Creating a productive international partnership in the Vision for Space Exploration

When US President George W. Bush on 14 January 2004 announced a new US “Vision for Space Exploration”, he called for international participation in “a journey, not a race”, a call received with skepticism and concern elsewhere. But, after a slow start in implementing this directive, during 2006 NASA has increased the forward momentum of action on the program and of discussions on international cooperation in exploring “the Moon, Mars, and beyond”. There are nevertheless a number of significant top-level issues that must be addressed if a cooperative approach to human space exploration is to be pursued. These include the relationship between utilization of the ISS and the lunar exploration plans, integration of potential partners’ current and future capabilities into the exploration plans, and the evolving space-related intentions of other countries.     

Promoting UK involvement in the ISS: a space station lifeboat?

The Space Development Council, an organisation of UK space interest groups, is calling for Britain to become re-involved in manned spaceflight. NASA previously offered UK astronaut training in return for participation in the X-38 Crew Return Vehicle, now postponed. A one-person return vehicle might provide an effective and useful alternative. Two designs have been put forward based on Waverider, at one time proposed to be the man-carrying payload for Blue Streak. The more sophisticated of the two is a flex-wing Waverider carrying a one-person escape capsule, designed for long-term on-orbit storage.     

Observations from over a decade of experience in developing faster, better, cheaper missions for the NASA small explorer program

The Small Explorer (SMEX) Project at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has accumulated nearly a decade of experience building missions with the underlying philosophy of “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC). Five satellites are now successfully operating on-orbit with only one serious instrument anomaly. Together this Project has accumulated 14.6 years of on-orbit experience without a spacecraft bus failure. Additionally, this project, under the Explorer Technology Infusion effort, has developed a protoflight version of a 21^st Century FBC spacecraft bus that has just completed environmental qualification and has been selected at the base spacecraft for NASA's Triana mission. Design and production of these six high performance spacecraft, in just ten years time, has provided a unique base of experience from which to draw lessons learned. This paper will discuss the fundamental practices that have been used by the SMEX Project in achieving this record of success.     

BNSC/RAS Town Meeting

In London on 20 September, the British National Space Centre and the Royal Astronomical Society convened a ‘Town Meeting’, a usage picked up from NASA. Basically it was a debate without the competetive element, whose topic was the next two of the European Space Agency's four ‘Cornestone’ projects for the ‘Horizon 2000’ programme, total budget 584 million ECU (about £467 million). The question in September was which would be no. 3 and which no. 4. Duncan Lunan reports on the discussion and the choices made.     

Piloted operations at a near-Earth object (NEO)

In late 2006, NASA's Constellation Program sponsored a study to examine the feasibility of sending a piloted Orion spacecraft to a near-Earth object. NEOs are asteroids or comets that have perihelion distances less than or equal to 1.3 astronomical units, and can have orbits that cross that of the Earth. Therefore, the most suitable targets for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) are those NEOs in heliocentric orbits similar to Earth's (i.e. low inclination and low eccentricity). One of the significant advantages of this type of mission is that it strengthens and validates the foundational infrastructure of the United States Space Exploration Policy and is highly complementary to NASA's planned lunar sortie and outpost missions circa 2020. A human expedition to a NEO would not only underline the broad utility of the Orion CEV and Ares launch systems, but would also be the first human expedition to an interplanetary body beyond the Earth–Moon system. These deep space operations will present unique challenges not present in lunar missions for the onboard crew, spacecraft systems, and mission control team. Executing several piloted NEO missions will enable NASA to gain crucial deep space operational experience, which will be necessary prerequisites for the eventual human missions to Mars.Our NEO team will present and discuss the following:

• new mission trajectories and concepts;

• operational command and control considerations;

• expected science, operational, resource utilization, and impact mitigation returns; and

• continued exploration momentum and future Mars exploration benefits.

