火星无人探测与行星保护

行星保护是每一个开展深空探测的国家都要面对的问题,火星是太阳系里最可能存在地外生命的星球之一,也是行星保护的重点关注对象,在我国火星探测即将正式启动之际,对标国际上行星保护的政策、标准、技术和管理措施,对我国未来在火星探测中满足国际上行星保护的要求至关重要。主要回顾了行星保护的历史,国外在火星探测历史上行星保护正向防护所采取的措施,以及现代科学技术发展对行星保护正向防护相关技术的影响,并对我国未来火星及深空探测活动中应该采取的行星保护正向污染防护技术提出了建议。     

21世纪载人航天活动展望(4)

3.2　载人火星探测□□就人类的空间探测而言 ,2 0世纪的壮举是美国的“阿波罗”登月计划 ,2 1世纪则将是载人火星探测。但要实现载人火星探测 ,首先要解决两个问题 :其一是目的和意义 ;其二是技术途径。3.2 .1　载人火星探测的目的和意义载人航天的目的和意义不外乎是对政治、军事、经济和科学技术的影响 ,但载人火星探测的目的和意义主要是其科学价值 ,即探明火星上有没有生命。在太阳系的九大行星中 ,除地球以外火星是最可能存在生命的行星。火星有厚的地壳 ,弱的磁场 ,还有稀薄的大气 ,其大气压相当于地球的 1%。火星表面温度极低 ,平均…     

美国国家科学院发布行星保护政策中期报告

正近期美国国家科学院发布《行星保护的目标、理由和定义:中期报告》。应NASA科学任务部的要求,针对美国政府资助的无人科学探测任务,提出了行星保护政策的目标、理由以及行星保护的定义。美国科学院下一步将针对商业探测和载人探测等涉及的行星保护问题开展进一步研究,并发布最终报告。一、政策目标行星保护政策的两个目标包括控制前向污染和后向污染。在无人地外探测任务中,前向污染是指携带来自地球的微生物的无人航天器由于着陆、环     

国际行星保护政策解读与技术前瞻

随着人类空间探测范围的不断拓展,行星保护成为人类后续深空探测必须要面临的一个重要问题。从行星保护的概念入手,对其研究背景以及美国、欧洲、俄罗斯等国目前相关的研究进展做了简要介绍,涉及了政策制定、标准规范、污染防控、技术体系等各个方面。载人深空探测过程中各个环节都可能存在污染源,必须针对性地开展保护和防护技术研究;深入研究国际行星保护政策、法规和技术体系,对于我国后续开展相关研究具有很好的参考和借鉴意义。     

萤火一号火星探测计划的科学目标

与其他行星相比火星是与地球最为相似, 也是最有可能在其上发现地球以外生命现象的一颗行星, 因此特别受到人类的关注. 近年来, 有国家已经发射了火星探测器, 并启动了载人火星探测研究计划. 中国是世界上第五个具备自主发射人造卫星的国家, 也是世界上第三个具备自主开展载人航天活动的国家. 但是中国在深空探测领域才刚刚起步. 2007年中俄两国签署了联合探测火星计划, 俄罗斯负责将中国研制的一颗微小卫星------萤火一号发送至火星轨道. 萤火一号将开展自主探测, 并与俄罗斯的火卫一探测器开展联合探测. 本文综述了萤火一号任务提出的科学背景及科学目标, 简要介绍了为实现科学目标配置的有效载荷, 以及入轨后的主要探测任务, 并对其科学探测结果进行了初步的展望.      

载人火星探测飞行方案

对世界各国载人火星探测的研究情况进行了简要综述,研究了国内外有关载人火星探测飞行方案,提出了载人火星探测方案确定的原则和方案基本思想.给出了一种载人火星探测飞行方案的总体设计,包括飞行轨道方案和载人火星飞船方案等.尤其对轨道设计的重要的两个参数——速度增量和飞行时间进行了详细计算.最后给出了飞行轨道选择、火星飞船从地球到火星和从火星返回地球等的轨道方案和火星飞船各组成部分方案的详细设计结果.     

