A security space capability for Europe? Implications for US policy

As the European Union takes tentative steps towards creating a “rapid reaction force” able to operate independently of NATO, an important question is what capabilities that force must have in order to operate effectively. Among those capabilities is the use of space systems for communications and intelligence applications. This article examines the prospects for an independent security space capability in Europe, and the implications of the emerging European interest in space autonomy for US policy.     

But what is the true rationale for human spaceflight?

Human interest in spaceflight is ancient. It is therefore ironic that, at a time when humans finally have the capability to travel in space, the notion that we should do so is being questioned. The author analyses the reasons for this — the historical/political and technological contingency of the Space Age and the sudden falling away of the conditions which drove space activity — and in the process provides a critique of the forgoing article and the tendency to search for utilitarian justifications of human spaceflight. He argues rather that space programmes will thrive only when driven by non-material cultural and political forces. US-Russian cooperation, which has principally been undertaken for geopolitical reasons is a model for the future.     

Hr 7308: A unique Cepheid

Numerical models of Cepheids have been computed with a range of effective temperatures and compositions. The amplitudes increase if the helium abundance increases or if the effective temperature decreases. The latter effect is contrary to observational data. The models also exhibit velocity amplitudes which are much lower than those observed.     

电磁流体动力驱动流体搅拌混合器特性研究

对小型电磁流体动力搅拌混合器的特性进行了理论分析和实验研究.该小型电磁动力混合器由聚碳酸脂和黄铜采用常规机械加工方法加工而成.研究采用的流体为氯化钠水溶液.为了观察流体的搅拌混合运动,在流体中加入微量微细玻璃珠作为示踪粒子.采用显微观测及图像采集技术记录流体的搅拌混合过程,用数字图像处理技术对流体速度场进行分析.建立了搅拌混合器的理论模型,并对其动力特性进行了数值分析,理论结果与实验结果相吻合.该小型电磁动力混合器已应用于微管道流动的混合控制并可应用于其它微流体控制系统中.     

A Geosynchronous Orbit Search Strategy

Since more than 10 years there is evidence that small-size space debris is accumulating in the geosynchronous orbit (GEO), probably as the result of breakups. Two break-ups have been reported in GEO. The 1978 break-up of an EKRAN 2 satellite, SSN 10365, was identified in 1992, and in 1992 a Titan 3C Transtage, SSN 3432, break-up produced at least twenty observable pieces. Subsequently several nations performed optical surveys of the GEO region in the form of independent observation campaigns. Such surveys suffer from the fact that the field of view of optical telescopes is small compared with the total area covered by the GEO ring. As a consequence only a small volume of the orbital element-magnitude-space is covered by each individual survey. Results from these surveys are thus affected by observational biases and therefore difficult to compare. This paper describes the development of a common search strategy to overcome these limitations. The strategy optimizes the sampling for objects in orbits similar to the orbits of the known GEO population but does not exclude the detection of objects with other orbital planes. A properly designed common search strategy clearly eases the comparison of results from different groups and the extrapolation from the sparse (biased) samples to the entire GEO environment.     

Spore UV and acceleration resistance of endolithic Bacillus pumilus and Bacillus subtilis isolates obtained from Sonoran desert basalt: implications for lithopanspermia

Bacterial spores have been used as model systems for studying the theory of interplanetary transport of life by natural processes such as asteroidal or cometary impacts (i.e., lithopanspermia). Because current spallation theory predicts that near-surface rocks are ideal candidates for planetary ejection and surface basalts are widely distributed throughout the rocky planets, we isolated spore-forming bacteria from the interior of near-subsurface basalt rocks collected in the Sonoran desert near Tucson, Arizona. Spores were found to inhabit basalt at very low concentrations (相似文献   

Ground based ISS payload microgravity disturbance assessments

In order to verify that the International Space Station (ISS) payload facility racks do not disturb the microgravity environment of neighboring facility racks and that the facility science operations are not compromised, a testing and analytical verification process must be followed. Currently no facility racks have taken this process from start to finish. The authors are participants in implementing this process for the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) Fluids and Combustion Facility (FCF). To address the testing part of the verification process, the Microgravity Emissions Laboratory (MEL) was developed at GRC. The MEL is a 6 degree of freedom inertial measurement system capable of characterizing inertial response forces (emissions) of components, sub-rack payloads, or rack-level payloads down to 10(-7) g's. The inertial force output data, generated from the steady state or transient operations of the test articles, are utilized in analytical simulations to predict the on-orbit vibratory environment at specific science or rack interface locations. Once the facility payload rack and disturbers are properly modeled an assessment can be made as to whether required microgravity levels are achieved. The modeling is utilized to develop microgravity predictions which lead to the development of microgravity sensitive ISS experiment operations once on-orbit. The on-orbit measurements will be verified by use of the NASA GRC Space Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS). The major topics to be addressed in this paper are: (1) Microgravity Requirements, (2) Microgravity Disturbers, (3) MEL Testing, (4) Disturbance Control, (5) Microgravity Control Process, and (6) On-Orbit Predictions and Verification.     

