Women and mission leadership

Only one of NASA's planetary science flight missions in the past 30 years has been led by a women scientist as Principal Investigator. The number of senior women in the field is small, but women are still underutilized, as seen by a cohort age analysis correlating with median ages for various key science roles. Worse, the more junior women are not joining missions as Co-Investigators and Participating Scientists at rates approaching their representation in the field of planetary science. In fact, they are underutilized in these roles not by a few percent, but by greater than a factor of two. The pipeline of women gaining mission experience today is increasing, but it is not keeping pace with the rate that women are now choosing to stay in the field for postdoctoral studies and beyond. The numbers definitively show for the first time that, for whatever reason, women are still underrepresented in mission leadership at NASA.     

Principal Investigators and mission leadership

Principal Investigators of small and medium sized space and earth science missions face many challenges during formulation, design, development, integration and test, launch, and operations; these challenges may be more easily met by team leaders with prior mission experience. This paper reports the results of the first known demographic study of NASA's Principal-Investigator-led missions and makes recommendations for preparing additional space scientists to lead. The addition of a Deputy Principal Investigator to proposal teams could reduce the burden on the Principal Investigator and provide an opportunity for additional scientists to gain mission leadership experience useful on future missions. The pool of mission-knowledgeable scientists could further be expanded to include scientists earlier in their careers via carefully managed Participating Scientist Programs. Adding Deputy Principal Investigators and Participating Scientist Programs to missions as a matter of course would reinforce effective management practices, open the field of proposers, and provide concrete ways to mentor the next generation of Principal Investigators.     

Transforming solar system exploration: The origins of the Discovery Program, 1989–1993

The Discovery Program is a rarity in the history of NASA solar system exploration: a reform program that has survived and continued to be influential. This article examines its emergence between 1989 and 1993, largely as the result of the intervention of two people: Stamatios “Tom” Krimigis of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), and Wesley Huntress of NASA, who was Division Director of Solar System Exploration 1990–92 and the Associate Administrator for Space Science 1992–98. Krimigis drew on his leadership experience in the space physics community and his knowledge of its Explorer program to propose that it was possible to create new missions to the inner solar system for a fraction of the existing costs. He continued to push that idea for the next two years, but it took the influence of Huntress at NASA Headquarters to push it on to the agenda. Huntress explicitly decided to use APL to force change on the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the planetary science community. He succeeded in moving the JPL Mars Pathfinder and APL Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) mission proposals forward as the opening missions for Discovery. But it took Krimigis's political skill and access to Sen. Barbara Mikulski in 1993 to get the NEAR into the NASA budget, thereby likely ensuring that Discovery would not become another one-mission program.     

A complexity-based risk assessment of low-cost planetary missions: when is a mission too fast and too cheap?

Under constrained budgets and rigid schedules, NASA and industry have greatly increased their utilization of small satellites to conduct low-cost planetary investigations. Recent failed small planetary science spacecraft such as Mars Polar Lander (MPL) and Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO), and impaired missions such as Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) have fueled the ongoing debate on whether NASA's “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC) approach is working. Several noteworthy failures of earth-orbiting missions have occurred as well including Lewis and the Wide-field Infrared Experiment (WIRE). While recent studies have observed that FBC has resulted in lower costs and shorter development times, these benefits may have been achieved at the expense of lowering probability of success. One question remaining to be answered is when is a mission “too fast and too cheap” that it is prone to failure? This paper assesses NASA FBC missions in terms of a complexity index measured against development time and spacecraft cost. A comparison of relative failure rates of recent planetary and earth-orbiting missions are presented, and conclusions regarding dependence on system complexity are drawn.     

MESSENGER's use of solar sailing for cost and risk reduction

The MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry, and Ranging (MESSENGER) mission used six planetary gravity assists in order to enable capture into orbit about Mercury. A key element of MESSENGER's successful trajectory was achieving the proper gravity assist from each planetary flyby. The criticality of the MESSENGER gravity assists levied tight accuracy requirements on the planetary-flyby targeting. Major errors could have precluded Mercury orbit insertion or required modifications to the trajectory that increased mission complexity, cost, and risk by requiring additional Mercury flybys and extending mission duration. Throughout the mission, MESSENGER modified its strategy for achieving accurate planetary flybys. By using solar sailing, the MESSENGER team was able to eliminate all of the flyby approach maneuvers without sacrificing flyby accuracy, thereby saving mission ΔV margin. The elimination of these approach maneuvers also markedly reduced mission risk, as these approach maneuvers were nominally planned during a time of heightened sensitivity to errors and precluded unique flyby science opportunities. The paradigm shift used by MESSENGER may be useful for other interplanetary missions, particularly if their trajectories require gravity assists in the inner solar system.     