Science in the national vision for space exploration: objectives and constituencies of the ‘discovery-driven’ paradigm

The NASA/White House Vision for Space Exploration is primarily focused on the development of human and robotic systems that will enable ‘discovery-driven’ investigations in areas important to the scientific community: Mars, the solar system's outer moons, and planets orbiting other stars. Such a portfolio can only be realized if NASA is prepared to target investment at opportunities that are most scientifically compelling. NASA's leaders will have to make decisions in subjective and uncertain environments about the relative long-term value of different kinds of scientific discoveries seen as equally important to different groups. A management paradigm of this kind will imply assessment of heterogeneous priorities and management of interdependent and changing requirements. In order to identify the basis and implications of a ‘discovery-driven’ paradigm, this paper surveys the relationship between the Vision's principles and its programmatic content, the objectives of the Vision's scientific focus areas and their interrelationships, and the public context in which science-focused exploration will proceed.     

Technology readiness assessments: A retrospective

The development of new system capabilities typically depends upon the prior success of advanced technology research and development efforts. These systems developments inevitably face the three major challenges of any project: performance, schedule and budget. Done well, advanced technology programs can substantially reduce the uncertainty in all three of these dimensions of project management. Done poorly, or not at all, and new system developments suffer from cost overruns, schedule delays and the steady erosion of initial performance objectives. It is often critical for senior management to be able to determine which of these two paths is more likely—and to respond accordingly. The challenge for system and technology managers is to be able to make clear, well-documented assessments of technology readiness and risks, and to do so at key points in the life cycle of the program.In the mid 1970s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) introduced the concept of “technology readiness levels” (TRLs) as a discipline-independent, programmatic figure of merit (FOM) to allow more effective assessment of, and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies. In 1995, the TRL scale was further strengthened by the articulation of the first definitions of each level, along with examples (J. Mankins, Technology readiness levels, A White Paper, NASA, Washington, DC, 1995. [1]). Since then, TRLs have been embraced by the U.S. Congress’ General Accountability Office (GAO), adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and are being considered for use by numerous other organizations. Overall, the TRLs have proved to be highly effective in communicating the status of new technologies among sometimes diverse organizations.This paper will review the concept of “technology readiness assessments”, and provide a retrospective on the history of “TRLs” during the past 30 years. The paper will conclude with observations concerning prospective future directions for the important discipline of technology readiness assessments.     

Life and intelligence in the universe from nanobiological principles: A survey and budget of concepts and perspectives

The new-born bioscience called Nanobiology has tackled the problems of the possibility of existence of extraterrestrial life and intelligence and of biosystem distribution in the Universe, as such questions actually belong to the realm of Theoretical Biology. The central, and yet unanswered points of such science have been reinvestigated by attempting knowledge and control of the hard-to-determine nanoscale-level classical and quantum interactions, which would supposedly give mechanistic, definite answers, both informationally and energetically, to the vexing questions put by biosystems to science: is the “living state” a physically definible concept, and how to define it? Are nanoscale kinetics or even detailed mechanics involved in the origin of life? What about intelligence, consciousness and their nanophysical roots? Are “life” and “intelligence” engineerable properties, or is any Artificial Intelligence program bound to mere metaphors? Self-organization, studied at the thermodynamic and the hydrodynamic level, showed the possibility of chemical evolution from amino acids, probably of cometary and/or meteoritic origin, up to spatiotemporal organization, autopoiesis and biological evolution, but didn't explain the origins of life. Questioning the uniqueness of the earthly evolutionary chemistry is cardinal for the ETI dilemma, as from a budgetary appraisal of perspectives in bionanoscale chaotic undecidable dynamics, quantum gravity and quantum vacuum, both “living state” and “intelligence” look like nonlocal, spacetime-linked cosmic phenomena.     

Lessons learned from Mir--a payload perspective

Among the principal objectives of the Phase 1 NASA/Mir program were for the United States to gain experience working with an international partner, to gain working experience in long-duration space flight, and to gain working experience in planning for and executing research on a long-duration space platform. The Phase 1 program was to provide the US early experience prior to the construction and operation of the International Space Station (Phase 2 and 3). While it can be argued that Mir and ISS are different platforms and that programmatically Phase 1 and ISS are organized differently, it is also clear that many aspects of operating a long-duration research program are platform independent. This can be demonstrated by a review of lessons learned from Skylab, a US space station program of the mid-1970s, many of which were again “learned” on Mir and are being “learned” on ISS. Among these are optimum crew training strategies, on-orbit crew operations, ground support, medical operations and crew psychological support, and safety certification processes.     