国外航天发展动态系列报道之六──国外空间探测的发展与现状

行星探测有助于了解地球和太阳系的起源、形成和演变，特别是对离地球最近的两颗行星——火星和金星的探测，更有助于我们深入了解人类的老家——地球，并提高对保护太阳系内这块唯一的绿洲的重要性的认识。虽然月球、行星探测技术难度较大，耗资亦巨，但是，随着行星探测活动的进一步深入，月球、火星探测必将成为ZI世纪航天技术的热点之一。1近年来国外田地空间探测的发展状况从航天活动一开始，国外就大规模地开展了日地空间探测与研究活动。1981年美国、前苏联、日本和欧洲的空间组织和机构联合成立了空间科学国际机构顾问组（IACG）…     

俄罗斯载人登月发展态势分析

苏联时期曾把月球作为探索太空的一个重点,并取得了丰硕的科研成果。苏联解体后,俄罗斯曾一度搁置了月球探测开发计划。进入21世纪后,随着欧盟、美国以及其他一些国家重返月球计划,俄罗斯也启动了探月计划。根据俄罗斯载人航天发展战略,2026-2040年俄罗斯将实施载人登月任务和载人火星考察,将于2032年前在月球建立长期考察站,在2035年以后进行载人火星考察,同时建立防止小行星撞地球的保护系统。新修订的《2016-2025年俄罗斯联邦航天计划》明确了探月、载人登月和驻月是俄罗斯载人航天发展战略的重要方向。     

火星表面高氯酸盐生物转化及原位制氧工艺技术

火星表面极端缺氧条件及广泛分布的高氯酸盐所形成的强氧化环境，对人类登陆探测及后续宜居环境建设构成直接威胁.根据对火星表面高氯酸盐分布的探测成果，地球上高氯酸盐生物降解研究进展，以及人类登陆火星对资源和环境的需求，提出了利用生物方法转化火星表面高氯酸盐进行原位制氧的设想与工艺，对其工艺过程、影响因素、关键技术与难点、行星保护与副产物资源化、后续火星环境改造等进行了前瞻性分析，有望在火星上同时实现高氯酸盐无害化处理与氧气原位制备，化害为益，为火星探测提供新思路与新方法.      

面向21世纪的载人火星航行

21世纪的头 2 0年里 ,人类将完成 2项世界性的大型航天工程——重返月球和载人火星航行。早在 30多年前 ,人类就已经多次成功地登上月球。从技术上来说 ,重返月球已经没有任何障碍。载人火星航行则是人类历史上破天荒的第一次 ,还需要解决因长期星际飞行产生的若干难题 ,因而需要继续进行多次无人火星探测 ,为人类登上火星提供依据 ,创造条件。怎样才能安全可靠地把人送上火星并返回 ,实现载人火星航行的伟大理想呢 ?让我们从行星航行的最基本问题——速度说起。1　需要大于 11.6 km/s的速度载人飞船要飞往火星 ,首先必须摆脱地球引力的束缚…     

Planetary protection issues related to human missions to Mars

In accordance with the United Nations Outer Space Treaties [United Nations, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UN doc A/RES/34/68, resolution 38/68 of December 1979], currently maintained and promulgated by the Committee on Space Research [COSPAR Planetary Protection Panel, Planetary Protection Policy accepted by the COSPAR Council and Bureau, 20 October 2002, amended 24 March 2005, http://www.cosparhq.org/scistr/PPPolicy.htm], missions exploring the Solar system must meet planetary protection requirements. Planetary protection aims to protect celestial bodies from terrestrial contamination and to protect the Earth environment from potential biological contamination carried by returned samples or space systems that have been in contact with an extraterrestrial environment. From an exobiology perspective, Mars is one of the major targets, and several missions are currently in operation, in transit, or scheduled for its exploration. Some of them include payloads dedicated to the detection of life or traces of life. The next step, over the coming years, will be to return samples from Mars to Earth, with a view to increasing our knowledge in preparation for the first manned mission that is likely to take place within the next few decades. Robotic missions to Mars shall meet planetary protection specifications, currently well documented, and planetary protection programs are implemented in a very reliable manner given that experience in the field spans some 40 years. With regards to sample return missions, a set of stringent requirements has been approved by COSPAR [COSPAR Planetary Protection Panel, Planetary Protection Policy accepted by the COSPAR Council and Bureau, 20 October 2002, amended 24 March 2005, http://www.cosparhq.org/scistr/PPPolicy.htm], and technical challenges must now be overcome in order to preserve the Earth’s biosphere from any eventual contamination risk. In addition to the human dimension of the mission, sending astronauts to Mars will entail meeting all these constraints. Astronauts present huge sources of contamination for Mars and are also potential carriers of biohazardous material on their return to Earth. If they were to have the misfortune of being contaminated, they themselves would become a biohazard, and, as a consequence, in addition to the technical constraints, human and ethical considerations must also be taken into account.     

