Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as the global leader in all areas of spaceflight and space science—is a unique organization in terms of size, mission, constraints, complexity and motivations. NASA's flagship endeavor—human spaceflight—is extremely risky and one of the most complicated tasks undertaken by man. It is well accepted that the tragic destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger on 28 January 1986 was the result of organizational failure. The surprising disintegration of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003—nearly 17 years to the day after Challenger—was a shocking reminder of how seemingly innocuous details play important roles in risky systems and organizations. NASA as an organization has changed considerably over the 42 years of its existence. If it is serious about minimizing failure and promoting its mission, perhaps the most intense period of organizational change lies in its immediate future. This paper outlines some of the critical features of NASA's organization and organizational change, namely path dependence and “normalization of deviance”. Subsequently, it reviews the rationale behind calling the Challenger tragedy an organizational failure. Finally, it argues that the recent Columbia accident displays characteristics of organizational failure and proposes recommendations for the future.     

The space life sciences strategy for the 21st century

In the past, space life sciences has focused on gaining an understanding of physiological tolerance to spaceflight, but, for the last 10 years, the focus has evolved to include issues relevant to extended duration missions. In the 21st century, NASA's long-term strategy for the exploration of the solar system will combine the assurance of human health and performance for long periods in space with investigations aimed at searching for traces of life on other planets and acquiring fundamental scientific knowledge of life processes. Implementation of this strategy will involve a variety of disciplines including radiation health, life support, human factors, space physiology and countermeasures, medical care, environmental health, and exobiology. It will use both ground-based and flight research opportunities such as those found in current on-going programs, on Spacelab and unmanned biosatellite flights, and during Space Station Freedom missions.     

Technical, organizational and political dynamics of the International Space Station program

This paper analyzes the dynamics of cooperation of the International Space Station (ISS) program from its inception in 1981 to the final Framework Agreements for cooperation concluded in 1998. These dynamics include technical and organizational arrangements, and policy preferences. Dynamics related to technical arrangements deal with technological and scientific resources, the former governed through mechanisms for control of technology transfer, the latter regulated through intellectual property rights provisions. The dynamics linked to organizational arrangements concern authority patterns—characterized by national and international responses—and bilateral and multilaterial decision-making patterns. The dynamics of policy preferences encompass functional and symbolic dimensions. Functional issues are structured through legal and political regimes that govern the ISS program. The symbolic dimension, which includes prestige, legitimacy, influence and international accountability, frames the nature of the cooperation realized for the ISS program. ISS cooperation has evolved through three stages: (1) coordination, where collaboration is engendered through institutional (International Coordinating Working Group) and ad hoc cooperative relationships (groups of scientists and engineers sharing information); (2) augmentation, which equates with technological enhancements of a national project that involve primarily bilateral arrangements; (3) interdependence, which deals with cooperation in enabling and critical path technologies that are arranged both bilaterally and multilaterally.     

New challenges for life sciences flight project management

Scientists have conducted studies involving human spaceflight crews for over three decades. These studies have progressed from simple observations before and after each flight to sophisticated experiments during flights of several weeks up to several months. The findings from these experiments are available in the scientific literature. Management of these flight experiments has grown into a system fashioned from the Apollo Program style, focusing on budgeting, scheduling and allocation of human and material resources. While these areas remain important to the future, the International Space Station (ISS) requires that the Life Sciences spaceflight experiments expand the existing project management methodology. The use of telescience with state-of-the-art information technology and the multi-national crews and investigators challenges the former management processes. Actually conducting experiments on board the ISS will be an enormous undertaking and International Agreements and Working Groups will be essential in giving guidance to the flight project management Teams forged in this matrix environment must be competent to make decisions and qualified to work with the array of engineers, scientists, and the spaceflight crews. In order to undertake this complex task, data systems not previously used for these purposes must be adapted so that the investigators and the project management personnel can all share in important information as soon as it is available. The utilization of telescience and distributed experiment operations will allow the investigator to remain involved in their experiment as well as to understand the numerous issues faced by other elements of the program. The complexity in formation and management of project teams will be a new kind of challenge for international science programs. Meeting that challenge is essential to assure success of the International Space Station as a laboratory in space.     

