Exobiological exploration of Mars.

Of all the other planets in the solar system, Mars remains the most promising for further elucidating concepts about chemical evolution and the origin of life. Strategies were developed to pursue three exobiological objectives for Mars exploration: determining the abundance and distribution of the biogenic elements and organic compounds, detecting evidence of an ancient biota on Mars, and determining whether indigenous organisms exist anywhere on the planet. The three strategies are quite similar and, in fact, share the same sequence of phases. In the first phase, each requires global reconnaissance and remote sensing by orbiters to select sites of interest for detailed in situ analyses. In the second phase, lander missions are conducted to characterize the chemical and physical properties of the selected sites. The third phase involves conducting "critical" experiments at sites whose properties make them particularly attractive for exobiology. These critical experiments would include, for example, identification of organics, detection of fossils, and detection of extant life. The fourth phase is the detailed analysis of samples returned from these sites in Earth-based laboratories to confirm and extend previous discoveries. Finally, in the fifth phase, human exploration is needed to establish the geological settings for the earlier findings or to discover and explore sites that are not accessible to robotic spacecraft.     

Circumstellar habitable zones: an overview

We review aspects of circumstellar habitable zones based on results reported at the First International Conference on Circumstellar Habitable Zones (held in 1994 at NASA Ames Research Center). Recent advances in atmospheric radiative transfer modeling have shown that circumstellar habitable zones are wider than previously thought. New considerations may allow a much shorter time scale both for the origin as well as the evolution of biological forms. The most abundant M dwarf stars, contrary to previous views, appear to be able to support the necessary conditions for a habitable zone around them. New planet formation models indicate that at least one planet should form within the circumstellar habitable zone of single dwarf stars regardless of mass. Biogenic materials also appear to be widespread and delivery to terrestrial planets via cometary impacts may be a viable mechanism. Finally, biology will modify a planet and provide positive feedback, in general, to increase the habitability of a planet. Overall, new astronomical, planetary, and biological considerations each seem to indicate that habitable zones around other stars may be both more widespread and more stable than previous research had indicated.     

Planetary protection issues for sample return missions.

Sample return missions from a comet nucleus and the Mars surface are currently under study in the US, USSR, and by ESA. Guidance on Planetary Protection (PP) issues is needed by mission scientists and engineers for incorporation into various elements of mission design studies. Although COSPAR has promulgated international policy on PP for various classes of solar system exploration missions, the applicability of this policy to sample return missions, in particular, remains vague. In this paper, we propose a set of implementing procedures to maintain the scientific integrity of these samples. We also propose that these same procedures will automatically assure that COSPAR-derived PP guidelines are achieved. The recommendations discussed here are the first step toward development of official COSPAR implementation requirements for sample return missions.     

A proposed new policy for planetary protection

In order to control contamination of planets by terrestrial microorganisms and organic constituents, U.S. planetary missions have been governed by a planetary protection (or planetary quarantine) policy which has changed little since 1972. This policy has recently been reviewed in light of new information obtained by planetary exploration during the past decade and because of changes to, or uncertainties in, some parameters used in the existing quantitative approach. On the basis of this analysis, a new planetary protection policy, with the following key features, is proposed: deemphasizing the use of mathematical models and quantitative analyses; establishing requirements for target planet/mission type (i.e., orbiter, lander, etc.) combinations; considering sample return missions a separate category; simplifying documentation; and imposing implementing procedures (i.e., trajectory biasing, cleanroom assembly, spacecraft sterilization, etc.) by exception, i.e., only if the planet/mission combination warrants such controls. Interpretation of the new policy for missions like Galileo, Mars Surface Sample Return, Saturn Orbiter with Twin Probes, and missions to comets are considered. In general, the new policy proposes elimination of all but documentation requirements for most planetary missions and simplification of the remaining compliance procedures.     