Searching for the magic bullet

A powerful statistical tool, paired-comparison, was tested as a method to determine the relative value American people place on two possibly competing paradigms in the United States Space Program: “Space as a Place to Explore” and “Civil and Commercial Uses of Space”. A limitation of the results, but not the methodology, is the participants were college students, not “voting” adults. Reliability and validity of items were developed and tested in two studies suggesting that the paired-comparison method is a reliable and powerful tool for measuring the relative value the public may place on programs within the US Space Program.     

Informed maintenance for next generation reusable launch systems

Perhaps the most substantial single obstacle to progress of space exploration and utilization of space for human benefit is the safety & reliability and the inherent cost of launching to, and returning from, space. The primary influence in the high costs of current launch systems (the same is true for commercial and military aircraft and most other reusable systems) is the operations, maintenance and infrastructure portion of the program's total life cycle costs. Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) maintenance and design have traditionally been two separate engineering disciplines with often conflicting objectives - maximizing ease of maintenance versus optimizing performance, size and cost. Testability analysis, an element of Informed Maintenance (IM), has been an ad hoc, manual effort, in which maintenance engineers attempt to identify an efficient method of troubleshooting for the given product, with little or no control over product design. Therefore, testability deficiencies in the design cannot be rectified. It is now widely recognized that IM must be engineered into the product at the design stage itself, so that an optimal compromise is achieved between system maintainability and performance.The elements of IM include testability analysis, diagnostics/prognostics, automated maintenance scheduling, automated logistics coordination, paperless documentation and data mining. IM derives its heritage from complimentary NASA science, space and aeronautic enterprises such as the on-board autonomous Remote Agent Architecture recently flown on NASA's Deep Space 1 Probe as well as commercial industries that employ quick turnaround operations. Commercial technologies and processes supporting NASA's IM initiatives include condition based maintenance technologies from Boeing's Commercial 777 Aircraft and Lockheed-Martin's F-22 Fighter, automotive computer diagnostics and autonomous controllers that enable 100,000 mile maintenance free operations, and locomotive monitoring system software.This paper will summarize NASA's long-term strategy, development, and implementation plans for Informed Maintenance for next generation RLVs. This will be done through a convergence into a single IM vision the work being performed throughout NASA, industry and academia. Additionally, a current status of IM development throughout NASA programs such as the Space Shuttle, X-33, X-34 and X-37 will be provided and will conclude with an overview of near-term work that is being initiated in FY00 to support NASA's 2^nd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle Program.     

NASA''s small spacecraft technology initiative “Clark” spacecraft

The Small Satellite Technology Initiative (SSTI) is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) program to demonstrate smaller, high technology satellites constructed rapidly and less expensively. Under SSTI, NASA funded the development of “Clark,” a high technology demonstration satellite to provide 3-m resolution panchromatic and 15-m resolution multispectral images, as well as collect atmospheric constituent and cosmic x-ray data. The 690-Ib. satellite, to be launched in early 1997, will be in a 476 km, circular, sun-synchronous polar orbit. This paper describes the program objectives, the technical characteristics of the sensors and satellite, image processing, archiving and distribution. Data archiving and distribution will be performed by NASA Stennis Space Center and by the EROS Data Center, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, USA.     

Technology readiness and risk assessments: A new approach

Systems that depend upon the application of new technologies inevitably face three major challenges during development: performance, schedule and budget. Technology research and development (R&D) programs are typically advocated based on argument that these investments will substantially reduce the uncertainty in all three of these dimensions of project management. However, if early R&D is implemented poorly, then the new system developments that plan to employ the resulting advanced technologies will suffer from cost overruns, schedule delays and the steady erosion of initial performance objectives. It is often critical for senior management to be able to determine which of these two paths is more likely—and to respond accordingly. The challenge for system and technology managers is to be able to make clear, well-documented assessments of technology readiness and risks, and to do so at key points in the life cycle of the program.Several approaches have been used to evaluate technology maturity and risk in order to better anticipate later system development risks. The “technology readiness levels” (TRLs), developed by NASA, are one discipline-independent, programmatic figure of merit (FOM) that allows more effective assessment of, and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies. Another broadly used management tool is of the “risk matrix”, which depends upon a graphical representation of uncertainty and consequences. However, for the most part these various methodologies have had no explicit interrelationship.This paper will examine past uses of current methods to improve R&D outcomes and will highlight some of the limitations that can arise. In this context, a new concept for the integration of the TRL methodology, and the concept of the “risk matrix” will be described. The paper will conclude with observations concerning prospective future directions for the important new concept of integrated “technology readiness and risk assessments”.     

