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| 寡头垄断企业战略投资期权博弈模型 | |
| 引用本文： | 邱菀华,余冬平.寡头垄断企业战略投资期权博弈模型[J].北京航空航天大学学报,2006,32(10):1220-1225. |
| 作者姓名： | 邱菀华 余冬平 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 北京航空航天大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100083; 2. 中央财经大学 国防经济与管理研究院, 北京 100081 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，高等学校博士学科点专项科研项目 |
| 摘 要： | 研究了寡头垄断企业战略投资决策行为,系统分析了不完全竞争环境下最优实物期权执行战略均衡规则.研究表明:负的外部性下存在抢先/序贯和同时投资3类均衡,而正的外部性下只存在同时投资均衡;企业价值和最优投资临界值都随市场不确定性增大而增大;竞争互动加速了企业投资,甚至当企业数目趋于无穷大的时候,其投资临界值位于垄断与马歇尔投资临界值之间. |
| 关 键 词： | 投资决策 实物期权 期权博弈 寡头垄断 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-5965（2006）10-1220-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-05-11 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-05-11 |
Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly |
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| Qiu Wanhua,Yu Dongping.Option games model of firm′s investment strategy in oligopoly[J].Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,2006,32(10):1220-1225. | |
| Authors: | Qiu Wanhua Yu Dongping |
| Institution: | 1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China; 2. Institute of National Defense Economy and Management, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China |
| Abstract: | The firm′s investment strategy was examined in oligopoly and the firm′s optimal equilibrium exercise strategy of real options was analyzed systemicallyunder incomplete competition. The research shows that there are three equilibriums, such as preemption, sequence and simultaneous investment, when existing negative externalities, However, there is just simultaneous investment equilibrium, when positive externalities. The firm′s value and optimal investment threshold increase with the raise of market uncertainty. Competitive interaction accelerates investment, furthermore the threshold is between monopolistic investment threshold and Marshallian investment tlhreshold, even though the firm number is infinite. |
| Keywords: | investment decision real options option games oligopoly |
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