Revised planetary protection policy for solar system exploration

In order to control contamination of planets by terrestrial microorganisms and organic constituents, U.S. planetary missions have been governed by a planetary protection (or planetary quarantine) policy which has changed little since 1972. This policy has recently been reviewed in light of new information obtained from planetary exploration during the past decade and because of changes to, or uncertainties in, some parameters used in the existing quantitative approach. On the basis of this analysis, a revised planetary protection policy with the following key features is proposed: deemphasizing the use of mathematical models and quantitative analyses; establishing requirements for target planet/mission type (i.e., orbiter, lander, etc.) combinations; considering sample return missions a separate category; simplifying documentation; and imposing implementing procedures (i.e., trajectory biasing, cleanroom assembly, spacecraft sterilization, etc.) by exception, i.e., only if the planet/mission combination warrants such controls.     

A quarantine protocol for analysis of returned extraterrestrial samples

A quarantine protocol is presented for analysis of samples of extraterrestrial material that might be returned from space to an Earth-orbiting quarantine facility. The protocol is designed to detect biologically active agents in extraterrestrial soil. Its goal is either to certify the sample safe to return to a terrestrial containment facility where extensive biological, chemical, geological and physical investigations can be conducted, or to detect “biological effects” thus dictating second order testing. The protocol requires 46 grams of a one kilogram returned sample plus 54 grams to be reserved for second order testing should that become necessary. The protocol operates at two levels. First, it seeks to detect the presence of any replicating organisms or toxic substances using chemical analyses, microscopy, metabolic tests, and microbiological culturing techniques. The second level involves hazard evaluation by adding any agents found at the first level (or the extraterrestrial soil) to challenge cultures of terrestrial species. The specific types of experiments and the means of executing them were chosen by participants in an American Society for Engineering Education Summer Systems Design Group to provide maximum life detection sensitivity, yet are compatible with a small crew operating behind biological barriers in a condition of weightlessness.     

Planetary protection issues and the future exploration of Mars.

A primary scientific theme for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) is the search for life, extant or extinct, on Mars. Because of this, concerns about Planetary Protection (PP), the prevention of biological cross-contamination between Earth and other planets during solar system exploration missions, have arisen. A recent workshop assessed the necessity for, and impact of, PP requirements on the unmanned and human missions to Mars comprising the SEI. The following ground-rules were adopted: 1) information needed for assessing PP issues must be obtained during the unmanned precursor mission phase prior to human landings; 2) returned Mars samples will be considered biologically hazardous until proven otherwise; 3) deposition of microbes on Mars and exposure of the crew to Martian materials are inevitable when humans land; and, 4) human landings are unlikely until it is demonstrated that there is no harmful effect of Martian materials on terrestrial life forms. These ground-rules dictated the development of a conservative PP strategy for precursor missions. Key features of the proposed strategy include: 1) for prevention of forward contamination, all orbiters will follow Mars Observer PP procedures for assembly, trajectory, and lifetime. All landers will follow Viking PP procedures for assembly, microbial load reduction, and bioshield; and, 2) for prevention of back contamination, all sample return missions will have PP requirements which include fail-safe sample sealing, breaking contact chain with the Martian surface, and containment and quarantine analysis in an Earth-based lab. In addition to deliberating on scientific and technical issues, the workshop made several recommendations for dealing with forward and back contamination concerns from non-scientific perspectives.     

The Antaeus project: An orbital quarantine facility for analysis of planetary return samples

A systems design study group jointly sponsored by the American Society for Engineering Education, Stanford University and NASA's Ames Research Center, was requested to develop a design for an orbiting quarantine facility. The proposed facility is constructed of Spacelab shells formed into five modules of different sizes, each compatible with missions of other objectives. Once placed in a low Earth orbit by the Space Shuttle, each component is linked via the international docking system. Radiating from the docking module are a replaceable logistics module which stores a thirty day supply of consumables and waste, a module providing living quarters for five crew members, a power system module, and a quarantine testing laboratory. Within the laboratory module is a primary barrier system of sealed cabinets in which the sample is assessed for life forms. These chambers isolate the sample from terrestrial contamination and protect the researchers. A combination of procedures and mechanisms separates the laboratory module from the remainder of the facility and provides a secondary barrier. The conditions of space provide a tertiary barrier protecting the Earth's biosphere.