| 论非对称信息条件下的农村信用社信贷问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 谷中原,卢琬莹.论非对称信息条件下的农村信用社信贷问题[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报(管理科学版),2008,26(2):96-100. |
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| 作者姓名： | 谷中原 卢琬莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南大学法学院 湖南长沙410075 |
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| 摘 要： | 农村信用社的信贷市场是一个典型的不完全信息环境。在这种环境里，农村信用社的信贷活动面临许多问题：主要包括逆向选择和道德风险以及信用社内部的委托一代理问题。低风险农户通过信号显示、信用社通过信贷配额制度解决信贷市场上的逆向选择问题；信用社通过加强风险控制制度建设和对借贷农户的道德和法制教育，解决道德风险问题；信用社通过设计信息激励机制和健全信贷责任追究制度解决内部的委托一代理问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 农村信用社 非对称信息 信贷问题 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-9734（2008）02-0096-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-12-21 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年12月21 |
On Loan Problems of Village Reputation Agency in Information Dissymmetry Environment |
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| GU Zhong-yuan,LU Wan-ying.On Loan Problems of Village Reputation Agency in Information Dissymmetry Environment[J].Journal of Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management,2008,26(2):96-100. |
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| Authors: | GU Zhong-yuan LU Wan-ying |
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| Institution: | GU Zhong-yuan,LU Wan-ying(School of Law, Central South University, Changsha 410075,China) |
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| Abstract: | The loan market of the village reputation agency is a typical incompletion information environment.in this kind of environment,the loan activity of the village reputation agency faces many problems.for example,Contrary choice and morals risk and entrustion-surrogation problem in the village reputation agency.The contrary choice problem is soluted by The signal manifestation of the low risk peasant household and quota system of the village reputation agency;the morals risk problem is soluted by enhance risk control system developments and The morals and legal system education to the loaner of the village reputation agency;the entrustion_surrogation problem is soluted by designing information encourages mechanism and loan duty pursues system. |
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| Keywords: | village reputation agency information dissymmetry loan problems |
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