中国地方官员经济竞争目的解说——一种激励经济学语境

运用激励理论可以解释中国地方官员经济竞争为何效率低下。由于官员外在激励的条件不具备,结果扭曲了官员的行为目的和行为选择,表现在：一是激励报酬缺乏。由于激励具有财政约束,不得已对官员采用非货币报酬激励,结果导致了代理人经济竞争的政治目的。二是业绩考核欠准。委托人目标难确定和代理人产出难评价,为官员通过经济竞争实现政治目的提供了条件。如果使委托人目标确定和代理人产出评价容易,则又会出现委托人目标片面和代理人产出评价简单的问题,同样使官员的政治目的容易实现。官员激励条件欠缺也造成外在激励的有效性缺乏,由此也突出了官员内在激励的重要性。

Goal Analysis on Chinese Local Officers'Economic Competition

The economic activities of China local authority official are lacking in efficiency.The reason lies in: Political purpose of officer's economic competition,This kind of purpose is that the external incentive of the official of the necessary condition is to short.First,it is lack to incentive the payoff.incentive has the financial restraint which limites the monetary payoff incentive so the result has caused the political purpose of agent's economic competition.Second,performance examination is not accurate enough.and the client has difficult goal to confirm the agent produces,this offers the condition the political purpose is realized.If client goals is confirmed and agent producing is appraised easy,so the problem can appear that client goals are one-sided and agent produce is appraised simple that make officers' political purpose easy to realize too.The external incentive of the official is invalid because the condition of the officer's incentive is deficient.Therefore official's intrinsic incentive is extremely important.