Innovations in mission architectures for exploration beyond low Earth orbit

Through the application of advanced technologies and mission concepts, architectures for missions beyond Earth orbit have been dramatically simplified. These concepts enable a stepping stone approach to science driven; technology enabled human and robotic exploration. Numbers and masses of vehicles required are greatly reduced, yet the pursuit of a broader range of science objectives is enabled. The scope of human missions considered range from the assembly and maintenance of large aperture telescopes for emplacement at the Sun-Earth libration point L2, to human missions to asteroids, the moon and Mars. The vehicle designs are developed for proof of concept, to validate mission approaches and understand the value of new technologies. The stepping stone approach employs an incremental buildup of capabilities, which allows for future decision points on exploration objectives. It enables testing of technologies to achieve greater reliability and understanding of costs for the next steps in exploration.     

A concept for NASA's Mars 2016 astrobiology field laboratory

The Mars Program Plan includes an integrated and coordinated set of future candidate missions and investigations that meet fundamental science objectives of NASA and the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). At the time this paper was written, these possible future missions are planned in a manner consistent with a projected budget profile for the Mars Program in the next decade (2007-2016). As with all future missions, the funding profile depends on a number of factors that include the exact cost of each mission as well as potential changes to the overall NASA budget. In the current version of the Mars Program Plan, the Astrobiology Field Laboratory (AFL) exists as a candidate project to determine whether there were (or are) habitable zones and life, and how the development of these zones may be related to the overall evolution of the planet. The AFL concept is a surface exploration mission equipped with a major in situ laboratory capable of making significant advancements toward the Mars Program's life-related scientific goals and the overarching Vision for Space Exploration. We have developed several concepts for the AFL that fit within known budget and engineering constraints projected for the 2016 and 2018 Mars mission launch opportunities. The AFL mission architecture proposed here assumes maximum heritage from the 2009 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). Candidate payload elements for this concept were identified from a set of recommendations put forth by the Astrobiology Field Laboratory Science Steering Group (AFL SSG) in 2004, for the express purpose of identifying overall rover mass and power requirements for such a mission. The conceptual payload includes a Precision Sample Handling and Processing System that would replace and augment the functionality and capabilities provided by the Sample Acquisition Sample Processing and Handling system that is currently part of the 2009 MSL platform.     

Market-based approaches for controlling space mission costs: the Cassini Resource Exchange

Using economic incentives to control costs is a new concept for space missions. The basic tenets of market-based approaches run counter to typical centralized management techniques often utilized for complex space missions. NASA's Cassini mission to Saturn used a market trading system to assist the Science Instrument Manager in guiding the development of the spacecraft's science payload. This system allowed science instrument teams to trade resources among themselves to best manage their resources (mass, power, data rate, and budget). Thus, Cassini Project management was no longer responsible for adjudicating and reallocating resources that result from instrument development problems. Instrument teams were responsible for directly managing their resources and if they ran into a development problem it was their responsibility to resolve their problem by descoping or through the use of a 'resource exchange.' Under the trading system, instrument cost growth was less than 1% and the total payload mass was under its allocation by 7%. This result is in stark contrast to the 50%–100% increases in these resources on past missions.     

Policy for robust space-based earth science,technology and applications

Satellite remote sensing technology has contributed to the transformation of multiple earth science domains, putting space observations at the forefront of innovation in earth science. With new satellite missions being launched every year, new types of earth science data are being incorporated into science models and decision-making systems in a broad array of organizations. Policy guidance can influence the degree to which user needs influence mission design and when, and ensure that satellite missions serve both the scientific and user communities without becoming unfocused and overly expensive. By considering the needs of the user community early on in the mission-design process, agencies can ensure that satellites meet the needs of multiple constituencies. This paper describes the mission development process in NASA and ESA and compares and contrasts the successes and challenges faced by these agencies as they try to balance science and applications within their missions.     

Design issues for a mission to exploit the gravitational lensing effect at 550 AU

Reported herein are the first results of a NASA-sponsored study at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California Institute of Technology, exploring the scientific promise and technological viability of a mission to exploit the gravitational lensing effect of the Sun to obtain huge antenna gains for electromagnetic waves grazing the Sun's disk. With regard to scientific promise, these results, reported at about the halfway point of the study, substantiate the huge antenna gains offered by, as it will be called here, a Solar Gravitational Telescope (SGT) and point to the instrument's potential promise as a “discovery machine” but suggest considerable limitations to the telescope's usefulness as a general purpose astrophysical research tool. These limitations are seen to arise, primarily, from the geometry and scale of the “virtual” telescope which must be achieved and maintained to utilize the lensing effect and the turbulence effects of the Sun's plasma on the observed target's signal. With regard to technological viability, the preliminary results suggest a very aggressive use of unproven, as-yet-unflown new technology will be required to enable the desired science observations and mission durations approaching the short (3–10 year) NASA-targeted mission duration goal. Key needed new technologies are advanced propulsion, lightweight telescopes, membrane mirrors, inflatable/rigidizeable structures, and novel coronagraphic techniques.     