Redefining safety in commercial space: Understanding debates over the safety of private human spaceflight initiatives in the United States

In 2009 President Obama proposed a budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that canceled the Constellation program and included the development of commercial crew transportation systems into low Earth orbit. This significant move to shift human spaceflight into the private sector sparked political debate, but much of the discourse has focused on impacts to “safety.” Although no one disputes the importance of keeping astronauts safe, strategies for defining safety reveal contrasting visions for the space program and opposing values regarding the privatization of U.S. space exploration. In other words, the debate over commercial control has largely become encoded in arguments over safety. Specifically, proponents of using commercial options for transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) argue that commercial vehicles would be safe for astronauts, while proponents of NASA control argue that commercial vehicles would be unsafe, or at least not as safe as NASA vehicles. The cost of the spaceflight program, the technical requirements for designing a vehicle, the track record of the launch vehicle, and the experience of the launch provider are all incorporated into what defines safety in human spaceflight. This paper analyzes these contested criteria through conceptual lenses provided by fields of science and technology policy (STP) and science, technology, and society (STS). We ultimately contend that these differences in definition result not merely from ambiguous understandings of safety, but from intentional and strategic choices guided by normative positions on the commercialization of human spaceflight. The debate over safety is better considered a proxy debate for the partisan preferences embedded within the dispute over public or private spaceflight.     

But what is the true rationale for human spaceflight?

Human interest in spaceflight is ancient. It is therefore ironic that, at a time when humans finally have the capability to travel in space, the notion that we should do so is being questioned. The author analyses the reasons for this — the historical/political and technological contingency of the Space Age and the sudden falling away of the conditions which drove space activity — and in the process provides a critique of the forgoing article and the tendency to search for utilitarian justifications of human spaceflight. He argues rather that space programmes will thrive only when driven by non-material cultural and political forces. US-Russian cooperation, which has principally been undertaken for geopolitical reasons is a model for the future.     

The essential role of human spaceflight

The question is: should the United States and nations at large pursue a human spaceflight program (and if so, why)? I offer an unwavering positive answer to this question, and state the reasons for it while considering the broad challenges and benefits of (human) spaceflight. Space exploration is a human activity that is intrinsically forward-looking, and as such, has positive potential. Both national and international space programs can galvanize the population, inspire the youth, foster job-creation, and motivate the existing workforce. The nature of the enterprises involved—their scale, novelty, and complexity—requires a steady and continuous upward progression toward greater societal, scientific and technological development. That is, in order to overcome the challenges of human spaceflight, progress is required. More to the point, the survival of humanity depends on expanding beyond the confines of our planet. Human spaceflight, in short, presents us with an opportunity to significantly advance the nation and the global community.     

The changing face of international space cooperation : One view of NASA

This article looks at how, over the past 20 years, NASA's role in space activities has changed. It looks at trends in NASA's posture towards cooperation with other nations and speculates on current and future behaviour. The Space Station programme in particular is discussed and the way in which NASA reconciles self-interest with cooperation.     

From suborbital space tourism to commercial personal spaceflight

Excellent essays have been recently published on the profitability and the future of space tourism. This paper is intended to supplement the considerations in this field and emphasizes the further potential evolution of commercial personal spaceflights. Indeed, based upon work done at the International Space University (ISU) the oligopolistic character of suborbital space tourism has been linked to marketing and product life cycle (PLC) considerations and has led to the thesis that space tourism as a profitable sector will require a follow-on strategy. Orbital space tourism, on one hand, could become an extension of the PLC but, on the other hand, it is assumed that point-to-point (P2P) commercial space transport will become the long term sustainable market. Without ignoring technical challenges, this paper will mainly concentrate on marketing and commercial aspects of personal spaceflight.     

Space life and biomedical sciences in support of the global exploration roadmap and societal development

The human exploration of space is pushing the boundaries of what is technically feasible. The space industry is preparing for the New Space era, the momentum for which will emanate from the commercial human spaceflight sector, and will be buttressed by international solar system exploration endeavours. With many distinctive technical challenges to be overcome, human spaceflight requires that numerous biological and physical systems be examined under exceptional circumstances for progress to be made. To effectively tackle such an undertaking significant intra- and international coordination and collaboration is required. Space life and biomedical science research and development (R & D) will support the Global Exploration Roadmap (GER) by enabling humans to ‘endure’ the extreme activity that is long duration human spaceflight. In so doing the field will discover solutions to some of our most difficult human health issues, and as a consequence benefit society as a whole. This space-specific R&D will drive a significant amount of terrestrial biomedical research and as a result the international community will not only gain benefits in the form of improved healthcare in space and on Earth, but also through the growth of its science base and industry.     

