article explains the ways in which the beliefs and norms guiding NASA operations have changed since the agency's first decade of operations.     

The changing face of international space cooperation : One view of NASA

This article looks at how, over the past 20 years, NASA's role in space activities has changed. It looks at trends in NASA's posture towards cooperation with other nations and speculates on current and future behaviour. The Space Station programme in particular is discussed and the way in which NASA reconciles self-interest with cooperation.     

Lunar base development missions

On 20 July 1969, humankind first set foot on our Moon. Since then we have developed the Space Shuttle, explored most of the planets, cooperated in the development of the International Space Station, and expanded our knowledge of the universe through use of systems such as the Hubble Space Telescope and the Mars Pathfinder. After just five human follow-on missions to our Moon, we have returned robotically only twice to orbit, to map the surface and explore for resources.

The indication of the presence of hydrogen concentration at the poles of our Moon found by Lunar Prospector has added a new perspective for groups studying and implementing future lunar missions. Plans for nearterm missions such as the European Space Agency (ESA) “Euromoon 2000”, the Japanese Lunar A and Selene, and the Mitsubishi ”Earthrise 2001” Project, along with follow-on phases to the Lunar Prospector, are the beginning of humankind's return to the Moon. Organizations such as the International Academy of Astronautics have long championed the “Case for an International Lunar Base,” and a vision of a commercially-based lunar program has been outlined by several groups. A Lunar Economic Development Authority (LEDA) promoted by the United Society in Space was promulgated by the filing of articles of incorporation in the state of Colorado on 4 August 1997. This non-profit corporation has as its goal the orderly development of the Moon, through issuance of bonds to international private citizens and business entities who care to invest in its long-term development.

This paper draws from the works of the aforementioned, and specifically from the International Academy of Astronautics Lunar Base Committee, to structure a series of architectures leading toward eventual international commercial colonization of the lunar surface. While the prospect of fully reusable transportation systems utilizing fully developed lunar resources to perpetuate the permanent lunar infrastructure is enticing, this is a goal. We must utilize our current and near-term capabilities to re-initiate human lunar presence, and then build on emerging technologies to strengthen our capabilities. Humankind's return to the Moon is a part of our destiny. We can return in the near future, and then proceed to a commercial, permanent settlement in the 21st century.     

The data compression problem for the “GAIA” astrometric satellite of ESA

Space-based astrometry has a great tradition at ESA. The first space-based astrometric satellite in history, “Hipparcos”, was launched by ESA in 1989 and, in spite of orbital problems, was able to accomplish almost all of its tasks until it was finally shut down in 1993. The results of the Hipparcos mission were published by ESA in 1997 in the form of six CD-ROMs: the Hipparcos Catalogue contains 118,218 entries with median astrometric precision of around 1 milliarcsec, and specific results for double and multiple systems. In practice, Hipparcos drew for the first time the three-dimensional “map” of the spherical region of the Galaxy surrounding the Sun and having a radius of roughly 1,000 light years.

Then, in 1995, ESA launched the study of a new astrometric satellite, named “GAIA” and about a hundred times more powerful than Hipparcos, i.e. with median astrometric precision of around 10 microarcsec. This new satellite is intended to measure the parallaxes of over 50 million stars in the Galaxy, at least for the brightest stars, and this would mean to “draw” the three-dimensional map of the whole Galaxy, reaching out even to the Magellanic Clouds, 180,000 light years away.

The team of European scientists and engineers now designing GAIA, however, is facing hard technological difficulties. One of these is the design and coding of radically new and ultra-powerful mathematical algorithms for the on-board compression of the 50-million-stars data that GAIA will send to Earth from its intended geostationary orbit. Preliminary estimates of the raw data rates from the GAIA focal plane, in fact, are of the order of a few Gigabits per second. To reduce the data stream to the envisaged telemetry link of 1 Megabit per second, on-board data compression with a 1 to 1,000 ratio is the target. Clearly, this is far beyond the capabilities of any lossless compression technique (enabling compression ratios of 1 to some tens), and so some “wise” lossy compression mathematical procedure must be adopted.

