| 委托-代理模型中代理人早期私有信息的研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 敖志军,惠益民.委托-代理模型中代理人早期私有信息的研究[J].北京航空航天大学学报,1999,25(1):88-90. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 敖志军 惠益民 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 北京航空航天大学,管理学院 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 在多阶段委托－代理关系中，代理人早期私有信息的存在和利用对于最优合同的设计着重要的意义，本文考虑了多阶段委托－代理模型中这样一类情况，代理人在合同刚刚签定之后和采取行动之前好获得早期私有信息，通过分析给出了这种情况下最优合同的条件，证明了代理人获得早期信息对委托－代理双方的价值。
|
| 关 键 词： | 模型法 合同对策 最佳化 多阶段委托-代理模型 早期私有信息 |
Study of Early Information of Agent in Multi-period Principal-agent Model |
| |
| Ao Zhijun,Hui Yimin.Study of Early Information of Agent in Multi-period Principal-agent Model[J].Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,1999,25(1):88-90. |
| |
| Authors: | Ao Zhijun Hui Yimin |
| |
| Abstract: | In principal agent relationship of multi period,the existence of agent's early information about the coming production and the use of them are very important to design of optimize contracts. This essay considers this kind of things in multi periods, which agent acquire private information just after signing contract and before acting,finds the condition of optimized contracts through analying and certificate the value of agent's acquiring of early information. |
| |
| Keywords: | modeling bargaining games optimization multi periods principal agent model private information |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