A multi-disciplinary plan for easier access, management, and analysis of science data

NASA’s COST LESS Team is pursuing strategies to reduce the cost and complexity of planning and executing space missions. The team’s technical goal is to reverse the trend of constructing unique solutions for similar problems. To this end, the team is exploring ways to represent mission functionality in terms of building blocks and is discovering approaches that could accommodate the same building blocks for seemingly disparate activities, such as organizing processed telemetry data, controlling onboard experiments, searching science archives, reducing and presenting information to science users, and supporting educational outreach. Reusable object technology (UOT), a research undertaking by the authors, is showing promise in recognizing similarities in functions which were previously viewed as unique because they appeared in different programs or mission phases. Since UOT is aimed at being implementation independent (i.e. the function performed could be accomplished manually, by an automated process, by a specialized instrument, etc.), no premature judgment for automation or autonomy need be made. In this paper, the authors attempt to strike a balance between theory and reality as they describe UOT, including its beginnings, its underpinning, its utility, and its potential for achieving substantive reductions in cost and complexity for the Agency’s space programs. The authors discuss their collaboration with the Center for EUV Astrophysics, University of California, Berkeley to reduce the cost and complexity of science investigations. Their multi-disciplinary plan incorporates both UOT and a complementary technology introduced in this paper, called interactive archives.     

Piloted operations at a near-Earth object (NEO)

In late 2006, NASA's Constellation Program sponsored a study to examine the feasibility of sending a piloted Orion spacecraft to a near-Earth object. NEOs are asteroids or comets that have perihelion distances less than or equal to 1.3 astronomical units, and can have orbits that cross that of the Earth. Therefore, the most suitable targets for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) are those NEOs in heliocentric orbits similar to Earth's (i.e. low inclination and low eccentricity). One of the significant advantages of this type of mission is that it strengthens and validates the foundational infrastructure of the United States Space Exploration Policy and is highly complementary to NASA's planned lunar sortie and outpost missions circa 2020. A human expedition to a NEO would not only underline the broad utility of the Orion CEV and Ares launch systems, but would also be the first human expedition to an interplanetary body beyond the Earth–Moon system. These deep space operations will present unique challenges not present in lunar missions for the onboard crew, spacecraft systems, and mission control team. Executing several piloted NEO missions will enable NASA to gain crucial deep space operational experience, which will be necessary prerequisites for the eventual human missions to Mars.Our NEO team will present and discuss the following:

• •new mission trajectories and concepts;
• •operational command and control considerations;
• •expected science, operational, resource utilization, and impact mitigation returns; and
• •continued exploration momentum and future Mars exploration benefits.

     

Characterization of Lithium-Polymer batteries for CubeSat applications

With the development of several key technologies, nanosatellites are emerging as important vehicles for carrying out technology demonstrations and space science research. Nanosatellites are attractive for several reasons, the most important being that they do not involve the prohibitive costs of a conventional satellite launch. One key enabling technology is in the area of battery technology. In this paper, we focus on the characterization of battery technologies suitable for nanosatellites.Several battery chemistries are examined in order to find a type suitable for typical nanosatellite missions. As a baseline mission, we examine York University's 1U CubeSat mission for its power budget and power requirements. Several types of commercially available batteries are examined for their applicability to CubeSat missions. We also describe the procedures and results from a series of environmental tests for a set of Lithium Polymer batteries from two manufacturers.     

New frontiers in design synthesis

The Intelligent Synthesis Environment (ISE), which is one of the major strategic technologies under development at NASA centers and the University of Virginia, is described. One of the major objectives of ISE is to significantly enhance the rapid creation of innovative affordable products and missions. ISE uses a synergistic combination of leading-edge technologies, including high performance computing, high capacity communications and networking, human-centered computing, knowledge-based engineering, computational intelligence, virtual product development, and product information management. The environment will link scientists, design teams, manufacturers, suppliers, and consultants who participate in the mission synthesis as well as in the creation and operation of the aerospace system. It will radically advance the process by which complex science missions are synthesized, and high-tech engineering systems are designed, manufactured and operated. The five major components critical to ISE are human-centered computing, infrastructure for distributed collaboration, rapid synthesis and simulation tools, life cycle integration and validation, and cultural change in both the engineering and science creative process. The five components and their subelements are described. Related U.S. government programs are outlined and the future impact of ISE on engineering research and education is discussed.     