In this paper a GAIA-adapted lossy data compression technique is presented, based on the Karhunen-Loève Transform (KLT). The essence of this method was already used by NASA for the Galileo mission when the large antenna got stuck and the mission was rescued by re-programming the on-board computer in terms of the KLT. That transform was officially named ICT — “Integer Cosine Transform” — by the NASA-JPL team led by Dr. Kahr-Ming Cheung. But the KLT here described for GAIA will of course differ from the JPL one in many regards, owing to the advances in computer technology.

Finally, estimates are also given about the possibility of using the KLT for onboard data compression in case GAIA is going to be put into orbit around the Lagrangian point L2 of the Earth-Sun system, and, above all, in case the number of stars to be observed is actually raised from 50 millions to one billion, as ESA currently appears to be likely to pursue.     

Apollo: Learning from the past,for the future

This paper shares an interesting and unique case study of knowledge capture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an ongoing project to recapture and make available the lessons learned from the Apollo lunar landing project so that those working on future projects do not have to “reinvent the wheel”. NASA’s new Constellation program, the successor to the Space Shuttle program, proposes a return to the Moon using a new generation of vehicles. The Orion Crew Vehicle and the Altair Lunar Lander will use hardware, practices, and techniques descended and derived from Apollo, Shuttle, and the International Space Station. However, the new generation of engineers and managers who will be working with Orion and Altair are largely from the decades following Apollo, and are likely not well aware of what was developed in the 1960s. In 2006, a project at NASA’s Johnson Space Center was started to find pertinent Apollo-era documentation and gather it, format it, and present it using modern tools for today’s engineers and managers. This “Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation Personnel” project is accessible via the web from any NASA center for those interested in learning answers to the question “how did we do this during Apollo?”     

Informed maintenance for next generation reusable launch systems

Perhaps the most substantial single obstacle to progress of space exploration and utilization of space for human benefit is the safety & reliability and the inherent cost of launching to, and returning from, space. The primary influence in the high costs of current launch systems (the same is true for commercial and military aircraft and most other reusable systems) is the operations, maintenance and infrastructure portion of the program's total life cycle costs. Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) maintenance and design have traditionally been two separate engineering disciplines with often conflicting objectives - maximizing ease of maintenance versus optimizing performance, size and cost. Testability analysis, an element of Informed Maintenance (IM), has been an ad hoc, manual effort, in which maintenance engineers attempt to identify an efficient method of troubleshooting for the given product, with little or no control over product design. Therefore, testability deficiencies in the design cannot be rectified. It is now widely recognized that IM must be engineered into the product at the design stage itself, so that an optimal compromise is achieved between system maintainability and performance.The elements of IM include testability analysis, diagnostics/prognostics, automated maintenance scheduling, automated logistics coordination, paperless documentation and data mining. IM derives its heritage from complimentary NASA science, space and aeronautic enterprises such as the on-board autonomous Remote Agent Architecture recently flown on NASA's Deep Space 1 Probe as well as commercial industries that employ quick turnaround operations. Commercial technologies and processes supporting NASA's IM initiatives include condition based maintenance technologies from Boeing's Commercial 777 Aircraft and Lockheed-Martin's F-22 Fighter, automotive computer diagnostics and autonomous controllers that enable 100,000 mile maintenance free operations, and locomotive monitoring system software.This paper will summarize NASA's long-term strategy, development, and implementation plans for Informed Maintenance for next generation RLVs. This will be done through a convergence into a single IM vision the work being performed throughout NASA, industry and academia. Additionally, a current status of IM development throughout NASA programs such as the Space Shuttle, X-33, X-34 and X-37 will be provided and will conclude with an overview of near-term work that is being initiated in FY00 to support NASA's 2^nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program.     