Biological assessment of Ariane 5 fairing

United Nations Space Treaties [10 and 11] require the preservation of planets and of Earth from contamination. All nations part to these Treaties shall take measures to prevent forward and backward contamination during missions exploring our solar system. As observer for the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the COSPAR (Committee of Space Research) defines and handles the applicable policy and proposes recommendations to Space Agencies [COSPAR Planetary Protection Panel, Planetary Protection Policy accepted by the COSPAR Council and Bureau, 20 October 2002, amended 24 March 2005. http://www.cosparhq.org/scistr/PPPolicy.htm.]. The goal is to protect celestial bodies from terrestrial biological contamination as well as to protect the Earth environment from an eventual biohazard which may be carried by extraterrestrial samples or by space systems returning to Earth. According to the applicable specifications, including in our case the French requirements [CNES, System Safety. Planetary Protection Requirements. Normative referential CNES RNC-CNES-R-14, CNES Toulouse, ed. 4, 04 October 2002.], the prevention of forward contamination is accomplished by reducing the bioburden on space hardware to acceptable, prescribed levels, including in some instances system sterilization, assembling and integrating the appropriate spacecraft systems in cleanrooms of appropriate biological cleanliness, avoiding or controlling any recontamination risk, and limiting the probability impact of space systems. In order to prepare for future exploration missions [Debus, A., Planetary protection: organization requirements and needs for future planetary exploration missions, ESA conference publication SP-543, pp 103–114, 2003.], and in particular for missions to Mars requiring to control the spacecraft bioburden, a test program has been developed to evaluate the biological contamination under the fairing of the Ariane 5 launcher.     

Estimation and assessment of Mars contamination.

Since the beginning of the exploration of Mars, more than fourty years ago, thirty-six missions have been launched, including fifty-nine different space systems such as fly-by spacecraft, orbiters, cruise modules, landing or penetrating systems. Taking into account failures at launch, about three missions out of four have been successfully sent toward the Red Planet. The fact today is that Mars orbital environment includes orbiters and perhaps debris, and that its atmosphere and its surface include terrestrial compounds and dormant microorganisms. Coming from the UN Outer Space Treaty [United Nations Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Outer Space Treaty") referenced 610 UNTS 205 - resolution 2222(XXI) of December 1966] and according to the COSPAR planetary protection policy recommendations [COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy (20 October 2002), accepted by the Council and Bureau, as moved for adoption by SC F and PPP, prepared by the COSPAR/IAU Workshop on Planetary Protection, 4/02 with updates 10/0, 2002], Mars environment has to be preserved so as not to jeopardize the scientific investigations, and the level of terrestrial material brought on and around Mars theoretically has to comply with this policy. It is useful to evaluate what and how many materials, compounds and microorganisms are on Mars, to list what is in orbit and to identify where all these items are. Considering assumptions about materials, spores and gas location and dispersion on Mars, average contamination levels can be estimated. It is clear now that as long as missions are sent to other extraterrestrial bodies, it is not possible to keep them perfectly clean. Mars is one of the most concerned body, and the large number of missions achieved, on-going and planned now raise the question about its possible contamination, not necessarily from a biological point of view, but with respect to all types of contamination. Answering this question, will help to assess the potential effects of such contamination on scientific results and will address concerns relative to any ethical considerations about the contamination of other planets.     

Overview of current capabilities and research and technology developments for planetary protection

The pace of scientific exploration of our solar system provides ever-increasing insights into potentially habitable environments, and associated concerns for their contamination by Earth organisms. Biological and organic-chemical contamination has been extensively considered by the COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection (PPP) and has resulted in the internationally recognized regulations to which spacefaring nations adhere, and which have been in place for 40 years. The only successful Mars lander missions with system-level “sterilization” were the Viking landers in the 1970s. Since then different cleanliness requirements have been applied to spacecraft based on their destination, mission type, and scientific objectives. The Planetary Protection Subcommittee of the NASA Advisory Council has noted that a strategic Research & Technology Development (R&TD) roadmap would be very beneficial to encourage the timely availability of effective tools and methodologies to implement planetary protection requirements. New research avenues in planetary protection for ambitious future exploration missions can best be served by developing an over-arching program that integrates capability-driven developments with mission-driven implementation efforts. This paper analyzes the current status concerning microbial reduction and cleaning methods, recontamination control and bio-barriers, operational analysis methods, and addresses concepts for human exploration. Crosscutting research and support activities are discussed and a rationale for a Strategic Planetary Protection R&TD Roadmap is outlined. Such a roadmap for planetary protection provides a forum for strategic planning and will help to enable the next phases of solar system exploration.     

Planetary Protection Policy (U.S.A.).

