人力资本投资中道德风险的防范——基于委托-代理理论的契约设计

目前在我国,人力资本投资并未对人力资本的收益起到积极的影响。造成人力资本收益低下的原因首先在于人力资本在接受投资的过程中已经出现了信息经济学中的道德风险,即学校一味地提高费用而忽视教学质量。通过建立学生与学校之间的委托—代理模型,证明了在契约中最佳的风险安排是代理人(即学校)承担所有的风险分担份额,同时引入第三方作为契约的监督人和实施者。在目前条件下,就是以政府为第三方,以学生就业为导向,合理地照顾学校、学生和劳动力市场三方的利益。

Avoiding the Moral Hazard in the Human Capital Investment

This paper supplies that the human capital revenue in our country is not as high as mentioned in the classical human capital theory.In fact the reason is the moral hazard in the human capital investment.Then this paper gives a principal-agent model to prove that the Pareto improvement is that the university deserves the entire hazard.It's a consideration for our education system reformation: to establish an Insurance Corporation and University.