Legal consequences of a SETI detection

If a detection of ETI takes place, this will in all probability be the result of either: (a) detecting and recognising a signal or other emission of ETI; or (b) the finding of an alien artifact (for instance on the Moon or other Celestial Body of our Solar System); or (c) the highly improbable event of an actual encounter. First and foremost, legal consequences regarding any of these contingencies will result from immediate consultations between nations on Earth. Understandings, memoranda and even agreements might be proposed and/or concluded. Such results within the field of terrestrial law will surely be a new branch of International Law, and particularly of International Space Law. At the same time, terrestrial nations will have to realize that any ETI will be self-determined intelligent individualities or organizations who might have their own understanding of “rules of behaviour” and thus, be legal subjects. Whether one calls such rules “law” or not: if two intelligent races—both of which have specific rules of behaviour—come into contact with each other, the basic understanding of such mutual rules will lead to a kind of “code of conduct”. This might be the starting point for a kind of Law—Metalaw—between different races in the Universe.     

A new paradigm for international cooperation in space exploration

In announcing a new Vision for the US space program, President George Bush committed the USA to “a long-term human and robotic program to explore the solar system”, via a return to the Moon, leading to exploration of Mars and other destinations. He also stated that other nations would be invited to join the vision. Many other nations have, or are developing, ‘exploration visions’ of their own. The potential for international cooperation therefore exists, both at the vision and program/project levels. This paper, based on Working Group discussions as part of an AIAA space cooperation workshop,¹ presents an approach for maximizing the return on all global investments in space exploration. It proposes an international coordination mechanism through which all these various national activities could be integrated into an inherently global enterprise for space exploration, a ‘virtual program of programs’. Within the context of the coordination, individual activities would utilize the full range of cooperative mechanisms for implementation. A significant benefit of this mode of conducting cooperation is that it would not require the negotiation of complex overarching international agreements as a precondition for initiating international activity.     

Improved space safety for astronauts

The 2003 Columbia accident demonstrated that spaceflight remains a risky and dangerous human endeavor, yet there have been few ‘unofficial’ investigations into astronaut safety. This report summarizes the findings of one such study by George Washington University's Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute—e.g. that simplicity of design may be better than complexity, that cargo missions would be better carried out robotically and that all new space transportation systems should be developed to common international standards—before examining ways that international cooperation can advance the cause of space safety. In establishing future space safety standards input from a wider range of participants (industry, universities and private research institutes, as well as space agencies, etc.) will need to be sought.     

Space agencies and the UN system: the Space Agency Forum (SAF) 10th Plenary

The Space Agency Forum (SAF) met for its 10th plenary meeting in Bremen on 30 September 2003. Its motto was “Space Agencies and the UN System”. Following various presentations on relevant issues, including the UN Space Applications Programme and the follow-up of UNISPACE III, SAF members discussed their participation in these fields. The meeting resulted in a number of inputs to these issue areas and coordinated approaches vis-à-vis policy questions.     

A European view on UNISPACE III follow-up

Preparations for the third UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) were intense. The conference itself was a success. But what forms will the follow-up take? Just reading the 150-page report is an effort in itself. Having played a central part in the preparations and organization, Europe fully appreciates the need to build on the spirit of cooperation which emerged from UNISPACE III. In November 1999, the European States gathered to analyze the results of the conference and to set a course for their future participation in the United Nations Programme on Space Applications (UNPSA), which is mainly done through ESA, and for their participation in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which is done through coordination among ESA Member States. This article presents the authors’ personal accounts of the results of the European efforts around UNISPACE III and shows how ‘European foreign policy’ can work in international space policy. It also seeks to illustrate Europe's commitment to putting space technology to work for the benefit of development throughout the world.     