Lunar oxygen: Economic benefit for transportation systems and in situ production by fluorination

The use of oxygen produced on the Moon—called “MOONLOX”—is considered as a propellant component for a reusable Earth-Moon transportation system consisting of an aeroassisted orbital transfer vehicle and a lunar bus for lunar descent/ascent. Conditions for economic benefit are discussed and the processing concept of a lunar oxygen plant based on fluorination is presented. It is shown that the necessary mass of supply from Earth for MOONLOX-production is an important parameter, which may not be neglected due to its strong influence on the economy. In the ideal case where no supplies from Earth are required a reduction of up to 50% in masses to be launched into low Earth orbit can be obtained for a typical lunar mission with use of MOONLOX compared to a reference scenario with Earth-derived propellant. Mass-saving decreases, however, significantly with increasing supply from Earth until a critical supply-rate is reached—measured in percentage of MOONLOX-mass produced and consumed—beyond which mass-saving and thus economically promising lunar oxygen production is no longer possible. This critical supply-rate depends on the scenario for MOONLOX-utilization and is much larger in the case of in situ use of MOONLOX on the lunar surface, e.g. as ascent propellant for the lunar bus, than in the case of export for complete refuelling of both space vehicles. The latter scenario therefore requires significantly more autonomy for MOONLOX-production. The reduction of masses to be transported into low Earth orbit and corresponding MOONLOX-consumption define for given specific Earth-to-LEO transportation costs an upper limit on MOONLOX-production costs beyond which economic benefit is not possible. Depending on the MOONLOX-utilization strategy this upper limit varies between 3000 and 55000 $/kg for current Earth-to-LEO transportation costs.     

Why rover preparatory programmes? The example of the French programme “VAP”

The very first activities concerning planetary rovers began in 1964 in the Soviet Union and in the United States for lunar missions. Nowadays, with the increase of new mission needs and technical possibilities, several space agencies have engaged in some preliminary programmes in that area with the following objectives:

• —to prepare their involvement in future international rover missions

• —to ease contacts/discussions between scientists and engineers

• —to study and develop a new generation of in situ experiments

• —to perform system/mission analysis in conjunction with the definition of the mission objectives

• —to analyze robotic problematics and implement robotic concepts in the rover architectures.

To perform these activities, several organizations have been set up in Russia, the United States, Japan, Italy and France, according to the relative weight of space engineering over robotic research.

In the case of the French programme (‘VAP—Automatic Planetary Rover’), the organization is based on a partnership between the CNES, a scientific committee, four national research laboratories and industries in order to optimize scientific and technical work, with an optimal use of past robotic research studies, as well as to generate spin-offs for Earth applications. Indeed, as a preliminary result, we now have a co-operative agreement with Russia to procure cameras and associated software for the autonomous navigation of the Marsokhod 96 and 2 projects for terrestrial applications of robotic concepts defined within the framework of the VAP programme.     

NASA''s small spacecraft technology initiative “Clark” spacecraft

The Small Satellite Technology Initiative (SSTI) is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) program to demonstrate smaller, high technology satellites constructed rapidly and less expensively. Under SSTI, NASA funded the development of “Clark,” a high technology demonstration satellite to provide 3-m resolution panchromatic and 15-m resolution multispectral images, as well as collect atmospheric constituent and cosmic x-ray data. The 690-Ib. satellite, to be launched in early 1997, will be in a 476 km, circular, sun-synchronous polar orbit. This paper describes the program objectives, the technical characteristics of the sensors and satellite, image processing, archiving and distribution. Data archiving and distribution will be performed by NASA Stennis Space Center and by the EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, USA.     

The US–Europe technology gap in space transportation: the view from the USA

This paper examines the debate within the USA over how to meet the perceived competition from the successful European Ariane launcher and the loss of US market share for space launch services that it represented. In particular, it explores the origins of the 1983 Reagan Administration policy to turn over expendable launch vehicle production and operation to private industry. The Administration's other decisions to: (1) use the Space Shuttle to fly all government payloads, and (2) allow NASA to market Space Shuttle services commercially, conflicted with this commercialization policy. These policies effectively caused US industry to delay entry into the international competition for launch services until after the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986.