核热推进载人火星探测方案设计

针对载人火星探测任务,结合我国现有技术基础,提出我国载人火星探测方案,重点研究载人火星探测任务推进系统的设计。首先,综合考虑载人深空探测任务的约束,采用Pork-Chop图设计了适用于不同任务场景的转移轨迹;然后,参考我国空间站技术,基于核热推进系统设计了我国载人火星探测任务的飞船;最后,对核热推进系统的发动机台数和推力进行了优化,得到了适用于不同任务场景的最优推进系统组合方案。本文所研究内容为我国未来载人火星探测任务提供了有益参考。     

A multi-disciplinary plan for easier access, management, and analysis of science data

NASA's COST LESS Team is pursuing strategies to reduce the cost and complexity of planning and executing space missions. The team's technical goal is to reverse the trend of constructing unique solutions for similar problems. To this end, the team is exploring ways to represent mission functionality in terms of building blocks and is discovering approaches that could accommodate the same building blocks for seemingly disparate activities, such as organizing processed telemetry data, controlling onboard experiments, searching science archives, reducing and presenting information to science users, and supporting educational outreach. Reusable object technology (UOT), a research undertaking by the authors, is showing promise in recognizing similarities in functions which were previously viewed as unique because they appeared in different programs or mission phases. Since UOT is aimed at being implementation independent (i.e. the function performed could be accomplished manually, by an automated process, by a specialized instrument, etc.), no premature judgment for automation or autonomy need be made. In this paper, the authors attempt to strike a balance between theory and reality as they describe UOT, including its beginnings, its underpinning, its utility, and its potential for achieving substantive reductions in cost and complexity for the Agency's space programs. The authors discuss their collaboration with the Center for EUV Astrophysics, University of California, Berkeley to reduce the cost and complexity of science investigations. Their multi-disciplinary plan incorporates both UOT and a complementary technology introduced in this paper, called interactive archives.     

无人月球基地总体初步设想

构建月球基地是月球探测的核心目标之一。作为一个巨型项目,月球基地总体建设涉及空间运输、能源、结构构建、月面移动、资源利用、科学探索、测控通信等诸多方面。文章尝试论述构建无人月球基地的任务目标、核心功能与组成、概念方案、实施步骤等核心要素,提出构建无人月球基地的总体思路,为未来月球基地任务的实施提供参考。     

Principal investigators and project managers: Insights from Discovery

NASA’s Discovery, Explorer, and Mars Scout mission lines have demonstrated over the past 15 years that, with careful planning, flexible management techniques, and a commitment to cost control, small space science missions can be built and launched at a fraction of the price of strategic missions. Many credit management techniques such as co-location, early contracting for long-lead items, and a resistance to scope creep for this, but it is also important to examine what may be the most significant variable in small mission implementation: the roles and the relationship of the principal investigator, responsible to NASA for the success of the mission, and the project manager, responsible for delivering the mission to NASA. This paper reports on a series of 55 oral histories with principal investigators, project managers, co-investigators, system engineers, and senior management from nearly every competitively selected Discovery mission launched to date that discuss the definition and evolution of these roles and share revealing insights from the key players themselves. The paper will show that there are as many ways to define the principal investigator/project manager relationship as there are missions, and that the subtleties in the relationship often provide new management tools not practical in larger missions.     

Lunar transportation scenarios utilising the Space Elevator

The Space Elevator (SE) concept has begun to receive an increasing amount of attention within the space community over the past couple of years and is no longer widely dismissed as pure science fiction. In light of the renewed interest in a, possibly sustained, human presence on the Moon and the fact that transportation and logistics form the bottleneck of many conceivable lunar missions, it is interesting to investigate what role the SE could eventually play in implementing an efficient Earth to Moon transportation system. The elevator allows vehicles to ascend from Earth and be injected into a trans-lunar trajectory without the use of chemical thrusters, thus eliminating gravity loss, aerodynamic loss and the need of high thrust multistage launch systems. Such a system therefore promises substantial savings of propellant and structural mass and could greatly increase the efficiency of Earth to Moon transportation. This paper analyzes different elevator-based trans-lunar transportation scenarios and characterizes them in terms of a number of benchmark figures. The transportation scenarios include direct elevator-launched trans-lunar trajectories, elevator launched trajectories via L1 and L2, as well as launch from an Earth-based elevator and subsequent rendezvous with lunar elevators placed either on the near or on the far side of the Moon. The benchmark figures by which the different transfer options are characterized and evaluated include release radius (RR), required delta v, transfer times as well as other factors such as accessibility of different lunar latitudes, frequency of launch opportunities and mission complexity. The performances of the different lunar transfer options are compared with each other as well as with the performance of conventional mission concepts, represented by Apollo.