Taking stock of Europe's developing space policy: from the European space policy workshops to the European space policy forum

A series of workshops designed to make up for the lack of high-level, informal discussion of European space policy has been running—with a gap during formulation of the EC Green/White Paper on this subject—since September 2002. In view of the progress made in establishing a coherent European strategy, and of various other recent events, such as China's entry into the human spaceflight field, the organizers intend not only to continue the series but also to establish a more permanent, research-oriented European Space Policy Foundation (ESPF). Following a report on the proceedings of the third workshop, held in September 2003, which covered developing an overall European policy, new applications (Galileo and GMES) and human spaceflight, the authors set out a proposal for an ESPF and present the six major research themes it would aim to investigate.     

Brazilian participation in the International Space Station (ISS) program: commitment or bargain struck?

The invitation to Brazil to join the International Space Station (ISS) program illustrates the way that foreign-policy makers in the USA favor short-term decisions over long-term commitments, while, in accepting the invitation, Brazil was also promoting other objectives. In taking the initiative to invite Brazil, President Clinton provided a unique opportunity to a middle-to-low-ranking spacefaring developing country to join the program as part of NASA's quota for the ISS. However, this action was the result of exchanges and bargains between the two countries, involving domestic and international interests on both sides—not all directly related to ISS activities—targeted at security and industrialization issues. These included the international non-proliferation regime, the commercialization of space systems and facilities (particularly Brazil's Alcantara Launch Center) and intellectual property.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs, a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

The relevance of economic data in the decision-making process for orbital launch vehicle programs,a U.S. perspective

Over the past fifteen years, major U.S. initiatives for the development of new launch vehicles have been remarkably unsuccessful. The list is long: NLI, SLI, and X-33, not to mention several cancelled programs aimed at high speed airplanes (NASP, HSCT) which would share some similar technological problems.The economic aspects of these programs are equally as important to their success as are the technical aspects. In fact, by largely ignoring economic realities in the decisions to undertake these programs and in subsequent management decisions, space agencies (and their commercial partners) have inadvertently contributed to the eventual demise of these efforts.The transportation revolution that was envisaged by the promises of these programs has never occurred. Access to space is still very expensive; reliability of launch vehicles has remained constant over the years; and market demand has been relatively low, volatile and slow to develop. The changing international context of the industry (launching overcapacity, etc.) has also worked against the investment in new vehicles in the U.S. Today, unless there are unforeseen technical breakthroughs, orbital space access is likely to continue as it has been with high costs and market stagnation.Space exploration will require significant launching capabilities. The details of the future needs are not yet well defined. But, the question of the launch costs, the overall demand for vehicles, and the size and type of role that NASA will play in the overall launch market is likely to influence the industry. This paper will emphasize the lessons learned from the economic and management perspective from past launch programs, analyze the issues behind the demand for launches, and project the challenges that NASA will face as only one new customer in a very complex market situation. It will be important for NASA to make launch vehicle decisions based as much on economic considerations as it does on solving new technical challenges.     

Assessing the legacy of the Space Shuttle

This article reviews the core legacies of the Space Shuttle program after 25 years and suggests that, while it was not an unadulterated success, on balance the Shuttle served a valuable role in the development of spaceflight and deserves an overall positive assessment in history. There are five core legacies that deserve discussion. First, the Space Shuttle has a reputation as a mistake resulting from a policy failure that should never have been pursued. Second, it has been criticized as a program that prohibited other paths for the US space program. Third, and more positively, the Space Shuttle provided more than two decades of significant human spaceflight capability and stretched the nature of what could be accomplished in Earth orbit much beyond where it had previously been. Fourth, it served as a relatively flexible platform for scientific activities. Finally, and perhaps most significantly since the US human spaceflight program has always been focused on national prestige, the Space Shuttle served well as a symbol of American technological verisimilitude.     