Strategic, technological and ethical aspects of establishing colonies on Moon and Mars

With the vast experience gained by Aerospace Community in the last five decades, the natural future course of action will be to expand Space Exploration. Our understanding of Moon is relatively better with a number of unmanned satellite missions carried out by the leading Space Agencies and manned missions to Moon by USA. Also a number of unmanned satellite missions and surface rover missions were carried out to Mars by those Space agencies generating many new details about Mars. While the future exploration efforts by global community will also be centered obviously on Moon and Mars, it is noteworthy that already NASA had declared its plans for establishing a Surface Base on Moon and developing the technical infrastructure required. Surface Bases on Moon and Mars give rise to a number of strategic, technical and ethical issues both in the process of development, and in the process of establishing the bases. The strategic issues related to Moon and Mars Surface Bases will be centered around development of enabling technologies, cost of the missions, and international cooperation. The obvious path for tackling both the technological development and cost issues will be through innovative and new means of international cooperation. International cooperation can take many forms like—all capable players joining a leader, or sharing of tasks at system level, or all players having their independent programmes with agreed common interfaces of the items being taken to and left on the surface of Moon/Mars. Each model has its own unique features. Among the technical issues, the first one is that of the Mission Objectives—why Surface Bases have to be developed and what will be the activity of crew on Surface Bases? Surface Bases have to meet mainly the issues on long term survivability of humans on the Mars/Moon with their specific atmosphere, gravity and surface characteristics. Moon offers excellent advantages for astronomy while posing difficulties with respect to solar power utilization and extreme temperature variations. Hence the technical challenges depend on a number of factors starting from mission requirements. Obviously the most important technical challenge to be addressed will be in the areas of crew safety, crew survivability, adequate provision to overcome contingencies, and in-situ resource utilization. Towards this, new innovations will be developed in areas such as specialized space suits, rovers, power and communication systems, and ascent and descent modules. The biggest ethical issue is whether humankind from Earth is targeting ‘habitation’ or ‘colonization’ of Moon/Mars. The next question will be whether the in-situ resource exploitation will be only for carrying out further missions to other planets from Moon/Mars or for utilization on Earth. The third ethical issue will be the long term impact of pollution on Moon/Mars due to technologies employed for power generation and other logistics on Surfaces. The paper elaborates the views of the authors on the strategic, technical and ethical aspects of establishing Surface Bases and colonies on Moon and Mars. The underlying assumptions and gray areas under each aspect will be explained with the resulting long-term implications.     

Flight demonstration of new thruster and green propellant technology on the PRISMA satellite

The concept of a storable liquid monopropellant blend for space applications based on ammonium dinitramide (ADN) was invented in 1997, within a co-operation between the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI). The objective was to develop a propellant which has higher performance and is safer than hydrazine. The work has been performed under contract from the Swedish National Space Board and ESA. The progress of the development has been presented in several papers since 2000.ECAPS, a subsidiary of the Swedish Space Corporation was established in 2000 with the aim to develop and market the novel “high performance green propellant” (HPGP) technology for space applications. The new technology is based on several innovations and patents w.r.t. propellant formulation and thruster design, including a high temperature resistant catalyst and thrust chamber.The first flight demonstration of the HPGP propulsion system will be performed on PRISMA. PRISMA is an international technology demonstration program with Swedish Space Corporation as the Prime Contractor.This paper describes the performance, characteristics, design and verification of the HPGP propulsion system for PRISMA. Compatibility issues related to using a new propellant with COTS components is also discussed. The PRISMA mission includes two satellites in LEO orbit were the focus is on rendezvous and formation flying. One of the satellites will act as a “target” and the main spacecraft performs rendezvous and formation flying maneuvers, where the ECAPS HPGP propulsion system will provide delta-V capability.The PRISMA CDR was held in January 2007. Integration of the flight propulsion system is about to be finalized.The flight opportunity on PRISMA represents a unique opportunity to demonstrate the HPGP propulsion system in space, and thus take a significant step towards its use in future space applications. The launch of PRISMA scheduled to 2009.