Technology readiness and risk assessments: A new approach

Systems that depend upon the application of new technologies inevitably face three major challenges during development: performance, schedule and budget. Technology research and development (R&D) programs are typically advocated based on argument that these investments will substantially reduce the uncertainty in all three of these dimensions of project management. However, if early R&D is implemented poorly, then the new system developments that plan to employ the resulting advanced technologies will suffer from cost overruns, schedule delays and the steady erosion of initial performance objectives. It is often critical for senior management to be able to determine which of these two paths is more likely—and to respond accordingly. The challenge for system and technology managers is to be able to make clear, well-documented assessments of technology readiness and risks, and to do so at key points in the life cycle of the program.Several approaches have been used to evaluate technology maturity and risk in order to better anticipate later system development risks. The “technology readiness levels” (TRLs), developed by NASA, are one discipline-independent, programmatic figure of merit (FOM) that allows more effective assessment of, and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies. Another broadly used management tool is of the “risk matrix”, which depends upon a graphical representation of uncertainty and consequences. However, for the most part these various methodologies have had no explicit interrelationship.This paper will examine past uses of current methods to improve R&D outcomes and will highlight some of the limitations that can arise. In this context, a new concept for the integration of the TRL methodology, and the concept of the “risk matrix” will be described. The paper will conclude with observations concerning prospective future directions for the important new concept of integrated “technology readiness and risk assessments”.     

Technology readiness assessments: A retrospective

The development of new system capabilities typically depends upon the prior success of advanced technology research and development efforts. These systems developments inevitably face the three major challenges of any project: performance, schedule and budget. Done well, advanced technology programs can substantially reduce the uncertainty in all three of these dimensions of project management. Done poorly, or not at all, and new system developments suffer from cost overruns, schedule delays and the steady erosion of initial performance objectives. It is often critical for senior management to be able to determine which of these two paths is more likely—and to respond accordingly. The challenge for system and technology managers is to be able to make clear, well-documented assessments of technology readiness and risks, and to do so at key points in the life cycle of the program.In the mid 1970s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) introduced the concept of “technology readiness levels” (TRLs) as a discipline-independent, programmatic figure of merit (FOM) to allow more effective assessment of, and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies. In 1995, the TRL scale was further strengthened by the articulation of the first definitions of each level, along with examples (J. Mankins, Technology readiness levels, A White Paper, NASA, Washington, DC, 1995. [1]). Since then, TRLs have been embraced by the U.S. Congress’ General Accountability Office (GAO), adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and are being considered for use by numerous other organizations. Overall, the TRLs have proved to be highly effective in communicating the status of new technologies among sometimes diverse organizations.This paper will review the concept of “technology readiness assessments”, and provide a retrospective on the history of “TRLs” during the past 30 years. The paper will conclude with observations concerning prospective future directions for the important discipline of technology readiness assessments.     

Ares I–X Flight Test Vehicle similitude to the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle

The Ares I–X Flight Test Vehicle is the first in a series of flight test vehicles that will take the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle design from development to operational capability. Ares I–X is scheduled for a 2009 flight date, early enough in the Ares I design and development process so that data obtained from the flight can impact the design of Ares I before its Critical Design Review. Decisions on Ares I–X scope, flight test objectives, and FTV fidelity were made prior to the Ares I systems requirements being baselined. This was necessary in order to achieve a development flight test to impact the Ares I design. Differences between the Ares I–X and the Ares I configurations are artifacts of formulating this experimental project at an early stage and the natural maturation of the Ares I design process. This paper describes the similarities and differences between the Ares I–X Flight Test Vehicle and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. Areas of comparison include the outer mold line geometry, aerosciences, trajectory, structural modes, flight control architecture, separation sequence, and relevant element differences. Most of the outer mold line differences present between Ares I and Ares I–X are minor and will not have a significant effect on overall vehicle performance. The most significant impacts are related to the geometric differences in Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle at the forward end of the stack. These physical differences will cause differences in the flow physics in these areas. Even with these differences, the Ares I–X flight test is poised to meet all five primary objectives and six secondary objectives. Knowledge of what the Ares I–X flight test will provide in similitude to Ares I—as well as what the test will not provide—is important in the continued execution of the Ares I–X mission leading to its flight and the continued design and development of Ares I.