Through existing treaty obligations of the United States, NASA is committed to exploring space while avoiding biological contamination of the planets, and to the protection of the Earth against harm from materials returned from space. Because of the similarities between Mars and Earth, plans for the exploration of Mars evoke discussions of these Planetary Protection issues. US Planetary Protection Policy will be focused on the preservation of these goals in an arena that will change with the growth of scientific knowledge about the martian environment. Early opportunities to gain the appropriate data will be used to guide later policy implementation. Because human presence on Mars will result in the end of Earth's separation from the martian environment, it is expected that precursor robotic missions will address critical planetary protection concerns before humans arrive.     

Societal issues as Mars mission impediments: planetary protection and contamination concerns.

Societal and non-scientific factors represent potentially significant impediments for future Mars missions, especially in areas involving planetary protection. This paper analyzes public concerns about forward contamination to Mars and back contamination to Earth, evaluates major areas where lack of information may lead to uncontrollable impacts on future missions, and concludes that NASA should adopt a strategy that actively plans both the generation and subsequent management of planetary protection information to ensure that key audiences obtain needed information in a timely manner. Delay or avoidance in dealing with societal issues early in mission planning will increase the likelihood of public opposition, cost increases and missed launch windows. While this analysis of social and non-scientific considerations focuses on future Mars missions, the findings are also relevant for RTG launches, nuclear propulsion and other NASA activities perceived to have health, safety or environmental implications.     

Planetary protection issues and the future exploration of Mars.

A primary scientific theme for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) is the search for life, extant or extinct, on Mars. Because of this, concerns about Planetary Protection (PP), the prevention of biological cross-contamination between Earth and other planets during solar system exploration missions, have arisen. A recent workshop assessed the necessity for, and impact of, PP requirements on the unmanned and human missions to Mars comprising the SEI. The following ground-rules were adopted: 1) information needed for assessing PP issues must be obtained during the unmanned precursor mission phase prior to human landings; 2) returned Mars samples will be considered biologically hazardous until proven otherwise; 3) deposition of microbes on Mars and exposure of the crew to Martian materials are inevitable when humans land; and, 4) human landings are unlikely until it is demonstrated that there is no harmful effect of Martian materials on terrestrial life forms. These ground-rules dictated the development of a conservative PP strategy for precursor missions. Key features of the proposed strategy include: 1) for prevention of forward contamination, all orbiters will follow Mars Observer PP procedures for assembly, trajectory, and lifetime. All landers will follow Viking PP procedures for assembly, microbial load reduction, and bioshield; and, 2) for prevention of back contamination, all sample return missions will have PP requirements which include fail-safe sample sealing, breaking contact chain with the Martian surface, and containment and quarantine analysis in an Earth-based lab. In addition to deliberating on scientific and technical issues, the workshop made several recommendations for dealing with forward and back contamination concerns from non-scientific perspectives.     

Planetary protection and the search for life beneath the surface of Mars.

The search for traces of extinct and extant life on Mars will be extended to beneath the surface of the planet. Current data from Mars missions suggesting the presence of liquid water early in Mars' history and mathematical modeling of the fate of water on Mars imply that liquid water may exist deep beneath the surface of Mars. This leads to the hypothesis that life may exist deep beneath the Martian surface. One possible scenario to look for life on Mars involves a series of unmanned missions culminating with a manned mission drilling deep into the Martian subsurface (approximately 3Km), collecting samples, and conducting preliminary analyses to select samples for return to earth. This mission must address both forward and back contamination issues, and falls under planetary protection category V. Planetary protection issues to be addressed include provisions stating that the inevitable deposition of earth microbes by humans should be minimized and localized, and that earth microbes and organic material must not contaminate the Martian subsurface. This requires that the drilling equipment be sterilized prior to use. Further, the collection, containment and retrieval of the sample must be conducted such that the crew is protected and that any materials returning to earth are contained (i.e., physically and biologically isolated) and the chain of connection with Mars is broken.     

Planetary environment protection ID no: F3.3-M.1.05 implications for the development of a network of surface stations on Mars.

The European Space Agency's studies of a Comet Nucleus Sample Return mission (ROSETTA) as its Planetary Cornerstone in its long-term programme 'Horizon 2000' and the Marsnet mission, a potential contribution of the Agency to an international network of surface stations on Mars, has revived the interest in the present state of Planetary Protection requirements. MARSNET was one of the four candidate missions selected in April 1991 for further Design Feasibility (Phase A) Studies. Furthermore, of all space agencies participating in planetary exploration activities only the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration had a well established Planetary Protection Policy on Viking and other relevant planetary missions, whereas ESA is considering the feasibility and potential impact of a planetary protection policy on its Marsnet mission, within the framework of a tight budgetary envelope applicable to ESA's medium (M) class missions. This paper will discuss in general terms the impact of Planetary Protection measures, its implications for Marsnet and the issues arising from this for the implementation of the mission in ESA's scientific programme.