Informed maintenance for next generation reusable launch systems

Perhaps the most substantial single obstacle to progress of space exploration and utilization of space for human benefit is the safety & reliability and the inherent cost of launching to, and returning from, space. The primary influence in the high costs of current launch systems (the same is true for commercial and military aircraft and most other reusable systems) is the operations, maintenance and infrastructure portion of the program's total life cycle costs. Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) maintenance and design have traditionally been two separate engineering disciplines with often conflicting objectives - maximizing ease of maintenance versus optimizing performance, size and cost. Testability analysis, an element of Informed Maintenance (IM), has been an ad hoc, manual effort, in which maintenance engineers attempt to identify an efficient method of troubleshooting for the given product, with little or no control over product design. Therefore, testability deficiencies in the design cannot be rectified. It is now widely recognized that IM must be engineered into the product at the design stage itself, so that an optimal compromise is achieved between system maintainability and performance.The elements of IM include testability analysis, diagnostics/prognostics, automated maintenance scheduling, automated logistics coordination, paperless documentation and data mining. IM derives its heritage from complimentary NASA science, space and aeronautic enterprises such as the on-board autonomous Remote Agent Architecture recently flown on NASA's Deep Space 1 Probe as well as commercial industries that employ quick turnaround operations. Commercial technologies and processes supporting NASA's IM initiatives include condition based maintenance technologies from Boeing's Commercial 777 Aircraft and Lockheed-Martin's F-22 Fighter, automotive computer diagnostics and autonomous controllers that enable 100,000 mile maintenance free operations, and locomotive monitoring system software.This paper will summarize NASA's long-term strategy, development, and implementation plans for Informed Maintenance for next generation RLVs. This will be done through a convergence into a single IM vision the work being performed throughout NASA, industry and academia. Additionally, a current status of IM development throughout NASA programs such as the Space Shuttle, X-33, X-34 and X-37 will be provided and will conclude with an overview of near-term work that is being initiated in FY00 to support NASA's 2^nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program.     

Planning the post-Apollo space program: Are there lessons for the present?

The current debate over the future of human spaceflight in the USA has been a fascinating, and troubling, exercise in futility for those inextricably committed to an expansive vision of human exploration and development of space. The retirement of the Space Shuttle, originally set for the end of 2010 but later extended into 2011, the technical and funding problems of the Constellation follow-on program that led to its cancellation in 2009, and the emergence of commercial vendors who might be able to offer human access to Earth orbit have all complicated the current environment. In view of this situation, the question may be legitimately asked: what might we learn from earlier efforts to develop a human spaceflight capability the last time such a transition took place? Using the post-Apollo transition from the ballistic capsule to a winged, reusable vehicle as a case study, this article seeks to illuminate the planning, decision-making, economic, and political issues that have arisen in this policy debate. It suggests that a web of interlocking issues—only one of which was technical—affected the course taken. Instead, politics, economics, social and cultural priorities, values, and institutional considerations all helped to frame the debate and shape the decision.     

A process model of technology innovation in governmental agencies: Insights from NASA’s science directorate

This paper investigates the process through which new technical concepts are matured in the NASA innovation ecosystem. We propose an “epoch–shock” conceptualization as an alternative mental model to the traditional stage–gate view. The epoch–shock model is developed inductively, based on detailed empirical observations of the process, and validated, to the extent possible, through expert review. The paper concludes by illustrating how the new epoch–shock conceptualization could provide a useful basis for rethinking feasible interventions to improve innovation management in the space agency context. Where the more traditional stage–gate model leads to an emphasis on centralized flow control, the epoch–shock model acknowledges the decentralized, probabilistic nature of key interactions and highlights which aspects may be influenced.     

Research priorities and plans for the International Space Station-results of the 'REMAP' Task Force

Recent events in the International Space Station (ISS) Program have resulted in the necessity to re-examine the research priorities and research plans for future years. Due to both technical and fiscal resource constraints expected on the International Space Station, it is imperative that research priorities be carefully reviewed and clearly articulated. In consultation with OSTP and the Office of Management and budget (OMB), NASA's Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR) assembled an ad-hoc external advisory committee, the Biological and Physical Research Maximization and Prioritization (REMAP) Task Force. This paper describes the outcome of the Task Force and how it is being used to define a roadmap for near and long-term Biological and Physical Research objectives that supports NASA's Vision and Mission. Additionally, the paper discusses further prioritizations that were necessitated by budget and ISS resource constraints in order to maximize utilization of the International Space Station. Finally, a process has been developed to integrate the requirements for this prioritized research with other agency requirements to develop an integrated ISS assembly and utilization plan that maximizes scientific output.     

Space tourism - A promising future?

Based on presentations made at the first International Symposium on Space Tourism (ISST), held in Bremen on March 20–22 1997, an overview over the current state of discussion on space tourism is given. Starting with an evaluation of the current situation for spaceflight, the author's viewpoint on the rationale for space tourism is described. The potential of space tourism as a future large space market is demonstrated using the results of recent market research and projection. This is followed by discussion of the appropriate technical means for space tourism in terms of space transportation systems and orbital infra-structure. In addition, the necessary non-technical boundary conditions to initiate space tourism and the associated dangers and risks are described and assessed